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 Abstract 
Over the last three decades, Chinese society has experienced dramatic social change. 
China1 is now turning into a global superpower, both economically and militarily but not 
necessarily politically. Western media often embarrass Chinese political leaders for their 
suppression on free speech and deviation from political democracy. This is the wider social 
context in which this thesis locates its enquiries.  
The Chinese media are deeply involved in this social transition. This thesis intends to 
provide an up-to-date investigation into journalistic culture in contemporary China, where 
journalism undergoes political suppression, commercial imperatives, and technological 
upgrades. This thesis examines the key tenets of practising journalism. It focuses on three 
areas: (1) the norms of practising journalism under political suppression, (2) the main 
forms of and roots of journalistic corruption that have brought forth by media 
commercialisation, and (3) the changes and continuities in journalistic practices associated 
with social media. 
This research is mainly based on six individual interviews and six focus group interviews, 
carried out between January 2012 and February 2012 in Beijing and Shanghai. The 
research is also supported by materials gained through personal communication in these 
cities.  
The research concludes that self-censorship and journalistic corruption are two prominent 
features of contemporary Chinese journalism. Social media have brought both changes and 
continuities to journalistic practices and media control methods. In analysing the factors 
shaping contemporary journalism, journalists tend to highlight the impact of traditional 
Chinese culture. This research, however, suggests that culture does not always play a 
determinative role. Political, economic and cultural factors, alongside other elements, all 
contribute to shaping journalism. We need a more dynamic and comprehensive perspective 
in examining journalism, which should be spatial-temporally constructed.  
                                                 
1 China refers to mainland China in this research unless states otherwise. Besides, in this research 
Yuan refers to Chinese currency which can be currently converted into British pounds at the rate: 
100 Yuan=9.62 Pounds. 
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 Introduction 
During Xi, Jinping’s first overseas visit to Russia, the new leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), gained overwhelming support in both traditional media reports 
and online chat-rooms. His appealing public persona and common touch aroused new hope 
for political liberty. However, a vice editor-in-chief of a mass-appeal newspaper 
commented, ‘it is hard for us to join the cheering crowds as the hands on the media are 
choking ever tighter’ (Personal communications No. 10, 24 March 2013). This is just one 
example of the changing environment in which the Chinese media are contextualised. 
Chinese authorities are modernising the ways of media control by combining coercion, 
censorship, propaganda, and spin. My research intends to sketch the key tenets of 
practising journalism in such context.  
This research is based largely on the researcher’s own experience as a political journalist 
for four years in mainland China. During that time, I pondered two questions: why has 
media control always been effective and why do journalists argue for professionalism on 
the one hand but end up with corruption on the other hand. This research is motivated by 
three areas of interest. The first is to explore the norms of practising journalism under tight 
media control. In this area, the common forms of media control will be explored. It is 
generally believed that it is self-censorship that keeps the media in line. The key task of 
this research is to probe what factors induce self-censorship. The second interest centres on 
journalistic corruption. This is a significant aspect of contemporary Chinese journalism, 
but it is highly under-explored. This research intends to investigate the prevalent forms of 
journalistic corruption. The essential aim is to analyse the roots of corruption. The media 
are experiencing dramatic changes worldwide due to the impact of new technology, 
especially social media. Thus, the third interest is to examine the new changes brought 
forth by social media. This is very much a dynamic area characterised by a fast-changing 
media landscape. Thus, this research intends to provide a preliminary observation 
regarding the impact of new technology.   
To these ends, the thesis is structured in two parts. The first part, which includes three 
chapters, constructs the theoretical, historical, and methodological framework within 
which the research has been conducted. The argument of this research is mainly based on 
journalists’ own accounts of their experiences, for they are the agents shaping 
contemporary journalistic culture and also the cornerstones of future Chinese journalism. 
Thus, the analysis relies heavily on interviews. Notably, this research employs focus group 
 interviews in an effort to explore common beliefs and norms shared by the participants. 
Beijing and Shanghai were chosen in this research as the fieldwork sites. These two 
megacities are China’s cultural and economic centres respectively. Choosing the two cities 
is both a theoretical concern and a practical result. From a theoretical point of view, the 
media in the two cities are leading figures in Chinese journalism and are often set as 
exemplars for the media in other cities to follow. Therefore, they are more representative 
of the future of journalism. From a practical view, the researcher used to work in those 
cities, making it easier to access to the interviewees both geographically and 
psychologically.  
The second part, drawing upon the findings in the fieldwork, is divided into three chapters. 
Chapter 4 examines the forms of media control and factors leading to self-censorship. 
Chapter 5 looks at journalistic corruption in great detail. The forms and roots of corruption 
are also explored. The final chapter focuses on the emerging impact of new technology. 
This line of analysis is further developed in the conclusion chapter to identify the key 
tenets of journalistic culture in contemporary Chinese context, which has been drawn on 
the findings of previous chapters. 
Drawing upon journalists’ own experiences, it is hoped that this up-to-date research will 
shed some light on the drivers shaping Chinese journalistic culture. This research is largely 
based on Western media theories to conceptualise Chinese journalism. It is also hoped that 
the fascinating changes occurring in Chinese journalism will enrich media theories through 
its unique practices.   
 
 Part I: Theory, history and methods 
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  Context ....................11	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  Historical	  Analysis.................................................................55	  
	  
Chapter	  Three:	  Methodology.........................................................................77	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Chapter One: Journalism Studies:  
Research and Context 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the dominant themes in journalism studies, drawing upon key 
research from the United Kingdom, the United States, and mainland China, in an attempt 
to construct a conceptual framework to analyse Chinese journalism. It comprises five 
themes: findings from the journalist surveys to explore who journalists are; the concept of 
professionalism; issues around media and source relations; debates about propaganda; and 
the main themes in Chinese journalism research. This chapter concludes by pointing out a 
number of gaps this research intends to fill. Initially this research begins by briefly 
identifying and discussing four key approaches to journalism studies that have emerged 
from previous media and communication research. 
The political economy of communication 
In summarising studies on media sociology, Schudson identifies three key approaches that 
are commonly employed: the political economy of communication, the sociological 
approach, and the cultural approach (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). This 
research adds a further fourth approach, political communication, which is relevant to the 
enquiries of this research. Subsequently, this chapter briefly reviews each approach. The 
first approach, the political economy of communication relates news production with the 
existing power structure in the wider society, especially political and economic forces in 
society (Murdock & Golding, in Curran et al. eds., 1977). The approach primarily 
emphasises the economic foundation of the media (Golding & Murdock, in Curran & 
Gurevitch eds., 2000). Its research agenda centres on the origins and consequences of 
media ownership, media conglomeration, the role of advertising, and so forth (Zhao & 
Xing, in Liu & Hong eds., 2007). For example, this approach argues that an increasing 
number of media outlets are controlled by a limited number of corporations. The economic 
elites who own the media are often aligned with the political elites. Thus, this alignment 
presumably inhibits any radical or grassroots voices. Embracing a critical view, this 
approach puts the inequalities of production, circulation, and consumption in the media 
sphere under the spotlight and argues that the inequalities are entangled with wider social 
inequalities. Furthermore, the inequalities are reproduced and presented as natural by the 
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media (Golding & Murdock, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). In this sense, the news 
media play a hegemonic role by preserving the existing social order.  
This approach is illuminating in examining Chinese media commercialisation (and is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2), whereas it lacks symmetrical attention on the 
impact from the political forces (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). In 
contemporary mainland China, political power, economic power, and professional norms 
all have impacts on news production (Lu & Pan, 2002). Political power, however, plays a 
dominant role. Neither economic power nor professional norms can compete with it (Lin, 
2010a). Chinese media began the process of commercialisation at the beginning of 1980s. 
From then on, the media have been increasingly relying on advertising revenue. In the 
same timeframe, the notion of professionalism was introduced into Chinese journalism and 
the tenets of professionalism, such as objectivity and detachment, began to gain currency. 
The Chinese media commercialisation, however, has its own unique characteristics. The 
political imperative, which is exclusively exerted by the party-state, has always been the 
primary principle of the Chinese media. Therefore, an emphasis on the political side is 
required to explore Chinese journalism. Herein, it is helpful to employ schoalrship on 
political communication.  
Political communication 
Political communication specifically focuses on the dynamics between the political sphere 
and the media sphere. A fruitful research tradition in political communication is to model 
media systems primarily based on the interactions between the media and politics. The 
earliest effort of this kind was made by Siebert et al. (1963), who divided the world’s 
media systems into four models: authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet 
communist. In the authoritarian model, the media are under the control of the government. 
A representative case of the libertarian type is the Anglo-Saxon model, within which the 
media should serve as a free market of ideas. The third model argues that the media should 
provide access to all social groups and be independent from commercial forces. The Soviet 
communist model, taking this name from the former Soviet media system, functions in 
such a way that the media are propaganda and agitation tools of the party-state.  
McQuail (1983) further extended the four into six models with two new categories: 
development and democratic participant. The democratic participant model emphasises 
that minority groups should have equal access to the media and promotes community 
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media. The development model requires more attention here as it resonates with 
contemporary China (Du, 2011). The model is usually seen in transitional societies that are 
undergoing transition from underdevelopment or colonialism to independence, where a 
free-market media cannot be sustained due to a lack of money, infrastructure, and 
audiences (McQuail, 1983). In such societies, the media are supposed to primarily serve 
national development and advocate national solidarity; press freedom comes after 
economic development and social development needs. In some circumstances, the state is 
entitled to intervene and restrict journalistic freedom for its developmental goals (ibid.). 
However, in practice, the development media theory ‘was invoked to justify a repressive 
political system and the arbitrary exercise of political power’ (Curran & Park, in Curran & 
Park eds., 1999: 5). A Chinese daily newspaper, Global Times (huanqiu shibao), based in 
Beijing, is a keen advocate if the development media model. The newspaper argues that 
the national interest and national development are its primary goal, so sometimes reports 
need to be adjusted to meet this goal (Du, 2011).   
The research of Siebert et al. (1963) has pioneered the study of the relationships between 
the media and state. However, harsh criticism has began to accumulate since the early 
1990s. The research was accused of being ethnocentric and parochial (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004; Curran & Park, in Curran & Park eds., 1999). From the 1990s onwards, a growing 
number of media scholars became aware of the limitations of existing media theories, 
which were often conceptualised in the context of Western experiences, particularly 
Anglo-Saxon practices, and called for a de-Westernisation of media theories (Curran & 
Park, in Curran & Park eds., 1999; Downing, 1996). Since then, media studies have 
experienced a subtle shift in recognising media pluralism, emphasising local abilities and 
theorising comparatively (Curran & Park, in Curran & Park eds., 1999).  
Thereafter, Hallin and Mancini made a notable effort to compare media systems across 
national borders in their book Comparing Media Systems (2004). Their research is 
noteworthy in three ways. First, they based their argument on a large quantity of empirical 
data from eighteen countries. Second, they conducted the comparison in a scientific 
manner, designing a four dimensional framework to identify differences between media 
systems. The four dimensions are: ‘the development of media markets; political 
parallelism, that is, the degree and nature of the links between the media and political 
parties; the development of journalistic professionalism; and the degree and nature of state 
intervention in the media system’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 21). According to this 
framework, they proposed three models to differentiate media systems in certain countries: 
Xu, Di 2013   
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• The polarized pluralist model: ‘the news media are similarly characterized by a 
high degree of external pluralism, in which media are seen as champions of diverse 
political ideologies, and commitment to these ideologies tends to outweigh 
commitment to a common professional culture. Ties between journalists and 
political actors are close, the state intervenes actively in the media sector, and 
newspapers emphasize sophisticated commentary directed at a readership of 
political activists’(ibid.: 298). 
• The democratic corporatist model: ‘the media culture is characterized by a 
surviving advocacy tradition that sees the media as vehicles for expression of social 
groups and diverse ideologies, and at the same time by a high level of commitment 
to common norms and procedures. State intervention in the media is extensive, but 
a high value is placed on media autonomy’ (ibid.). 
• The liberal model: the role of the media is more of providing information to 
citizen-consumers and being a watchdog of the government. Journalistic 
professionalism is developed, and government intervention into the media sphere is 
limited.   
 
Last but not least, Hallin and Mancini were very cautious about generalising their models, 
and they repeatedly argued that the models are not universally applicable. In fact, they 
confined the application of the models to North America and Western Europe, claiming 
that for them to ‘fit China onto the triangle defined by [the] three models would simply be 
silly’ (Hallin & Mancini, in Hallin & Mancini eds., 2012: 5). This is a notable contribution 
in media studies that realises the limitations of the notion of the ‘Western media model’. 
Actually, the researchers argued that one of the objectives of their analysis was to: 
demystify the notion of a “Western media model” to some degree, both by 
showing that there is not in fact a unitary “Western model,”  because media 
systems in the Western world have developed according to several distinct 
patterns, and by treating media systems not as abstract ideals but as concrete 
social formations that developed under particular historical conditions (Hallin 
& Mancini, in Hallin & Mancini eds., 2012: 1). 
This objective has been well accomplished and their analysis draws attention to the 
uniqueness of various media systems. Following this, de Burgh (2005) extended the efforts 
of de-Westernising media theories further by compiling various journalistic norms from 
different regions into one book, Making Journalists, in which he argues for recognising 
diverse media models and emphasising the role of culture in shaping journalism (more 
details on this are given later). This section now discusses another approach, the sociology 
of journalism. 
The sociology of journalism 
This approach derives mainly from sociological theories. The key tenet is that news is 
socially constructed (Tuchman, 1978a). The task of sociologists is to unravel the social 
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constraints in the news making process. This approach concentrates on examining news 
organisational constraints, professional norms, media-source relations, and so forth. ‘The 
world is bureaucratically organized for journalists’ (Fishman, 1980: 51). Therefore, the 
allocation of journalists closely resembles the bureaucracy of government. Journalists are 
assigned to different beats to cover the news. The word ‘beat’ originally referred to the 
regular patrol route of a police officer. Applied to journalism, the term ‘beat’ denotes the 
range of topics a journalist is assigned for reporting. Occupying a beat, a journalist can get 
a continuous and steady supply of raw material for news production (Schudson, in Curran 
& Gurevitch eds., 2000). Professional requirements, such as objectivity and detachment, 
further facilitate journalists’ reliance on official sources, for the official sources are 
normally regarded as authoritative and reliable. This entails the perspective of media-
source relations. The heavy reliance of journalists on official sources narrows the spectrum 
of news and erodes the journalistic claim of serving the public interest. 
This chapter delineates theories regarding professionalism and media-source relations. The 
concept of professionalism has been warmly welcomed by Chinese journalists and keenly 
promoted by Chinese media scholars, even though it is an Anglo-Saxon concept. 
Examining what this concept means for and how it is used by Chinese journalists is of both 
theoretical and practical value. In terms of media-source relations, Chinese journalists rely 
heavily on official sources, which is an outcome of tight media control. Yet with the 
flourishing of social media and new communication technologies, it is argued that the 
spectrum of sources, which had been dominated by officials, has been widened (Xiao, in 
Shirk ed., 2011; McNair, 2006). This research intends to explore whether media-source 
relations are changing in the new digital age. 
Cultural studies of journalism 
The cultural approach emphasises the cultural impact on news production (Schudson, in 
Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). This approach intends to find the ‘symbolic determinants 
of news’ (ibid.: 189). For example, a cultural angle is particularly helpful in identifying 
‘generalized images and stereotypes in the news media’ (ibid.). De Burgh (2005) has 
argued that different cultures entail different news models. Some basic journalism concepts 
differ across cultures (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). What counts as news 
is coloured by cultural elements (ibid.). For example, the former Soviet media paid very 
little attention to the events that happened in the prior 24 hours (Mickiewicz, 1988, cited in 
Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000: 192). They focused on reporting long-range 
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political plans and stockpiled stories (ibid.). Moreover, what constitutes news is also 
influenced by culture. Gans (1979) has identified eight core cultural values underpinning 
American news: ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town 
pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, order, and leadership. These eight values are the 
unquestioned and taken-for-granted assumptions through which American news is 
gathered and framed (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000: 192). As a culturally 
and historically rich country, Chinese traditional culture affects journalism in various 
aspects. However, a cultural approach to analyse Chinese journalism is relatively in low 
stock in the existing scholarship. The political point of view and the political economy 
perspective are dominating Chinese journalism research (more details are presented later in 
this chapter). This research intends to include the examination on the role of traditional 
Chinese culture in shaping journalistic practices.  
The above approaches have weaknesses as well (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 
2000). The political economy view focuses on the economic foundation of the media. Its 
underlying assumption is that media ownership affects media content. Yet in some cases, 
the link ‘is not apparent’ (ibid.: 178). For example, a private Spanish press, which adhered 
to ideological purity under the Franco regime, turned to profits priority after the Franco 
period (de Mateo, 1989, cited in Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). 
Furthermore, the blending of state-controlled and market-oriented media makes it more 
difficult to understand by only taking the political economy view (Schudson, in Curran & 
Gurevitch eds., 2000). In the Chinese context, media ownership patterns are not easy to 
define for the media are theoretically owned by the party-state, while operating under 
commercial imperatives (more details are presented in Chapter 2). Therefore, other 
perspectives are needed. 
In examining media-source relations, the sociological view argues that journalists heavily 
rely on officials as sources. This is because the world is bureaucratically set for journalists 
to report and journalists are assigned to cover governmental agencies (Fishman, cited in 
Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). Yet what the sociological view overlooks is 
that the reliance on officials as sources may also be attributed to cultural and historical 
factors. In the case of China, it is a cultural tradition that official information is generally 
viewed as more authoritative than information from other sources. This tradition is also an 
outcome of history. In the feudal period and in the Mao era, due to the control of 
information, official reports were the only available information that could be accessed by 
the public. Therefore, a cultural and historical perspective is needed.  
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De Burgh (2005) has called for the resurgence of the cultural paradigm in examining 
journalism, in which culture is regarded as ‘fundamental and cannot be explained away by 
economics’ (ibid.: 17). He argues that ‘how journalism operates in a given society… is the 
product of culture’ (ibid.). Yet the difficulty in employing this approach is that what 
culture is shows no sign of being settled. Furthermore, culture is ‘difficult to quantify, and 
operates in a highly complex context with psychological, institutional, political, 
geographic, and other factors’ (Harrison, in Harrison & Huntington eds., 2000: xxv).  
Each of the above approaches explores news production in one dimension. An integration 
of the approaches has been called for (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). 
Nonetheless, the integration remains a challenge for journalism research, as systematic 
research combining the approaches has not yet emerged. Moreover, there is no well-
developed framework or practical guidelines on integrating the approaches, and in fact, 
there exists some tension between the approaches. Taking one approach often means 
insulating from the others. For example, in analysing tabloidisation,2 a political economy 
view attributes the phenomenon directly to the commercial incentives of the media (de 
Burgh, 2005; Esser, 1999). However, what journalists have put into tabloids is culturally 
associated (de Burgh, 2005). If taking too rigid one view, it would make the whole picture 
inexplicable (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch, eds., 2000). Besides, all the approaches 
fall short of ‘comparative and historical perspectives’ (Schudson, in Curran & Gurevitch 
eds., 2000: 177). This research intends to provide some comparative and historical 
information that adds depth and range to the existing material in this area. Chapter 2 
explores the history of Chinese journalism. The next part of this section focuses on 
journalist survey findings and data, which allows for a comparison of journalistic culture. 
1.2 Journalist survey research  
To explore the Chinese journalistic culture, it is first necessary to know the composition 
and features of the journalist workforce. The survey research provides comprehensive 
                                                 
2 The term ‘tabloidisation’ refers to a trend in news reporting that downgrades hard news, while 
emphasising scandal, sex, and entertainment news, as well as sensationalising news through the 
use of bold font headlines or illustrations and so forth (see Esser, F. 1999. ‘Tabloidization’ of News: 
a Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American and German Press Journalism, European Journal of 
Communication, 14: 291-324). The term is based on its etymon ‘tabloid’, which originally referred to 
‘a pharmaceutical trademark for the concentrated form of medicines as pill or tablet. This narcotic 
tabloid effect and the fact that it is easy to swallow have been readily transferred to the media’ 
(Esser, 1999: 292). In the early 20th century in London, the word ‘tabloid’ began to refer to the size 
of the newspaper which could be easily folded and read on buses or trains (ibid.). In the present 
day, tabloids represent a type of newspaper, which use eye-catching stories and emphasise 
saleability. 
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information regarding the demographic features of journalists, which helps in providing a 
general picture of who journalists are and how the workforce is changing. Notably, the 
survey findings, obtained by quantitative methods to provide macro-level information, are 
also supplementary to this research, which generally employs qualitative methods to probe 
micro-level information. Furthermore, this research looks at contextual factors, such as 
cultural tradition, in shaping Chinese journalistic culture. A comparison between Anglo-
Saxon journalists and Chinese journalists helps in identifying the differences, which 
facilitates locating the contextual factors. Thus, the following part first reviews the survey 
findings of American and British journalists. 
The U.K. and U.S. journalist surveys 
The following section first looks at the demographic features of journalists. Age, 
education, marital status, gender, and ethnicity have all been explored. The first nationwide 
American journalist survey was conducted in 1971. Modelled on this survey, Weaver and 
colleagues have developed the American journalist survey into a decennial one. Weaver et 
al. (Weaver & Willnat, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012) creatively reported on the 
demographic features of U.S. journalists by portraying the profile of a typical journalist: 
the average U.S. journalist in 2002 was a married White male, just over 40, holding a 
bachelor’s degree. The 2002 survey found that 89 per cent of all journalists held a four-
year college degree, which was significantly higher than the percentage among all adult 
Americans, being only 26 per cent in 2002 (Brownlee & Beam, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 
2012: 352). Moreover, compared with journalists ten years earlier, the U.S. journalists 
were more likely to hold a four-year college degree. The 2001 U.K. survey revealed that 
55 per cent of U.K. journalists were younger than 34 years old; 59 per cent were married; 
49 per cent were women; and 69 per cent had an undergraduate degree (Sanders & Hanna, 
in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012: 225-28). A comparison of the 2001 survey and the 1995 
survey (Henningham & Delano, in Weaver ed., 1998) showed a notable rise in the 
proportion of women and undergraduate degree holders, with a 24 per cent and 20 per cent 
increase respectively. It is suggested that these increases were due to changes in the higher 
education system (Sanders & Hanna, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012: 225-28).  
Working conditions, working hours, income, job satisfaction, and career commitment have 
all been examined. Survey data imply a deterioration of working conditions nowadays with 
a shrinking number of journalists working longer hours than before. The U.K. survey 
showed that the average number of working hours per week for British journalists was 41.6 
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compared with 35 as an average for all occupations in 2001 (Sanders & Hanna, in Weaver 
& Willnat eds., 2012: 229). Meanwhile, due to economic and technological challenges, the 
journalist workforce is downsizing. A retrospective estimation of the number3 of U.S. full-
time journalists through the decades illustrates the trend (see figure 1).                      
Figure 1 The trend of the U.S. journalist workforce size4 
 
 
Sources: * (Johnstone et al., cited by Weaver, in Weaver et al. eds., 2007: 1)  
** (Weaver, in Weaver et al. eds., 2007: 1) 
*** (The State of the News Media, 2013) 
     
As shown above, from 1971 to 1992, the estimated number of U.S. journalists was rising. 
In 2002, the number dropped slightly, and in 2012 the number decreased sharply. 
‘Newspaper newsroom cutbacks in 2012 have brought the industry down 30 per cent since 
2000 in the U.S.’ (The State of the News Media, 2013). Heavy job cuts also hit British 
journalism. Since 2006, at least ‘3,500 editorial/journalism jobs have been lost in 
television, radio, and in the regional and local newspaper sector in Britain’ (Sanders & 
Hanna, in Weaver & Willnat ed., 2012: 223). The reasons are complex, but the two most 
                                                 
3 It is difficult to identify the exact number of journalists in the U.S. and the U.K. for four reasons. 
First, journalists are not licensed by any authorities, and so there are no nationwide organisations 
to track the workforce data. Second, although memberships in professional groups may be 
indicative of the journalist workforce, not all journalists like to join professional groups. Third, 
journalism is in turbulence nowadays with constant job-cuts. Therefore, the workforce size is 
comparatively more dynamic than in previous times. Last but not least, who qualifies as a journalist 
is highly debated. The line between journalist and audience has been significantly blurred by new 
journalistic genres, such as user-generated content, amateur journalists, and citizen journalists. 
Different surveys employ different parameters to define journalists. For example, the 1997 U.K. 
survey estimated that the total number of journalists was 31,596 during 1995-1997, whereas the 
2001 U.K. survey estimated 60,000 to 70,000 that year. Sanders and Hanna (in Weaver & Willnat 
ed., 2012: 224) argued that it was unlikely that the U.K. journalist workforce nearly doubled within 6 
years. Therefore, the gap between numbers was probably due to methodological differences. As a 
result, this research merely reports on the U.S. workforce trend based on the decennial surveys of 
Weaver et al., for they have employed a consistent definition of journalist. 
4 Journalist was defined as full-time workers with editorial responsibilities in U.S. English-language 
mainstream news media in the 1971 survey. The 1982, 1992, 2002 surveys are modelled on the 
1971 survey, which facilitates the comparison of survey data. 
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prominent are the economic downturn and the impact of new technology (more details in 
Chapter 6). 
The U.S. and U.K. journalists appear to be far more satisfied than dissatisfied with their 
jobs. The 2002 U.S. survey showed that 84 per cent of journalists were at least fairly 
satisfied with their jobs, and 77 per cent intended to stay in the business for the next five 
years (Brownlee & Beam, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012: 354). The 2001 U.K. survey 
found that 78 per cent were content with their work, and the majority planned to remain in 
journalism (Sanders & Hanna, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012: 229). Given the job losses 
in some newsrooms, it is suggested that job satisfaction and job commitment may be due 
to a lack of other job opportunities (Brownlee & Beam, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012: 
354).  
The situation in terms of salaries is mixed. By and large, journalism is not a well-paid job 
compared with, for example, doctors and lawyers. The 2001 U.K. survey showed that the 
median annual salary of journalists was £22,500 that year (Sanders & Hanna, in Weaver & 
Willnat eds., 2012: 229). It is reported that 50 per cent of journalists were satisfied with 
their salary, and 48 per cent were dissatisfied (ibid.). Yet according to the research of the 
National Union of Journalists, nearly half of all British journalists earned less than the 
nation’s average wage. Moreover, the starting rate for journalists was £7,000, much lower 
than the median starting rate for graduates (ibid.). A similar situation is reported in the U.S. 
as well. In 2012, the median annual starting salary of journalism graduates was $32,000, 
over $10,000 lower than that of all 2012 graduates, $42,666 (Becker et al., 2013). The 
relatively low starting rate may require new journalists to have other financial sources of 
income (more discussion on this given later). Another impact is that journalists may look 
for freelance jobs to supplement their incomes. The 2012 U.S. survey reported that 43.3 
per cent were working part-time jobs on the side (Becker et al., cited in Boyles, 2013). 
This may endanger the quality of reporting and the integrity of the work.  
A notable concern is the socio-economic backgrounds of journalists. The 2001 U.K. 
journalist survey shows that 68 per cent of new entrants to journalism came from a 
professional or managerial family background (Sanders & Hanna, in Weaver & Willnat 
eds., 2012: 226). A possible reason for this could be that media jobs usually require several 
months of internships that are often unpaid, which may deter some graduates with low 
budgets from entering this sector, meaning that media jobs are more obtainable for better-
financed graduates (ibid.). This has raised two concerns. First, as journalists are more 
Xu, Di 2013   
 
21 
likely to come from a higher social class, they may be less concerned with working class 
people (Schudson, 2011). Second, journalists and politicians tend to belong to the same 
microcosm, and the intertwining of their lives may foster similar narrow views (ibid.). In-
depth interviews conducted with journalists working at Westminster in the U.K. further 
confirmed the concern revealing that ‘40 per cent of political journalists have frequent 
lunches with politicians and almost 60 per cent consider at least one politician as a friend’ 
(van Dalen & van Aelst, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012: 518). This may pose a danger to 
journalistic detachment, plurality, and democracy. The next section discusses the results of 
survey data that has examined the journalistic culture of Chinese journalists.  
Chinese journalist surveys 
In the last two decades, mainland China has been undergoing dramatic social changes, 
which have had a profound influence on journalists. A comparison of the findings 
regarding the basic aspects of journalists in different surveys (Zhang & Su, in Weaver & 
Willnat eds., 2012; Lin, 2010a; Lu & Yu, 2003a, 2003b; Yu, 1998; Chen et al., in Weaver 
ed., 1998) may provide a comprehensive understanding of the trends and changes as shown 
in the figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Trends and changes in Chinese journalists5 
 
Sources: Data extracted from five surveys (Chen et al., in Weaver ed., 1998; Yu, 1998; Lu & Yu, 2003a; Lin, 
2010a; Zhang & Su, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012) (sources are listed as the same order as the surveys 
listed above).  
 
By and large, Chinese journalists are getting younger and better educated, resembling the 
trends of American and British journalists. They are more likely to be female and less 
likely to be Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members. The rise of female journalists and 
educational level may be an outcome of the changes in the higher education system since 
the 1980s (Lu & Yu, 2003a).  
The other two notable changes are in age and CCP membership. The two nationwide 
surveys in 1997 and 2010 showed that the average age dropped from 37.4 to 33.1. The 
median age also dropped from 34.9 in the 1995 nationwide survey to 31 in the 2005 
Guangzhou survey. It is suggested that the drop may be related to structural changes in the 
media industry. Since the mid-1990s, new entrants have flooded into the Chinese media 
market standing as mass-appeal newspapers (dazhonghua baokan/shichanghua baokan). 
They are inclined to recruit and promote younger staff, which may pull down the average 
age of the workforce (Lin, 2010a). A concomitant to a younger generation of journalists is 
the relatively shorter amount of work experience.  
 
                                                 
5 ‘N’ refers to nationwide survey; ‘SH’ and ‘GZ’ refers to Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. The 2002 SH 
and 2005 GZ survey reported statistics from print media only; whereas, the three nationwide surveys reported 
figures from both print and broadcasting media. The year refers to the time when the survey was conducted. 
Age figures of the 1995 N and 2005 GZ survey are median; and others are mean. The figure for education 
refers to the proportion of people who hold a bachelor’s degree or above. The percentage of majors in 
journalism refers to people majoring in journalism out of all people holding a bachelor’s degree or above. The 
figure of CCP membership reflects the proportion of journalists who are members of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).  
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Figure 3 Trend of working experience 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: (Zhang & Su, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012; Yu, 1998) 
 
As clearly shown in figure 3, journalists with richer work experience are dwindling, while 
relatively inexperienced journalists are increasing. To be a journalist is increasingly a short 
and transitional job. When getting older, journalists prefer to find other more lucrative and 
more stable jobs. Therefore, journalists are becoming less committed and more short-term 
in their career (Zhang & Su, in Weaver & Willnat eds., 2012). This marks a significant 
change with profound implications, which unfortunately is under-exploited in survey 
studies, leaving a gap for this research to fill.  
The changes in CCP membership are also noteworthy. The number of journalists that are 
members of the CCP has decreased from 54 per cent in the 1995 national survey (Chen et 
al., in Weaver ed., 1998) to 38.4 per cent in the 2005 Guangzhou survey (Lin, 2010a). At 
face value, the drop may indicate a loosening bond between journalists and the governing 
party. These changes, however, do not mean that political freedom is more tangible in the 
media sector. The 1995 nationwide survey indicates that ‘job rank has the strongest 
association with the CCP membership’ (Chen et al., in Weaver ed., 1998: 21), and 89 per 
cent of the top-level executives and 80 per cent of the mid-level directors were party 
members (ibid.). CCP membership remains a key factor leading to promotion.  
In terms of job satisfaction, the survey findings generally show that Chinese journalists are 
content with and proud of their jobs. It is reported that 64.29 per cent of journalists were 
satisfied or very satisfied with their work (Lin, 2010a). Lu (2004) insightfully explained 
that the relatively high evaluation on job autonomy did not indicate the degree of press 
freedom or professionalism. Instead, it was a result of self-adjustment, where a number of 
journalists have adjusted themselves to the existing system in order to justify their jobs and 
gain career achievement within the bureaucracies. However, Lu did not provide in-depth 
descriptions about how individuals accommodated to the existing order, which leaves a 
vacuum for this research to fill (more discussion in Chapter 4). Another possible 
explanation could be that journalists ‘have their eyes on both the past and the future’ (Chan 
et al., 2004: 266). Journalists may think the media environment has improved compared 
with the past in the Mao era and will continue to improve in the future (ibid.).  
Items Working in the media sector  
for 11 years and over 
Working in the media sector 
for 5 years or less 
The 1997 nationwide survey 48.4% 28.8% 
The 2010 nationwide survey 33.2% 38.6% 
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Furthermore, journalists also responded positively to questions about job autonomy with 
65 per cent of journalists somewhat agreeing or completely agreeing that they had a great 
deal of autonomy at work (Chen et al., in Weaver ed., 1998). This also poses a paradox 
with the reality that the party-state constantly suppresses the media. A possible explanation 
from Chan et al. (2004: 266) suggests that ‘journalists are no longer the idealistic 
enthusiasts that they were in the 1980s’. A significant number of journalists have turned 
into materialists who concern more for material gains than journalism independence. 
Survey studies have provided the same finding: journalists are least satisfied with their 
payments and benefits (Zhang & Su, in Weaver and Willnat eds., 2012; Chan et al., 2004; 
Lu, 2003; Yu, 1998). Journalists also put payments as their top stress factors (Zhang & Su, 
in Weaver and Willnat eds., 2012). Unlike the U.S. and U.K. journalists who were paid 
less compared with the average level of the whole working population (as discussed 
previously), Chinese journalists were generally well paid. For instance, in Shanghai in 
2002 the average monthly salary of journalists was three times compared with that of 
Shanghai urban workers (Lu & Yu, 2003a). The discrepancy between journalists’ concern 
about payments and their comparatively better income may be due to their unmet 
expectations (Chan et al., 2004). This explanation, however, is a scholarly guess, which 
should be testified by journalists themselves. Furthermore, the payment conditions of 
Chinese journalists may have implicit connections with unethical practices, which is 
lacking in the existing scholarship.  
Journalism ethics occupy an important place in Chinese journalist surveys. Yu (1998) 
reported a number of pervasive corrupt forms of conduct, such as the acceptance of gifts, 
free meals and free travel, favourable reporting in exchange for advertisements, asking for 
cash for publicity, taking bribes, and so forth. Five years later, the Shanghai survey showed 
that the scale and extent of journalistic corruption was even worse with an increasing 
number of journalists even more tolerant of unethical behaviour (Lu & Yu, 2003d). 
Unfortunately, almost all survey studies were vague about the reasons behind corruption. 
The contemporary situation and roots of corruption deserve thorough investigation, which 
this research intends to work on and discusses in Chapter 5. The next part of this chapter 
reviews sociological research that has centred on the concept of professionalism within 
journalistic culture. 
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1.3 Professionalism 
Debates around the concept of professionalism offer an interesting perspective that allows 
us to examine contemporary Chinese journalists. How the concept has been adapted to the 
Chinese context, and for what Chinese journalists use it, may enrich scholarly 
understanding about the concept. This can be also seen as an effort to de-Westernise media 
theories by providing evidence from non-Western countries (Curran & Park, in Curran & 
Park eds., 1999). This section begins by exploring the difficulties in defining it. The 
second part looks at professionalism in the case of journalism. The third part reviews 
scholarship regarding Chinese journalistic professionalism.  
The problem of definition 
The research into professions is very much centred on how to define it. The earlier 
literature was dominated by a trait approach, which listed a set of attributes to differentiate 
a profession from an occupation. Millerson had provided a list of twenty-three elements, 
the core of which were ‘skills based on theoretical knowledge; the provision of training 
and education; the testing of the competence of the members of the profession; 
organisation; adherence to the professional code of conduct; altruistic service’ (Millerson, 
cited in Tumber & Prentoulis, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 59). The problem with listing, 
however, is that researchers cannot reach a consensus regarding the core elements. Another 
approach is to subdivide the stages of professionalisation. Based on American evidence, 
Wilensky (cited in Tumber & Prentoulis, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 60) identified five stages 
of professionalisation:  
• The emergence of a full-time occupation 
• The establishment of a training school 
• The founding of a professional association 
• Political agitation directed towards the protection of the association by law 
• The adoption of a formal code 
 
This approach views professions in a more specific and dynamic light. Yet still obscure is 
the end-state of professions, towards which an occupation may be moving (Freidson, in 
Dingwall & Lewis eds., 1983: 21). Additionally, scholarly literature up to this time had 
neglected professions’ wider contract with society (Dingwall, in Dingwall & Lewis eds., 
1983: 7).  
Xu, Di 2013   
 
26 
The work of Elliott (1972) links the development of a profession with the changes in class 
system. He suggested two phases of professions in Britain’s history: the status profession 
in pre-industrial society and the occupational profession in post-industrial society (Elliott, 
1972). The representative cases of the former are the original learned professions of 
medicine, law, and the clergy (including university teaching) (Freidson, in Dingwall & 
Lewis eds., 1983). Such professions achieved high social status primarily because of their 
associations with the gentleman class. Expertise was not a concern. The most crucial factor 
for a profession was that ‘only man of the necessary social standing could get access’ 
(Elliott, 1972: 30). After the Industrial Revolution, members of the emerging middle class 
began careers as architects, accountants, and so forth. These new occupations queued up 
for the title of ‘profession’ and Elliott refers to these new aspirants as ‘occupational 
professions’ (1972: 16). It is important for such occupations to gain recognition as a 
‘profession’ in that the title can be translated into social prestige and was also crucial in 
negotiating for ‘a state-sanctioned market shelter’ (Freidson, in Dingwall & Lewis eds., 
1983: 24, original emphasis). Such a claim is also reflective of the social demands of the 
new middle class. This research explores how the term, profession, was introduced into 
mainland China in Chapter 2. The term firstly appeared in university classrooms in the 
early 1980s when China started its reform and opening-up policy. It was fuelled by 
political reforms in the 1980s and then suppressed after the Tiananmen Square incident in 
1989. The following part analyses professionalism in the case of journalism. 
Professionalism in the case of journalism 
The tenets of journalistic professionalism include objectivity, detachment, and 
independence (Huang, 2005). Scholarly writings mainly centre on two themes: whether or 
not journalism is a profession and how journalistic professionalism is used in practice. The 
following paragraphs firstly discuss the former theme. 
The debate about journalism as a profession 
Whether journalism is a profession or not is very much in debate. Journalists are keen to 
embrace it, whereas scholars are equally keen to question it. The survey is extensively used 
to explore whether shared professional norms or values are in place, allowing us to judge 
whether journalism is a profession. By comparing the findings of 31 journalist surveys 
conducted in various parts of the world, Weaver et al. (2012) argued that universal 
journalistic culture and shared professional values have not yet emerged. Thus, journalism 
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as a profession is under-developed. Yet Splichal and Sparks (1994: 40) claimed that 
journalism in a number of countries ‘would be well on the road to professionalisation’ 
based on the striking similarity among journalism students in arguing for journalistic 
independence and autonomy. The Chinese journalists survey also reported that journalists 
are becoming professionals (Lu, 2003), as they hold consensus on professional values: 
objectivity, impartiality, and accuracy. Although the conclusions are different, they are all 
based on the same underlying assumption: a shared value is an indicator of a profession. 
This is, however, only one indicator of a profession, which is not sufficient to make a 
definite conclusion.  
Another approach is to evaluate journalism based on traits by drawing from classic 
professions, such as medicine. As discussed previously, licensing systems, shared 
professional values, professional associations, theory-based expertise, and codes of 
conduct are generally regarded as parameters. Journalism therefore presents a number of 
difficulties as a profession. First and foremost, journalists themselves often do not want to 
be licensed, certificated or classified by any official authorities (Weaver, in de Burgh ed., 
2005: 44). No licence is the key deficiency in differentiating journalists from other 
occupations. Second, journalists have less interest in joining professional organisations 
(Weaver & Wilhoit, in Weaver & Wilhoit eds., 1986: 127-8). Third, journalism is not 
based on any systematic theory. A considerable number of theories from other subjects are 
borrowed to fill the textbooks. The statistics of seven journalism and communication 
textbooks reveal that 249 theories are entitled as communication theories, with only 7 per 
cent mentioned in three or more textbooks and 195 out of the 249 theories only mentioned 
in one textbook (Anderson, 1996, cited in Wu, 2009a: 6). This situation indicates that there 
is no consensus on the core theories of journalism and communication. Additionally, 
journalism as a subject is still struggling to legitimise itself along with law and medicine in 
the college stance (Tumber and Prentoulis, in de Burgh ed., 2005). In some outstanding 
universities, journalism is seen as sub knowledge either affiliated to humanities school or 
to sociology school. Additionally, a degree in journalism is often optional (Hallin, in 
Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000: 220). In fact, only 36 per cent of American journalists held 
a journalism degree; and the proportion in Britain is only 4 per cent (Weaver, in de Burgh 
ed., 2005: 47-8). Moreover, a journalism degree has no added value to career routes 
(Elliott, in Curran et al. eds.,1977) and an emphasis on practical skills brings journalism 
closer to a craft than a profession (Tumber & Prentoulis, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 58).  
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This is the case in Britain, where there exist no accepted career routes, entry requirements, 
and self-policing systems (Marr, 2004). In the United States, however, journalism as a 
profession has ‘mostly succeeded’ (ibid.: 3). American journalism graduates are moulded 
by standards and in return are achieving social status (ibid.). From its origin, British 
journalism has been closer to a trade than to a profession. In the 17th and 18th centuries, 
British journalism was performed by young people coming from lower classes with limited 
education. They normally obtained practical skills through a long period of apprenticeship 
with low payment. Since Victorian times, the status of journalism began to rise due to 
wider social reforms, such as the abolition of stamp duty and the emergence of mass 
democracy, and particularly an alliance with politics. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
the National Union of Journalists was set up, which was first and foremost a trade union 
rather than a professional organisation, focusing on labour issues (Marr, 2004; Splichal & 
Sparks, 1994). Around the 1950s, the national journalists training body was formed. 
Journalism was becoming a ‘semi-profession’ (Marr, 2004: 35). In the present day, British 
journalists are rather cynical and sceptical about their jobs. Interestingly, journalists call 
themselves ‘hacks’ (Marr, 2004). ‘Hack’ is a shortened word for hackney, which originally 
referred to an easy-riding horse. Applied to journalism, it deprecates journalists’ work as 
short-written and low-quality merely for payment. Even elite journalists such as Andrew 
Marr, working for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), would call his own job a 
trade rather than a profession.  
The majority of journalists, however, still strive for the professional title. An important 
ideological basis supporting journalism’s self-assertion as a profession is that journalism 
holds a special place in democracy. Journalism provides vital and neutral information to 
serve the public interest, which is crucial to maintaining a healthy democracy (Schudson, 
2008). This argument, however, encounters a number of discrepancies in practice. First, 
contemporary media organisations, which are often privately owned, are highly 
commercialised, emphasising profit rather than serving the public interest (McNair, 2009; 
Hallin, in Curran & Gurevitch eds., 2000). Second, existing scholarship generally indicates 
that news can never be neutral (Taylor & Willis, 1999). Raw materials are first 
bureaucratically set for journalists to gather. Then journalists’ subjective views, news 
organisations’ commercial interests, and other social forces all colour the news (Gans, 
1979; Tuchman, 1978a, 1978b; Tuchman, 1972; White, 1950). In fact, the notion of 
objectivity grants more to journalists than to the general public. Journalists employ a 
number of skills and procedures, such as presenting both sides of the story in structuring 
facts, and using ‘quotation marks’ to indicate their objective standpoint. The stories, 
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however, are predominantly provided by the officials, and both sides of the stories are 
‘within the legitimated opposition of political parties or branches of government’ 
(Tuchman, 1978b: 110). Thus, objectivity becomes a ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman, 1972: 
660), which functions as a bulwark for journalists to counter back critics (Tuchman, 1978a; 
1978b; 1972). The following part explores what professionalism means for journalists and 
how it is used. 
Professionalism as a control mechanism  
Journalistic professionalism is actually ‘a double-edged sword’ (Soloski, 1989: 218). On 
the one hand, professionalism can be interpreted as cultural capital (Aldridge & Evetts, 
2003). News judgement is a key constituent of this capital, which differentiates newsmen 
as professionals from ordinary people as laymen. Thus, the selection of materials can be 
labelled as selecting suitable news for the public good. Not only do professions presume to 
tell the rest of their society what is good and right for it, but they can also set the very 
terms of thinking about problems that fall in their domain (Dingwall, in Dingwall and 
Lewis eds., 1983: 5). Scholars have found that professionalism also empowers journalists 
to thwart interventions from management on the claim that journalism as a profession must 
be independent. News organisations could also employ the same claim to counter back 
interventions from different social forces.  
On the other hand, professionalism provides an efficient framework to control journalists. 
Soloski pointed out two ways of control through professionalism: first, it sets standards 
and norms of behaviour, and second, it determines a professional reward system (1989: 
212). The first way can be achieved through professional training or education. 
Additionally, a shared cognitive base also facilitates the control. For instance, objectivity is 
widely accepted as the most important professional norm, which requires journalists to 
hold back their own thoughts and follow standardised writing styles, such as the inverted 
pyramid structure and using direct quotes. Thus, journalists’ personalities and creativities 
are tuned according to the shared professional norms. Challenges and any radical changes 
to this shared value system are often considered as deviant from professionalism. Writing 
styles, however, as well as meeting deadlines are more organisational needs than 
professional requirements (Elliott, in Curran et al. eds., 1977). As mentioned previously, 
objectivity may protect news organisations from legal charges. Moreover, the monopolistic 
status of news organisations will not be threatened as long as they claim they are reporting 
objectively.  
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The second means of control is to prescribe a professional ladder for journalists. To get 
promoted, journalists must abide by individual organisational policies. Conforming to 
companies’ policies is simulated as the requirement of professionalism (Aldridge & Evetts, 
2003). Additionally, managers and superiors are normally regarded as more professional 
than subordinates, as are their work judgements. Thus, disobedience to managers and 
superiors can be translated as unprofessional or making one unfit for the job. Therefore, 
bureaucratic control is implemented by the virtue of professionalism (ibid.). Furthermore, 
Soloski (1989) reported an interesting finding from participant observations in the 
newsroom. Individual news organisations had policies regarding their own taboo topics. 
Journalists generally accepted such policies as part of their professional tasks and found 
them not to undermine their ability to inform citizens. In light of this, the wider social 
control laid upon news organisations is internalised into organisational control and further 
becomes a professional requirement taken for granted by journalists. Additionally, to 
achieve professional fame and justify their professional status, journalists continuously 
adjust themselves to the individual working environment. Therefore, the self-control 
mechanism is provoked unconsciously yet actively by journalists themselves. ‘The 
discipline of selves has become the self-discipline, where the key controls are internalized 
and proactive rather than external and reactive’ (Aldridge & Evetts, 2003: 556). This is 
very much illustrative of Chinese journalism which is discussed later. The following part 
looks at scholarship regarding Chinese journalistic professionalism. 
Chinese journalistic professionalism 
American and British scholars are rather critical of journalistic professionalism, whereas 
Chinese scholars regard it emancipatory for Chinese journalism (Wu, 2009a; Lu, 2003; 
Pan & Chan, 2003; Lu & Pan, 2002). This existing scholarship is highly concentrated on 
one theme: the logic of professionalism versus the logic of party propaganda. 
Professionalism is emancipatory in that it stands as a direct competitor to party journalism 
(Pan & Chan, 2003), the latter of which stresses that the media are the mouthpiece of the 
ruling party. Professionalism advocates objective and detached reporting, aimed at 
delivering impartial information, whereas party journalism emphasises an intervening way 
of reporting in order to spread propaganda and mobilise people (ibid.). Thus, idealistically, 
professionalism helps to wipe propaganda information away from news reporting. In 
reality, however, ‘the professional logic is not strong enough to oppose the political logic’ 
Xu, Di 2013   
 
31 
(Lin, 2010a: 421). This invokes the question why is professionalism still gaining 
popularity among Chinese journalists and for what it is used. 
Based on survey data, Lin (ibid.) finds a double paradox when Chinese journalists employ 
professionalism. First, when encountering conflicts involving political, legal, or economic 
concerns, Chinese journalists embrace professionalism. They do not actively engage in 
action, even though they possess liberal attitudes. Second, when confronted with moral or 
cultural issues, Chinese journalists tend to discard professionalism. For instance, a quarter 
of respondents in the survey admitted being involved in paid journalism, which is 
obviously against ethical standards. The research has discovered interesting phenomena for 
further exploration. In this short journal article, Lin did not provide contextual 
explanations, such as what the conflicts are with political or cultural concerns. Moreover, 
the reason behind these paradoxes is obscure. This research intends to fill in the gaps.  
The above research takes the connotation of Anglo-Saxon journalistic professionalism to 
examine journalism in the Chinese setting. The problem is that professionalism denotes 
different things in the two settings. In a brilliant study of Chinese journalistic 
professionalism, Lu and Pan (2002) find that the tenets of professionalism are deliberately 
handpicked to constitute its Chinese version. Professionalism was imported into mainland 
China in the early 1980s. Unlike their American and British counterparts who promoted 
the concept themselves, Chinese journalists learned it from university classrooms. From 
then on, objectivity and impartiality began to be adopted by journalists as the new way of 
news reporting (Zhao, 1998). Compared with professionalism originated in Anglo-Saxon 
settings, the Chinese version is fragmented. Operational skills, such as the inverted 
pyramid writing style and the use of quotation marks, are adopted, whereas the essence of 
serving the public interest is discarded. The main reason is obviously related to coercion 
from the party-state, for the party still manipulates the media in its own favour. 
Furthermore, a number of scholars emphasise that the Chinese version of professionalism 
is a mixture of Chinese traditional culture and journalistic skills (Lin, 2010b; Rui, 2010; 
Wu, 2009a; Lu, 2004; Lu & Pan, 2002). Chinese journalists generally regard themselves as 
traditional intellectuals, or the literati, who prioritise the nation’s interests over individual’s 
rights (Lin, 2010b; Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005). Thus, when confronted with political 
orders, cultural elements work as a ‘convenient expedience’ (Lin, 2010b: 181) to resolve 
the paradox between professionalism and party journalism through translating political 
orders into national interest issues. This is insightful research but it lacks in-depth 
description. What cultural elements are evoked, to what extent does culture play a role, and 
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how do journalists adjust themselves in this paradox all demand further investigation. This 
research directly addresses these key questions in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The tenets of professionalism argue that journalists should be independent from any social 
power. The media should serve as the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1962) or the ‘free market 
of ideas’ (Schudson, 1981). The ideal role of the media is not the focus of this research. 
These ideals, however, are what media scholars expect. In reality journalists heavily rely 
on officials as news sources (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). In the Chinese context, media 
control further exacerbates the reliance of journalists on official sources. Yet, new 
communication technology, such as social media, seems to have weakened this reliance 
and changed journalistic culture (Xiao, in Shirk ed., 2011; McNair, 2006). In order to 
explore the changes, a theoretical perspective of media-source relations is needed. The 
next part of this chapter discusses media-source relations. 
1.4 Media-source relations  
The relationship between the media and sources is ‘a key issue’ in the study of media 
sociology (Schlesinger, in Ferguson ed., 1989: 61). Gans has argued that studying the 
source ‘is the best way, or perhaps the only one, to connect the study of journalism to the 
larger society’.6 The source, in narrow terms, refers to information providers. Gans (1979) 
regards sources as actors whom journalists observe or interview, including interviewees 
and those supplying background information or suggestions. The current focus of media-
source relations emphasises the reliance on officials as sources (Hall et al., 1978; Sigal, 
1973). Such a reliance may have consequences on the news content transmitted to 
audiences. This section reviews three pieces of research which represent three distinctive 
views in this research area.  
Journalists and sources undergo mutual selection in everyday practices. Journalists receive 
raw materials provided by various agents who are potential sources. According to certain 
criteria, such as news values and organisational policies, journalists select and edit some 
materials into news and then the agents who provided them can become news sources. The 
agents also select journalists to get their materials publicised. Agents may prefer journalists 
                                                 
6 The quote was originally a personal correspondence between Schlesinger P. and Gans H. (22 
July 1988), obtained from Schlesinger, P. & Tumber, H. (1994) Reporting Crime: the Media Politics 
of Criminal Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press.  
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who work for prestigious media organisations. They may also select journalists with whom 
have personal ties for personal concerns.  
Gans (1979) provided a systematic and thorough study on media-source relations in which 
he identified two basic aspects constituting the relations. On the one hand, to become 
potential sources, information providers must meet four conditions: incentives, power, the 
ability to supply suitable information, and geographic and social proximity. To be specific, 
information providers must have incentives to become sources. Power, which is both an 
outcome and an ingredient of the hierarchies in society, in general terms, rests with one’s 
social status. Power largely affects whether one can get access to journalists. For example, 
the president has instantaneous access to all news media, whereas the powerless must 
resort to civil disturbances to obtain it (Gans, 1979: 120-121). In addition, potential 
sources that could provide newsworthy and least-checking information have better chances 
of becoming sources. Furthermore, they must be socially and geographically close to 
journalists. Journalists, on the other hand, evaluate sources’ suitability based on their past 
suitability, productivity, reliability, trustworthiness, authoritativeness, and articulateness. 
Public officials are assumed to be reliable, authoritative and can provide official 
information on a regular basis. Moreover, official information normally requires the least 
checking which appeals to journalists. Thus, it is availability and suitability that makes 
public officials the most frequent and regular sources. Notably, mutual selection between 
journalists and sources is normally asymmetrical in that more often sources lead 
journalists, especially when sources have certain power. Furthermore, sources, according 
to Gans (1979), provide information as members or representatives of organised and 
unorganised interest groups as well as larger sectors of a nation and society. It is, therefore, 
essential to investigate for whom sources act and speak.  
Gans has pointed out the asymmetrical relationship between the media and their sources. 
Hall et al. (1978) take one step further suggesting a structured view of media-source 
relations. Hall et al. (1978) suggest that the structure of sources is hierarchical. Those in 
powerful and privileged institutional positions are believed to have more accurate and 
specialised information so their views are supposed to be more credible and convincing. 
This is exactly the case in what Becker has called the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ (1967: 
243). They are regarded as ‘accredited sources’ on whom the media rely. Under the 
professional demands of being objective and the constant pressure to meet deadlines, 
journalists normally resort to ‘accredited sources’, which facilitates preferential access to 
the media for those in power. Therefore, they can establish an initial definition of 
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controversial topics to the public. The result of this structured preference in giving 
opinions on the media is that those in power become the ‘primary definers’ of topics (Hall 
et al., 1978: 58). The media, therefore, in a structured relationship with sources, plays a 
secondary role in constructing reality by reproducing the definitions of the powerful. 
Therefore, the ideas of the ruling class become the ruling ideas. In light of this, the media 
implements their ideological function by reinforcing the existing power structure in 
society’s institutional order (Hall et al., 1978: 58-59).  
The research of Hall et al. is insightful, yet the boundaries of primary definers are still 
obscure (Schlesinger, in Ferguson ed., 1989: 66). Hall et al. refer to MPs and ministers as 
primary definers. Yet access to media among MPs and ministers is unequal as some may 
enjoy privileged access over others (ibid.). Thus, to draw a definitive boundary around 
primary definers is not an easy task. Additionally, Hall et al. failed to draw attention to the 
disputes among the privileged themselves (ibid.). The privileged may have unequal access 
to the media. Even if they are equally powerful, they may hold different opinions on 
certain issues. Thus, who has the final word remains a problem. Hall et al. tend to view 
them as a unified body. Furthermore, there are strong grounds to doubt whether the media 
always hold a subordinate position. In an objection, Schlesinger argues that ‘the media 
may take the initiative in the definitional process by challenging the so-called primary 
definers and forcing them to respond as in investigative journalism’ (Schlesinger, in 
Ferguson ed., 1989: 67, original emphasis). In a refined model, Schlesinger contends that 
sources are ‘conceived as occupying fields in which competition for access to the media 
takes place, but in which material and symbolic advantages are unequally distributed’ 
(Schlesinger, in Ferguson ed., 1989: 77, original emphasis). As for Schlesinger, the 
powerful cannot secure the defining primacy in virtue of their positions only. Rather, they 
can achieve this primacy in this imperfectly competitive field by virtue of successful 
strategies. By designating an imperfectly competitive field, Schlesinger claims that the 
material capital, symbolic resources, and other resources are unequally distributed in this 
contested field. However, those who are preferentially given these resources still have to 
employ strategic actions to achieve dominance. Thus, the ‘primary definition becomes an 
achievement rather than a wholly structurally predetermined outcome’ (Schlesinger, in 
Ferguson ed., 1989: 79). Schlesinger further provides an ideal type of source strategy 
involving four minimal conditions: a well-defined message, optimal media outlets to place 
the message, timing, and anticipated opposition. Besides, resources are crucial in assessing 
source strategies, which includes the financial base, cultural capital, and institutional 
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power (ibid.). Schlesinger creatively presents a dynamic yet structured field within which 
potential sources compete for access to the media.  
All of the above studies, however, were developed in the West, or more specifically in the 
Anglo-Saxon context. In mainland China, however, the media are under overt censorship 
and propaganda imperatives. The party-state regularly issues directives to the media and 
censors media content. In this sense, sources can hardly operate in a contested field. 
Actually, Schlesinger (in Ferguson ed., 1989) particularly suggests further investigation on 
the impact of propaganda and censorship in media-source relations. Mainland Chinese 
journalism thus provides a telling case to be explored. Furthermore, as mentioned in the 
introductory part, it is suggested that new communication technology has democratised 
access to the media. A number of Chinese social media studies also argue that the internet 
has allowed grassroots voices to be heard, which had been precluded from the traditional 
media (Qian & Bandurski, in Shirk ed., 2011; Xiao, in Shirk ed., 2011). Thus, this issue of 
whether new changes in the media sector have brought forth new media-source relations is 
discussed specifically in Chapter 6.  
Propaganda has always been a key word in Chinese journalism. The following section now 
reviews previous research that has focused on the relationship between journalism and 
propaganda. 
1.5 Propaganda   
Propaganda in its broad sense pervades all aspects of public life and plays an increasingly 
central role in modern society (Ellul, 1965). This section first discusses the changes of its 
connotation through history, which is closely associated with historical and ideological 
backgrounds. The term was born with a sacred meaning in religion (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica Online, 2012). Nowadays, it often has an unfavourable meaning in the West, 
especially in Britain and America, which contrasts with that of in the East, such as China 
and the former Soviet Union. An examination of its evolution helps to unpack the 
historical and ideological elements, which have coloured the meaning of propaganda. The 
key scholarship regarding propaganda is then reviewed. Propaganda possesses an essential 
place in approaching Chinese journalism, but it lacks a symmetrical place in the existing 
scholarship. The final part reports on research of this kind. The following section explores 
the evolution of propaganda. 
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The evolution of propaganda 
In the present day, propaganda is very much a value-laden word, but it was originally used 
as a sacred word with ‘highly respectful connotation’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 
2012). In 1622, Gregory XV established a formal organisation, the sacred congregation for 
the propagation of the faith (the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide7) to spread 
Catholic doctrines to non-Christian lands and to oppose Reformation. Thus, the word was 
associated ‘with doctrines based on faith rather than on reason’ (Lambert, cited in Fellows, 
1959: 182). Additionally, the word carried unfavourable shades in Protestant countries that 
it did not have in Catholic countries (O’Donnell & Jowett, in Smith ed., 1989), which 
indicates that its connotation is entangled with the social context of where it is used.  
During World War I (WWI), propaganda was developed into an organised practice 
conducted by the state. A number of chief participating countries established governmental 
organisations specifically in charge of propagating war information. For instance, Britain 
established the Propaganda Policy Committee. Notably, deceit and lies were involved in 
information circulated to the public by such organisations (ibid.). Just after WWI, a 
considerable amount of material was published exposing the purposeful exaggeration, 
falsehood, and fabrication involved in wartime propaganda. A good case in point is George 
Creel’s How We Advertised America. The author, the former head of the Committee on 
Public Information of America, ‘proudly hastened to make his exploits public’ (Jowett, 
1987), only to find that he had sparked great concern or even resentment. The general 
public realised propaganda could pose great threats to democracy if left unchecked.  
In the interwar period, the connotation of propaganda forked in two polar directions: a 
highly negative meaning in the West and a holy meaning in the East. In 1937, the Institute 
of Propaganda Analysis (IPA) was set up in America to ‘help the educator and the layman 
detect propaganda so that he will be more intelligent in choosing the variety of propaganda 
he will follow and in reaching his own decisions’ (Cantril, 1938: 221). By that time, 
propaganda was regarded as a set of techniques that could be countered. With the rise of 
the Leninist party, propaganda gained an entirely new connotation. 
                                                 
7 The formal title of the organisation is ‘sacra Congregatio christiano nomini 
propagando’, see ‘Propaganda’, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online [Online]. Available at: 
http://original.search.eb.com/eb/article-9109443#cite (Accessed: 7 December 2012). 
‘Propaganda, Sacred Congregation of’, Catholic Encyclopaedia Online [Online]. Available 
at: http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=9668 (Accessed: 8 December 
2012). 
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The Leninist party in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) carried propaganda 
to its very limit. Four features characterised Soviet propaganda at that time. First, 
propaganda evolved from merely focusing on changing people’s minds to become more 
concerned with mobilising people into action. Second, propaganda began to be associated 
with ideology in a fundamental way (Bytwerk, in Smith ed., 1989) and became 
indispensable to legitimate the sole-party regime. The Leninist party laid its legitimacy not 
on mass voting but on mass acceptance of Marxist-Leninist doctrines and communist 
ideology. Propaganda had been introduced as an essential tool to indoctrinate people and 
spread communist ideology. Third, both the scale and the penetration of Leninist 
propaganda into society climbed to a higher level compared with the wartime propaganda. 
Everything had been propagandised, including transportation vehicles, statues, memorial 
days, films, and books, all of which became propaganda tools (Schudson, 1989). Most 
importantly, the propaganda organisation was systematically built into the party’s 
bureaucracy. Propaganda departments were established firstly at the central level in the 
early 1920s and then set up at each party level (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2012). 
Drawing from the above discussion, the essence of propaganda development in the Soviet 
context is that it became the cardinal state apparatus after which mainland China was 
patterned. 
Coinciding with the Leninist-Stalinist period, the Nazi was another prominent host of total 
propaganda (details given later), which to a predominant extent aggravated hostility of the 
public towards propaganda. After World War II (WWII), with the booming in advertising 
and the public relations industry, propaganda began to be seen as an inevitable 
phenomenon and in a less unfavourable light. In the present day, China and America are 
two prominent hosts of contemporary propaganda, which Ellul (1965) called ‘sociological 
propaganda’ meaning entire life style propaganda. The propaganda information of this type 
is systematically embedded in cultural and historical settings and is closely associated with 
social climate. The content of such information is usually abstract and vague yet inspiring. 
The public may accept such information unconsciously. The ‘American Dream’ is a good 
case in point. The ‘American Dream’ argues that anyone can achieve prosperity and 
success through hard work. In light of this, one’s hardships in life are seen as a personal 
problem, ignoring the social and systematic problems such as the unequal access to 
resources (more discussion on this is presented later). Figure 4 summarises the main 
changes that the word propaganda has undergone: 
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Figure 4 The evolution of propaganda 
 
Period Prominent user Features General perception 
17th century Catholic church Spread doctrines Sacred meaning in 
Catholic countries, less 
favourable in Protestant 
countries 
Extensively employed by 
all war participants 
Organised activity conducted 
by governments 
Negative connotation The WWI and 
interwar period 
Leninist party in the 
USSR; Nazi Germany 
Addressing to all members of 
society; bureaucratically set 
up as state apparatus  
Respectful meaning  
The WWII Nazi Germany, Leninist-
Stalinist party in the 
USSR, America, Britain 
Total propaganda conducted 
in a scientific manner 
Strong negative 
connotation 
Post-war  Advertisements, public 
relations 
Pervasive usage Less unfavourable 
Contemporary 
usage 
China, America Sociological propaganda, life-
style propaganda easily 
inducing unconscious 
acceptance 
Vague, less certain 
 
From what has been discussed above, propaganda was associated with the organisation that 
spread doctrines. Later on, it came to describe the doctrine itself (Jowett, 1987). At the 
beginning of the 20th century, propaganda was used to mean the techniques used to change 
people’s minds (ibid.). Additionally, the evaluating flavour of propaganda is closely linked 
to the social context, in which it is applied. The following section reviews key propaganda 
research.  
Propaganda research 
A groundbreaking work on propaganda was conducted by Lasswell. In his dissertation, 
Propaganda Technique in the World War in 1927 (reprinted in 1938), he examined the 
definition of propaganda, the categorisation of propaganda content, propaganda 
techniques, and its effects. This was the first systematic and scientific research on the topic 
in which he pointed out the fundamental mechanism of propaganda: the manipulation of 
symbols. He defined propaganda as techniques managing the ‘collective attitudes by the 
manipulation of significant symbols’ (1927: 9; 1927: 627). Interestingly, he claimed that 
propaganda facilitates ‘social solidarity’ (Lasswell, 1927: 221). Additionally, he linked 
propaganda with the modern world by arguing that power in the modern society is 
subdivided and diffused, and can therefore be won more by illusion than by coercion 
(Lasswell, 1927: 222). These are insightful ideas, which unfortunately lack elaboration, 
since Lasswell only mentioned them in the final part of his dissertation in few words. 
Moreover, his work centres on war propaganda, which may not be applicable to other 
types of propaganda. The contribution of Lasswell is that he discarded the general 
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antagonistic view towards propaganda at that time and conducted his research in an 
unbiased tone. Lasswell’s work provoked interest in this area. Propaganda research 
reached a climax when the Institute of Propaganda Analysis was founded in 1937 (cf. the 
evolution of propaganda). Propaganda research at that time, however, mainly employed a 
humanistic method, which was charged with lacking systematic and serious theoretical 
implications (Jowett, 1987; Sproule, 1987). Furthermore, the negative connotation of the 
word further damaged its academic legitimacy (Sproule, 1987). Therefore, since the end of 
1930s, propaganda research gave way to the new emerging statistical communication 
research (ibid.).  
More than three decades later, the work of Ellul (1965) provides a rather radical and 
subversive argument regarding propaganda in modern technological society. He linked 
propaganda with modernism as well as the structure of modern society. Among all his 
insightful findings, three are more prominent. First and foremost, Ellul claimed that 
propaganda and modern technological society are interdependent echoing the ideas of 
Lasswell but in more detail. ‘Only in the technological society can there be anything of the 
type and order of magnitude of modern propaganda, which is with us forever; and only 
with the all-pervading effects that flow from propaganda can the technological society hold 
itself together and further expand’ (Kellen, 1965: v, translator of Ellul’s work). That is, on 
the one hand, modern technological society provides handy tools for propaganda, such as 
the media, to reach every household in the society. On the other hand, propaganda 
integrates all the people in the society both mentally and materially (more details given 
later). 
Second and probably the most powerful argument of Ellul is that propaganda is a 
‘necessity’ of modern society (Ellul, 1965: 118). This has twofold meanings. On the one 
hand, the state needs propaganda. In a democracy, in theory, the state must base its public 
decisions on the will of the public. In reality, however, the state cannot simply follow the 
public opinion, in that the opinion may be vague or against national interests. Thus, the 
state needs propaganda to tune public opinion to its ruling demands. This idea echoes what 
Lasswell (1927) had briefly claimed: when the use of force was no longer the instrument of 
rule, propaganda stood out as a substitute. On the other hand, propaganda is also in need of 
propagandees. He subverts the general belief that modern man is a victim of propaganda. 
Instead, the individual ‘not merely lends himself to propaganda, but even derives 
satisfaction from it’ (Ellul, 1965: 138). In modern technological society, the individual is 
absorbed in a crowd in which he is lonely enclosed. Urbanisation further makes individuals 
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feel even more weak and diminished. Moreover, man is deeply dependent on public 
facilities, such as public transportation and public servants. Thus, propaganda ‘springs 
from the modern man’s actual living condition’ which functions as ‘the true remedy for 
loneliness’ (Ellul, 1965: 144-160). Furthermore, the inability to process complicated, 
voluminous and intensive modern information also creates the need for propaganda as 
guidance. Besides, to work successfully, propaganda must address individuals ‘enclosed in 
the mass and as participants in that mass’ (Ellul, 1965: 6). The reason for this is that 
individuals share common beliefs and feelings within the crowd. If propaganda succeeded 
in reinforcing his prejudices and stereotypes with other members in the crowd, he feels 
justified. Through propaganda, the uncertainty of life is reduced, and the individual feels 
himself needed and engaged in political activity.  
Third, Ellul insightfully pointed out that the key characteristic of modern propaganda is 
that it is total propaganda. Drawing on the term ‘total war’, total propaganda is not aimed 
at the matter in hand, or short-term mobilisation, but is intended for long-term integration 
of all members of society. Furthermore, total propaganda employs all types of media and 
addresses all social aspects, including politics, economics, culture, and education. 
Moreover, propaganda pervades all aspects of people’s social life and invades every 
moment of an individual’s life. Furthermore, Ellul provided a typology of propaganda, in 
which he listed four pairs of propaganda forms. This research focuses on one of them, 
‘sociological propaganda’ (Ellul, 1965: 62), which is very much relevant to the situation in 
mainland China. Sociological propaganda is entire life style propaganda which 
‘unconsciously moulds individuals and makes them conform to society’ (ibid.). This form 
of propaganda is the most vast, the least certain and normally vague. No deliberate 
propaganda actions are needed; instead, sociological propaganda is ‘permeated through 
social climate, unconscious habits, and customs’ (Ellul, 1965: 65). For instance, U.S. 
citizens are originally from many different parts of the world; thus, it employs a way of life 
as its ‘basis of unification and as instrument of propaganda’ (Ellul, 1965: 67). In addition, 
the uniformity also plays an economic role by determining ‘the extent of the American 
market’ (Ellul, 1965: 68). ‘Mass production requires mass consumption, which is based on 
widespread identical views regarding what the necessities of life are’ (ibid.).  
Ellul’s work is criticised for being radical and lacking scientific methods. Besides, in his 
view, propaganda is so ‘all-encompassing that everything becomes propaganda’ (Bytwerk, 
in Smith ed., 1989: 37). Furthermore, a key deficiency of his work is that he 
deterministically argued that all propagandees are keenly eager for propaganda. A number 
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of audience studies have suggested that communication is an interactive process in which 
the receivers may create ‘dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings’ 
(O’Shaughnessy, 2004: 26; Hall, 1973). The three types of reading stance may not simply 
be applied to the readings of propaganda information. Propagandees may also develop 
oppositional reading from the propaganda information. Research suggests that audiences in 
the former Soviet Union and Mainland China are especially apt at reading between the 
lines (Shirk, in Shirk ed., 2011; Ma, in Curran & Park eds., 1999). Ellul’s work, however, 
is helpful in guiding Chinese propaganda research. He argued that mainland China and the 
United States are two striking hosts of sociological propaganda. Accordingly, this research 
applies his ideas to explore Chinese propaganda in Chapter 4.     
The work of Ellul has been more or less neglected in academia, possibly because he argued 
that intellectuals are the most vulnerable to propaganda. Later on, in 1988, Herman and 
Chomsky elaborated the propaganda model, which provoked worldwide debates (Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988). From a political economy view, they traced the routes ‘by which 
money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent, and allow 
the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public’ 
(ibid.: 2). They argued that the American media systematically fulfil a propaganda role, 
which is far from how the free media are generally perceived. The ‘essential ingredients’ 
of the propaganda model are the five filters of news (ibid., original emphasis): 
• The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass-media firms 
• Advertising as the primary income source of the mass media 
• The reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, 
and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of 
power 
• ‘Flake’ as a means of disciplining the media  
• ‘Anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism 
 
In light of this, the U.S. media can be seen as analogous to totalitarian media in which 
conformity is secured (Schlesinger, 1989a). This work had received harsh criticism and has 
even been labelled as ‘conspiracy’ (Herman & Chomsky, 1988: xii). One of the key critics 
comes from its ‘deterministic’ character (Schlesinger, 1989a: 297). The model is held to 
have predictive ability by which news is censored by the five filters. The fifth filter, 
anticommunism, however, is backstage and is being replaced by the War on Terror 
(Sparks, 2007). Furthermore, the propaganda model is based on the performance of the 
American media; whether or not it can be applied to other social settings remains 
questionable (Sparks, 2007; Schlesinger, 1989a). It may be too radical to view the media in 
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democratic society as merely a propaganda model. In mainland China, however, the media 
as a propaganda model is very much alive. This research explores news filters in Chinese 
journalism in Chapters 2 and 4. The next section of this chapter now reviews some key 
research into Chinese propaganda. 
Research on Chinese propaganda 
Propaganda is the most prominent feature of the Chinese media system, although it 
remains an understudied area in Chinese journalism research. This is partly because it is a 
highly sensitive topic for mainland Chinese scholars and because Western scholars may 
have difficulties accessing such information (more discussion on this in the following 
section). Here, three key studies in this area are briefly reviewed. 
In the 1990s, just after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the party-state launched its 
second wave of reform to rebuild its legitimacy (more details in Chapter 2) (Zhao, 2008). 
The policy change had great influence in the media sector. A number of scholars had 
explored whether propaganda remained as a sole dimension in approaching the media after 
the 1970s (Lynch, 1999; Chang et al., 1993). Among such works, Lynch’s work is one of 
the most thorough studies regarding the changes in propaganda and thought control in 
mainland China. Based on case studies and interviews, he argued that administrative 
fragmentation, property-rights reform, and new communication technologies, such as 
satellite TV and the internet, largely eroded the party-state’s ability to control the media 
and thought work. For instance, the media may take the risk to publish sensitive content to 
attract a larger audience in order to gain more advertising revenue. Lynch optimistically 
implied that the party-state began to lose its media control and no longer heavily relied on 
thought work or propaganda to control society. Lynch’s work noticed these new changes. 
However, the status quo indicates that he overrated the role of economic reform. The 
authorities still heavily use the methods of thought control and propaganda.  
Work by Zhao (1998) arrived at the similar conclusion that media commercialisation 
added a new dimension to the Chinese media. Due to commercialisation, the Chinese 
media had gone through a fundamental change. Most of the media are economically 
independent from the party. Advertising and market forces began to play an increasingly 
important role in the media sector. Nonetheless, media control has never been loosened. 
Thus, the media are caught between two masters: the political, that is the party-state, and 
the commercial, that is the audiences. In light of this, Zhao argued for a 
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propagandist/commercial model to frame the Chinese media. Zhao provided a succinct 
observation regarding the intertwining condition of the Chinese media between party 
control and market imperatives. Her work is probably the most cited study regarding 
Chinese media in Western academia. Yet her arguments are mainly based on trade journal 
articles, which lack first-hand or frontline information from journalistic practitioners. 
Besides, her model fails to take account of cultural factors, which this research intends to 
highlight. Furthermore, this model overlooks the contradictions between propaganda and 
commercial forces. This dichotomous model cannot explain the priority issue. That is, 
when confronting each other, which side will have the final word, propaganda or 
commercial interest? This remains an open question in Zhao’s dichotomous model. Zhao 
later extends her thinking in examining media conglomeration, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
It is widely acknowledged that the Central Propaganda Department oversees all media in 
mainland China. Yet this institution is naturally clandestine, so the area lacked any 
systematic study (Hassid, 2008). Based on internal documents and reports, Brady (2008) 
presents an extraordinarily comprehensive study of the whole propaganda system in 
mainland China. She provided a thorough description of the structure, the function, the 
working mechanisms, and the staffing issues of the central propaganda department as well 
as the local ones. The most exciting finding lies in her claim that contemporary Chinese 
propaganda is modernising to meet new needs. Particularly, ‘China’s propaganda system 
has deliberately absorbed the methodology of political public relations and other modern 
methods of mass persuasion commonly utilised in Western democratic societies, adapting 
them to Chinese conditions and needs’ (Brady, 2008: 3). A good case in point is that the 
Central Propaganda Department changed its name into the Central Publicity Department to 
reduce its negative image (Brady, 2008: 73). Additionally, governmental officials have 
been given lectures on ‘how to improve their public images’ (Brady, 2008: 86). The model 
of Blair government’s spin-doctor was even introduced into China as an information 
officer (daoxiang zhuanjia). Furthermore, Brady identified a number of new tactics 
systematically employed by propaganda departments to control the media after the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown, including regular briefings with media editors, monitoring 
groups issuing both prizes and punishment, a new approach to funding politically 
favourable media, and so forth (Brady, 2008: 49). Brady’s study was the first book-length 
research into the propaganda system in China, which provided extensive accounts 
regarding the bureaucracies and the working mechanisms of the system. The researcher 
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claims that China is clearly an alive ‘propaganda state’ (Kenez, 1992, cited in Brady, 2008: 
1) in that propaganda is the very lifeblood to legitimate the sole-party regime.  
The above three studies all have illuminating points in guiding this research. However, 
they all left journalistic practitioners unquestioned, leaving a gap for this research to fill. 
The following section discusses the main themes regarding Chinese journalistic culture in 
journalism research. 
1.6 The main themes regarding Chinese 
journalistic culture 
There exists a profound gap regarding Chinese journalism research between mainland 
Chinese scholars and those from Western countries. The two kinds of research are different 
in their research agenda, orientation, and methodology. A predominant number of the 
mainland Chinese studies are administrative research in the sense that they are funded by 
governmental bodies or even propaganda departments and taken as references for policy-
making. Questionnaires are commonly used in such studies. The conclusions are 
descriptive words rather than analytical accounts (Wu, 2009b). Additionally, scholars are 
rather cautious in arriving at any findings that may be offensive to the authorities. 
Interestingly, there is clear division in terms of the research perspective between studies of 
Chinese issues and studies of Western issues. In approaching the Western issues, Chinese 
scholars adopt cultural imperialism or a political economy view to criticise the inequalities 
in the world communication system (Wu, in Zhang & Huang eds., 2002). It is reported that 
a research project with 0.6 million Yuan funding (approximately £60,000) invited 
researchers to explore the fake nature of Western press freedom (xifang xinwen ziyou de 
xuwei benzhi yanjiu).8  
This research largely relies on Western scholarship, especially British and American media 
theories, as the theoretical basis for analysing Chinese journalism. It is worth pointing out 
that such a reliance does not mean to set Western journalistic norms as ideals for 
journalists in other countries to follow. Actually, ‘North America and Western Europe are 
the marginal cases globally, the leading exceptions to how the media work in much of the 
world’ (McCargo, in Hallin & Mancini eds., 2012: 207). Additionally, such a reliance may 
                                                 
8 ‘2013 National Key Research Projects Call for Applying’, National Planning Office of Philosophy 
and Social Science [Online]. Available at: http://www.npopss-cn.gov.cn/n/2013/0130/c220880-
20371686.html (Accessed: 10 September 2013). 
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promote doubt as to whether Western theories are relevant or applicable to the examination 
of Chinese journalism. This issue is far beyond the scope of this research, yet it is 
necessary to explain the choice of this research strategy to some degree.  
First, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, one of the objectives of this research is to 
probe journalistic norms under tight media control and to investigate the factors inducing 
self-censorship. The existing scholarship on this issue is essentially conducted outside of 
mainland China. Interestingly, such research is largely done by Chinese nationals educated 
in Western countries. As discussed above, Zhao, Yuezhi is a good case in point. Second, 
Western media theories are not necessarily only applicable to Western countries. A number 
of theories developed in the West also take Chinese experiences into account. For example, 
as discussed previously, Ellul’s analysis on propaganda included Chinese propaganda 
practices in the Mao era (Ellul, 1965), and his analysis is referred to frequently in this 
research. Furthermore, as Zhao has pointed out, it is important to acknowledge Western 
influences and the American hegemonic power on media development in non-Western 
countries (Zhao, in Hallin & Mancini eds., 2012). Actually, modern media systems in 
many non-Western countries, including the Chinese media, were ‘a Western imposition to 
begin with – colonial and missionary agents set up the first modern newspapers in 
colonized or semi-colonized port cities’ (ibid.: 146) (more details on this in Chapter 2). 
Moreover, objectivity, detachment and other tenets of professionalism developed and 
promoted in Anglo-Saxon journalism have gained currency in Chinese journalism since the 
1980s. Although there is far greater gap between ideals and practices, Chinese journalistic 
practitioners have paid considerable lip service to professionalism (Lu & Pan, 2002).  
The acknowledgement of Western influences, however, does not mean a total and 
uncritical acceptance of Western media theories, as it has been a trend in media studies to 
be aware of the limitations of Western theories (Waisbord, in Lee ed., 2014). To a larger 
extent, journalism is a kind of cultural production, which is coloured by geographically-
bound and historically-shaped cultural elements. Thus, an emphasis on Chinese culture 
may serve as a remedy to borrowing Western theories in order to analyse the Chinese 
media. The following section discusses the existing scholarship regarding Chinese 
journalism, which centres on three main themes: media control, news reform, and 
journalistic corruption. At the end of this section, this research briefly explores the 
scholarship investigating Chinese journalism principally from a cultural perspective and 
provides a further synopsis of the essence of Chinese culture.  
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Media control  
Aside from the propaganda research discussed previously, a number of studies explore the 
concomitant of propaganda: censorship. Link (2002) provided a short but brilliant piece of 
work arguing that Chinese media control has relied primarily on inducing self-censorship. 
Furthermore, it is the use of vagueness which makes self-censorship pervasive. There 
exists no explicitly stated banned list or written rules explaining what is unacceptable. Link 
(2002) points out the following four advantages of such vagueness9: 
• A vague prohibition frightens more people 
• A vague accusation pressures an individual to curtail a wider range of activity 
• A vague accusation is useful in maximising what can be learned during forced 
confessions 
• A vague accusation allows arbitrary targeting 
 
Based on the succinct findings of Link, Hassid further expanded these ‘through the 
theoretical lens of organization theory’ (2008: 421). Hassid attributes self-censorship to 
uncertainty. No media law, no explicit control rules, and no formal documents listing 
banned topics all contribute to pervasive self-censorship. Moreover, uncertainty also 
creates a pro-self-censorship environment in the newsroom. Veterans who deal skilfully 
with political risks and politically reliable media workers may receive enhanced power and 
privileges. It is also suggested that uncertainty is a deliberate strategy employed by the 
Central Propaganda Department to control the media.  
Echoing the above research, de Burgh (2003) also claimed that it is through self-censorship 
rather than the correcting or elimination of texts that orthodoxy is maintained. In a rare 
case, the cultural and historical aspects have been taken into account in de Burgh’s 
research. Historically, Chinese journalists saw themselves as ‘the throat and tongue’ of the 
governing party, and this remains so in the present day. He stressed that Chinese culture is 
inextricably bound with the role of journalists as well as their identities. Paternalism and 
patriotism as elements of Confucianism are also widely held by Chinese journalists. 
Moreover, Chinese journalists enjoy their social status as a privileged class. They see the 
audience as ‘masses’ instead of ‘citizens’ to be educated and enlightened. Accordingly, 
they are sceptical about the appropriateness of democracy for China. De Burgh named this 
neo-conservatism. Similarly, Lee (2009; 2000; 1990) also emphasised cultural traditions in 
                                                 
9 Link, P. (2002) ‘China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier’, The New York Review of Books, 11 
April [Online]. Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/April/11/china-the-
anaconda-in-the-chandelier/ (Accessed: 15 January 2013) 
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shaping Chinese journalism. Actually, democracy and press freedom were introduced as 
early as the 1900s. The Confucian ethos, such as sacrificing personal rights to serve the 
good of the nation, transformed their application in the Chinese context. They were not 
seen as ends but as means to national modernisation.  
Under tight media control, the media are primarily conceptualised as the propaganda 
instrument of the party-state. Yet since China launched its reform and opening-up policy, 
the media have taken on double imperatives: the party’s and the market. The change is 
analysed under the name of news reform, which is discussed in the next part.  
News reform  
News reform is ‘a catch-all phrase encompassing everything from technical improvements 
in writing and editing to proposals for the structural overhaul of press organization and 
ownership’ (Polumbaum, in Lee ed., 1990: 37). News reform is actually a part of social 
reforms launched just after the Cultural Revolution, which is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. News reform is primarily characterised by ‘a wave of commercialization and 
marketization’ (Pan, in Lee ed., 2000: 68). Thus, the research regarding news reform 
focuses on media commercialisation (Chen, C., 2003b; He, in Lee ed., 2000; Zhao, 2000; 
Chen, H. L., 1999; Ma, in Curran & Park eds., 1999; Zhao, 1998; Pan, 1997; Chan, in Yu-
shek & Brosseau eds., 1993; Polumbaum, in Lee ed., 1990).  
To investigate how media commercialisation evolved in an authoritarian country, scholars 
endeavour to identify the trajectory and characteristic of commercialisation. The key 
characteristic is that commercialisation took place in a ‘commandist’ media system, which 
is ‘an embellished Leninism-Stalinism built on traditional feudalism that intrudes into 
every facet of social life and puts individual thought and behaviour under scrupulous 
control’ (Lee, in Lee ed., 1990: 5). To be specific, this remarkable process of media 
commercialisation occurred in the Chinese power structure as Lee (ibid.) explains as 
follows:  
National power is totally centralized in…a unified ‘party-state-military-
economic-ideological’ complex in which a small corps of senior leaders atop 
the pyramidal structure make final decisions. This power structure rests on 
state coercion, breeds cults of personality, and monopolizes ideology and mass 
media. The ‘small society’ is thus absorbed by the ‘big state’ and depends 
exclusively on it for survival. (Su, cited in Lee, in Lee ed., 1990: 5) 
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In this power structure, the media are not first and foremost a commercial entity; rather, it 
is the propagandist instrument (Pan, in Lee ed., 2000). However, in the process of media 
commercialisation, the media were given both political and market imperatives, which is 
believed by many as two contradictory forces (Chen, L., in Pan & Wu, 2008; Pan, in Lee 
ed., 2000; Zhao, 1998).  
The majority of studies regarding media commercialisation employ a political-economy 
perspective, since ‘politics and economics are too deeply intertwined to be separated’ (He, 
in Lee ed., 2000). The scholars reside in three camps based on their views of the 
relationship between political forces and economic forces. One favours a political-versus-
economic dichotomy emphasising the antagonistic reaction between the two with one 
always outweighing the other (Chen, C. 2003; Chen, H., 2000; He, in Lee ed., 2000; Chen, 
H. L., 1999). The representative argument claims that the market economy weakens 
political control or vice versa. He (in Lee ed., 2000) creatively metaphorised the interplay 
as a tug-of-war. Another view sees the two forces mutually incorporating and negotiating 
(Huang, 2007; Pan, in Lee ed., 2000; Pan, 1997). The third view sees political forces 
playing an increasingly active role in pursuing a marketised media. In an insightful study 
of press conglomeration, Zhao (2000) argues that political forces purposely induce 
economic forces and keep them under control.  
In sum, the political-economy perspective provides extensive insights into the evolution of 
the Chinese media. In fact, it works within the state-society framework, with the economy 
functioning as a societal actor. The state-society framework dominates the study of 
Chinese media reform, which is not a limitation but a realistic choice, for all reforms in 
China were devoted to reconfiguring the relationship between state and society (Pan, 
2008). Before the reforms, China was run under a planned economic system, in which the 
central government controlled almost all resources and planned everything regarding social 
development. For example, all companies were owned by the state. Private ownership was 
strictly banned. At that time, the society was completely subordinate to the state. Since the 
launch of the reforms, the central government has begun to advocate the market economy 
system. The government has loosened its control over resources and empowered societal 
forces to energise the economy. Since then, private ownership has been boosted. Thus, 
societal forces can bargain with the state over certain issues. Nonetheless, the societal 
forces still depend on the state in terms of resource allocation. In the media field, the state 
monopolises media ownership, while loosening its control over media finances. The 
unprecedented media commercialisation brought forth a prominent concomitant: 
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journalistic corruption. The next part of this chapter reviews research regarding journalistic 
corruption. 
Journalistic corruption  
The research regarding journalistic corruption is special in that it is largely neglected in 
Western research about Chinese journalism, whereas it has attracted extensive academic 
attention in mainland China (Chen et al., 2010; Zhang & Lu, 2008; Chen, L., 2007; Zheng 
& Chen, 2004; Lu & Yu, 2003; Luo et al., 2001; Yu, 1998). The studies have found a 
range of corrupt behaviours conducted by journalists, such as taking free gifts and all 
expenses-paid interviews (ibid.). As to the reasons behind the corrupt behaviour, some 
(Zheng & Chen, 2004; Lu & Yu, 2003a; Yu, 1998) provided a rather vague explanation: 
that it is due to profound systematic factor failing to specify the constituents of the factor. 
Chen, L. (2007) offered a more developed argument. First, the mainland Chinese media are 
under transition from a pure propaganda tool into a more market-oriented institution. At 
this particular moment, the media are half part of the party-state system and half part of the 
market system. Thus, the media are far from an independent professional organisation 
policing its employees. Second, professional norms and values are absent in mainland 
China. Third, a more practical reason is that journalists lack the protection of rights and 
interests, which may trigger corruption.  
Most of the above studies employ questionnaires, which pre-set the choices for the 
respondents to choose from. In other words, the questionnaire method might inhibit a 
diversity of thoughts from emerging (more discussion on this in Chapter 3). Largely based 
on journal articles, Zhao provided another explanation: ‘corruption has been part and 
parcel of the process of media commercialization’ (1998: 72). Zhao locates the corruption 
root in ‘the contradictions between the Party’s old ways of conceptualizing and organizing 
journalism and the new commercialized environment under which journalism operates’ 
(1998: 84). According to Zhao, ‘the contradictions between [the party logic and the market 
logic] provide fertile ground for paid journalism’ (ibid.). To give one example, the party 
still attaches propaganda tasks to the media. The media have to report on dull party 
meetings but are forbidden from conducting investigative reports, which makes journalism 
unchallenging. Thus, the ‘journalists’ talents are being diverted into businesses’ (ibid.). In 
other words, there is nowhere for journalists to realise their professional aspirations and 
journalists end up practising corruption. Zhao argues that there is an element of ‘passive 
political resistance in the practice’ (1998: 88). Zhao’s analysis falls within the political 
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economy communication framework, with the cultural aspects left untouched. Also, the 
journalistic practitioners’ accounts are kept out of sight. The next part briefly discusses 
Chinese culture and its application to understand journalism. 
Chinese culture 
As discussed previously, the existing scholarship mainly adopts a political economy and 
sociological view to examine Chinese journalism, while cultural influences are largely 
neglected. De Burgh has argued for a reemphasis of the cultural paradigm (2005). He 
doubted whether there is a universally applied model of journalism. Although globalisation 
and new technology have homogenised journalism worldwide, an ideal form of journalism 
cannot exist (ibid.). As for de Burgh, culture should be regarded as the core criterion to 
differentiate types of journalism in varied locations. An emphasis on the role of culture, 
however, does not mean that culture is the sole factor colouring the news. Nor does this 
mean that culture plays a deterministic role. This research intends to add a cultural 
dimension to examine Chinese journalism, despite research of this kind being relatively 
low in stock.  
De Burgh (2003) has conducted a thorough research on Chinese journalists, which contains 
considerable analysis of the influences of Chinese history and culture on journalism. He 
acutely discovered that Chinese people are obsessed with history and that history often 
serves as a validation for current undertakings. If a measure or move was taken in the past, 
then the current undertakings of a similar kind could be validated. Additionally, de Burgh 
has argued that topics for public discussion in mainland China are not only confined by 
political diktat, but also more of ‘the wider cultural framing’ (2003: 112). He claims that in 
Chinese society, ‘approaches to authority and to relations with others are different from 
those encountered in anglophone societies and condition work in many different ways. 
Authority is expected to be paternal in style, mirroring family relationship, and obedience 
is due regardless of the behaviour of those in authority’ (ibid.). The products of the typical 
Chinese family form are dependent on an established leadership (ibid.: 113). Whenever 
such leadership is lacking, Chinese people tend to ‘create situations of total predictability 
or control’ (ibid.). Therefore, the anglophone tolerance of complementary or competing 
authorities is foreign to the Chinese (ibid.). Such social conformity to a single and 
established authority is actually a barrier to professionalism (ibid.). 
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De Burgh presents a strong case in identifying the cultural influences that shape Chinese 
journalism. Following this, in a rare case, Zeng (2012) provides a comparative insight into 
how different cultural values underpin journalistic norms in two newsrooms: BBC World 
and Phoenix Television. Zeng found that, compared with the BBC journalists, the Phoenix 
journalists played a weaker role in the news production process. To be specific, there were 
strong factions in the Phoenix newsroom, forming a hierarchical working environment. 
‘Top reporters and top translators select the news, assign the work, decide the angle of 
reports on sensitive events, and check the correctness and suitability of scripts and video 
for every piece of news’ (Zeng, 2012: 261). However, the BBC journalists played a 
stronger role in producing news with normally no superiors directing news angels. It is 
suggested that this difference can be attributed to cultural factors, specifically that Chinese 
people tend to be more respectful to authority (ibid.: 11). 
The above studies are helpful in identifying cultural influences on journalism, yet the 
problem of this research strategy is in the term ‘culture’ itself. As mentioned previously, 
culture is not easy to define, making it difficult to be employed as a tool to analyse social 
phenomena. A number of scholars have endeavoured to discover the characteristics of a 
certain culture through a comparison with other cultures (Zeng, 2012; Liang, 2003). Liang 
has listed fourteen characteristics of Chinese culture, which include long history, no 
religion, stagnant culture, enormous population and large territory, family first (jia benwei), 
filial piety and so forth (Liang, 2003: 23—32). Drawing upon social psychology studies on 
culture (Chiu & Hong, 2006), Zeng (2012) has formulated a list of characterisitcs that 
distinguish Chinese culture from others: 
• Power distance: referring to ‘how people relate to one other in terms of equality or 
hierarchy.’ (Zeng, 2012: 11) Chinese people tend to weigh more on hierarchy and 
authority than on equality. 
• Individualism-collectivism: Chinese people are more bound by collective 
responsibility. 
• Harmony/ conformity: referring to the values regarding consensus and 
confrontation. 
• Causal attribution: referring to how people explain events and actions. 
• Duties vs. rights: East Asian people are ‘more conscious of duties than rights’ (ibid.) 
compared with American people. 
• Filialism: Filial piety is one of the most important ‘traditional values that persist in 
present-day China’ (ibid.). 
 
Zeng further argues that the differences between cultures are rooted in ‘family form’ (2012: 
8). Echoing this, Liang claims that the fundamental uniqueness of Chinese culture lies in 
its emphasis on family life (2003: 21). Family life constitutes the primary and principal 
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social life of Chinese people. Moreover, all social relationships are formulated on the mode 
of the family relationship (ibid.). For instance, a governmental office is often seen as a 
family, with the head of the office viewed as the shaikh. This unique cultural trait has an 
essential impact on journalistic practices, which is discussed further in Chapter 5. This 
chapter now concludes by identifying the gaps in the existing scholarship. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed some of the important previous research related to this project. 
The last part of this chapter pulls together some of the key issues that have emerged and 
identifies those gaps in our knowledge that this research will explicitly address. First, this 
research adds a cultural and historical dimension in analysing Chinese journalism. Zeng 
(2012: 87) claims that ‘debate on cultural influences on news production tends to be led by 
product study and pays more attention to audiences than to journalists.’ Following her 
argument, this research emphasises the impact of culture on journalists. Second, the survey 
studies report a number of corrupt practices conducted by journalists. The surveys, 
however, fail to identify the reasons behind this corruption. Moreover, the perceptions held 
by journalists towards the corrupt practices are also lacking. The survey studies, which 
have prescribed the answers for journalists to choose from, may inhibit journalists’ own 
thoughts from emerging (more discussion on this is presented in Chapter 3). Aside from 
the survey studies, a number of key research findings are based on trade journal articles or 
scholarly guesses, which have also left journalistic practitioners disregarded. This research 
bases its argument mainly on journalists’ own accounts employing in-depth interviews and 
focus group interview methods to add to our understanding through the journalists’ 
subjective accounts of their experience.  
It is necessary to point out that this research is largely driven by the researcher’s four-year 
career as a political journalist, during which time the researcher had struggled with 
propaganda directives. On the one hand, these experiences arm the researcher with 
journalistic jargon and norms, facilitating the interviews with journalists; on the other 
hand, however, these experiences may colour the selection and interpretation of research 
materials. These limitations are further discussed in Chapter 3.   
Considering the aims of this research and the gaps in the existing scholarship, this research 
intends to work on four themes: cultural influences, propaganda control, journalistic 
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corruption and the impact of social media. Thus, the research questions are listed as 
follows. 
Regarding the cultural influences, this research explores: 
• What elements of culture are mobilised in influencing journalistic practices? In 
the existing scholarship, when culture is referred to, the exact factors are 
ambiguously identified. Therefore, this research intends to point out the exact 
cultural elements that are normally involved in journalistic practices. 
• How do such elements interact with other social factors, such as political 
forces and commercial forces? This question intends to map out a mechanism 
of the three key forces, which have been left untouched in the existing 
scholarship. 
 
Regarding propaganda control, this research investigates: 
• The main forms of propaganda control in daily journalistic practices. Brady 
(2008) has provided a number of propaganda forms as discussed previously. 
Yet she mainly based her argument on documents and reports. Therefore, it is 
hard to differentiate the daily used form from the relatively novel forms that 
may be rarely used. This research explores the main forms based on journalists’ 
own accounts from their daily practices. 
• How do journalists react to the existing media control system? This is a key 
research area, but it remains underexplored in the existing scholarship. 
• The factors inducing self-censorship. A number of studies identified that it is 
self-censorship that toes the media in line (Hassid, 2008; de Burgh, 2003). 
Hassid argued that the uncertainty engenders self-censorship. As pointed out 
previously, this is a scholarly guess, which requires testimony from journalistic 
practitioners. 
 
Regarding journalistic corruption, this research examines: 
• The main forms of corruption. Although Zhao (1998) and Yu (1998) explored 
corruption forms, these studies are outdated. An updated probe into the main 
forms of corruption is needed, which this research intends to provide.  
• The roots and implications of journalistic corruption. Chen et al. (2010) and 
Zhao (1998) have provided explanations for this as mentioned previously. Yet 
their arguments are again scholarly guesses. 
 
This research also explores the impact of social media on traditional journalism and its 
practice. This is clearly a dynamic research area, which is attracting increasing academic 
interest and is characterised by a fast-changing media environment. As a result, this work 
offers a snapshot of journalism in transition, being shaped by political, economic, and 
technological factors. The research questions in this area include: 
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• How have media-source relations changed in the new social media 
environment? 
• How do social media impact on journalistic practices? 
 
Having looked at previous related research, the next chapter provides some important 
historical context within which the contemporary research later in the thesis needs to be 
located. The historical developments since the 1980s when China launched its Reform and 
Opening-up Policy (gaige kaifang) that dramatically changed the media landscape are thus 
an important part in understanding the current drivers of media change and are the focus of 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Historical Analysis 
This chapter explores the Chinese media from a historical perspective. It focuses on the 
evolution of the media since 1979 when commercialisation started. Media 
commercialisation has brought fundamental changes to the media sector, which has altered 
the media structure, journalistic practices, and to a certain extent, reconfigured state-media 
relations (Zhao, 2000, 1998; Pan, 1997). This chapter first introduces the historical origins 
of the Chinese media to illuminate historical and cultural elements which still influence 
journalism in the present day. The second section then delineates the media 
commercialisation process. The third section looks at the media structure and 
administrative control in the present day. This chapter concludes by summarising and 
highlighting key features of media development since 1979. The next part of this chapter 
traces the historical origins of the Chinese media.  
2.1 Historical origins of Chinese media 
Scholars have traced the beginning of traditional Chinese journalism to the Tang Dynasty 
(from the 7th century to the 10th century) gazette (di bao), which was the official or semi-
official encyclicals (Fang & Ding eds., 2009; Chen, C., 2007). Yet modern journalism 
started at the end of the 19th century, ‘exclusively as the result of Western influence’ (Lee, 
in de Burgh ed., 2005: 107). This influence came from two aspects. First, the early press 
was initiated and financed by Western missionaries for whom many Chinese people 
worked as apprentices and learned practical skills (Wu, 2009b; Chen, C., 2007). Second, 
the Chinese set up their own newspapers later on primarily to propagate nationalism and 
mobilise ordinary people in order to resist the ‘Western imperialist invasion’ (Lee, in de 
Burgh ed., 2005: 107). Therefore, at the very beginning, the chief function of the Chinese 
media was to propagate and enlighten rather than to provide information (ibid.). The early 
journalistic practitioners, such as Wang, Tao (王韬) and Liang, Qichao (梁启超), were 
regarded as the traditional literati (wen ren) instead of journalists or businessmen, which is 
reflective of the Confucian ethos. In fact, they also valued themselves as the literati. In the 
Confucian ethos, the literati can be characterised by the following three interconnected 
elements (Rui, 2010; Wu, 2009a; Lu, 2004; Lu & Pan, 2002).  
First is ‘responsibility’. Confucianism emphasises that the literati should take the nation’s 
good as their own responsibility. The realm of the responsibility is delimited by the ‘three 
cardinal guides’ (san gang), which is the core Confucian tenet. The ‘three cardinal guides’ 
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is a set of rules that prescribe the social order: the ruler guides the subject (jun wei chen 
gang), father guides son (fu wei zi gang), husband guides wife (fu wei qi gang). Thus, the 
prioritised responsibility of the literati is to assist the ruler in guiding the ruled. Moreover, 
Confucianism contends that an individual’s responsibility overrides his rights (Lee, in de 
Burgh ed., 2005). Second is to ‘get into the social affairs’ (rushi qinghuai). The literati 
were encouraged to be involved in the social affairs of their society. In ancient times, the 
literati used their wisdom to make the reign benevolent. The best way was to become 
officials and then comment on social affairs through consulting (jinjian, 进谏) activity, in 
which the literati raised social problems and offered resolutions to the emperor. A 
benevolent emperor was expected to accept the suggestions. If this failed, the literati were 
supposed to quit (chu shi); otherwise, they might encounter humiliation, such as dismissal 
or even purge. Third is ‘elitism’. The literati normally regarded themselves as being the 
elite class and represented the social consciousness (shehui liangzhi). The ordinary people, 
however, were viewed as the masses that need to be educated and enlightened. 
This synopsis is again inevitably oversimplified, since China is a historically and culturally 
huge country. Yet this research argues that this synopsis contains the most essential 
elements of the literati from a historical-cultural view. When applied to journalism, the 
cultural elements play a latent role in framing the media pattern. In terms of state-media 
relations, the state is easily translated into the ruler, while the media equates to the subject. 
Therefore, the pattern of relations is that the state guides the media. In terms of media-
audience relations, taking the elitist view, the audience are regarded as the masses who 
need to be educated. These elements are very much relevant to journalism in the present 
day (more details in chapters 4 and 5).   
The above traditional cultural elements combining with the wider national crisis had 
fostered a special journalistic genre at the end of 19th century: political commentary from 
the literati (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 111) (wen ren lun zheng). Two features of this 
genre are notable: news reporting and personal comments were mixed, and the comments 
were often fuelled with strong personal feelings (bifeng changdai ganqing) (Fang & Ding 
eds., 2009). The media were conceived as the instrument not only to ‘get the ear of the 
monarch’ (Cheek, 1989: 54), but also to enlighten the masses. Considering the national 
crisis, the literati took a rather proactive tone in advocating nationalism and national 
reforms. This journalistic genre still strikes a responsive chord in present day journalism.  
Xu, Di 2013   
 
57 
The 1920s to the 1930s marked a ‘golden period’ (Zeng, 1989: 317, cited in de Burgh, 
2003: 103) for Chinese journalism. First, political newspapers and privately owned 
commercial newspapers coexisted. Second, a great number of newspapers were able to 
stand high in the market as well as serve the public good. Third, press freedom was 
promoted. In 1930, ‘Regulations for the Protection of Press Freedom were enacted’ (de 
Burgh, 2003: 103). A prominent exemplar at that time was the Da Gong Bao (Lee, in de 
Burgh ed., 2005), a privately owned commercial newspaper whose chief editor, Zhang, 
Jiluan (张季鸾), promulgated four editorial principles (ibid.): 
• Do not ‘align with any political parties’ (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 112) (bu 
dang) 
• Do not ‘be swayed by money’ or ‘accept political subsidies or investments’ (bu 
mai) 
• Do not seek private gains but serve the public (bu si) 
• Do not ‘be blinded by ideology or emotion’ (ibid.) (bu mang).  
 
The first principle is similar to the detachment claim in Western professionalism as 
discussed in Chapter 1. The third is rather like serving the public good in Western 
professionalism. The Da Gong Bao, not only achieved national renown and high 
circulation but also gained the foreign press award from the University of Missouri School 
of Journalism in 1941 for its journalistic integrity (ibid.), and scholars claim that the Da 
Gong Bao was the professional model (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005). Journalism education 
was also on a fast track. Thus, it was suggested that professionalism began to emerge 
during this time (Chen, C., 2007). 
A deeper look, however, may reveal another story. Zhang, Jiluan published an editorial 
note regarding the Missouri award saying that: 
Chinese media are different from Western media in that the Chinese media are 
basically the organ for the literati to deliver political comments rather than a 
business organ. … The humble value of the Da Gong Bao is that although it 
runs as business, it maintains its original feature as the organ for the literati to 
comment on current affairs. (Zhang, 1941)  
The political commentary from the literati was still promoted. Moreover, the media were 
seen as the instrument for the literati to fulfil their responsibility, that is, to serve the 
nation. Although Zhang argued for a detached role and serving the public, this was far 
from achieved in reality. When the Japanese invaded China, the paper voluntarily 
submitted itself to military censorship (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005). ‘National survival 
overrode the professional autonomy it had long advocated’ (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 
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112). Zhang’s principles are indeed similar to the tenets of Anglophone professionalism. 
This research, however, argues that the principles were mainly used to protect the paper 
itself. At that time, China was in political chaos with warlords and political parties 
constantly competing with each other. An alignment with any group could offend others 
and cause trouble for the paper. Thus, a detached political stance was employed to protect 
the paper. Nonetheless, the principles advocated ethical journalistic practices, which 
accorded with Anglophone professionalism. 
Privately owned commercial media existed until 1956 when Mao launched the 
nationalisation campaign. All privately owned media organisations were taken over by the 
party-state. From then on, the party logic began to dominate Chinese journalism. During 
the Cultural Revolution,10 party journalism showed its extreme version. No advertising was 
available through the media as it was considered capitalist spiritual contamination. The 
media merely relied on the party’s subsidy to survive. A great number of media outlets had 
to cease publishing during that time. Yet the surviving media had to print quotes of 
Chairman Mao (mao zhuxi yulu) every day on the front pages. Politics first, facts second 
became the guiding policy for the media (Zhao, 1998).  
A schema provided by Schudson (1989) is helpful to explain the trends and changes of 
communication in China. The schema divides political communication into four types 
(Schudson, 1989: 304): 
• Elite communication: the governors communicate among themselves 
• Hegemonic communication: the governors address the governed 
• Petitionary communication: the governed address the governors 
• Associational communication: the governed communicate among 
themselves 
 
The schema ‘is overly simple, but it facilitates defining the field of discussion and 
clarifying historical trends’ (Schudson, 1989: 305). Generally speaking, from the modern 
origins to the 1970s (except the 1920s and the 1930s), hegemonic communication 
dominated the Chinese media. Yet, since the media began its commercialisation process, 
petitionary communication has begun to emerge. The next part of this section explores the 
process of media commercialisation. 
                                                 
10 The Cultural Revolution started from 1966 to 1976. It was originally a political campaign initiated 
by Mao in the name of removing capitalists from the communist party. Mao brought up the idea that 
the key issue was the class struggle between the proletariat class and the capitalist class. Yet it 
was developed into a national turmoil which paralysed the country in all aspects.  
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2.2 Media commercialisation 
This section traces the evolution of the media from 1978 to the present day, which has 
gone through three phases: the adoption of business management, the reintroduction of 
advertising, and conglomeration and capitalisation. These three phases followed in 
sequential order and have causal links, yet they are overlapping at some points.  
Before looking at the phases specifically, it is necessary to contextualise media 
commercialisation. Media commercialisation started just after the Cultural Revolution. It 
was a critical moment when economic failure and political chaos coexisted. It was also a 
tipping point for the nation when the Zeitgeist was changing dramatically. By and large, 
the old dominant communist ideology was collapsing, while the new one was in demand. 
The party’s leadership under Deng, Xiaoping, launched the Reform and Opening-up policy 
(gaige kaifang), which was intended to shift the focus from class struggle to economic 
development. Yet the old ideological remains still existed at that time. Deng took a 
‘shelving’ strategy, that is, shelving ideological disputes about capitalism and socialism 
(bu zhenglun xing she xing zi), instead focusing on economic development. To some 
extent, Deng managed to shift the party’s legitimacy from a predominantly ‘ideology-
based’ one to a more ‘performance-based’ one (Pei, 1994: 47), and performance was 
principally evaluated by economic development. Thus, the stronger the economy, the more 
solid the one-party reign could be considered. To be more specific, the party-state changed 
to pursue a growth-based legitimacy. This strategy, according to Hu and Li (2005), 
disregarded the contradictions between the new economic development and the old 
ideological remains. This research contends that Deng’s strategy can also be viewed as an 
effort to reconstruct the new ideology which can be best explained by his own words: 
‘development is the absolute principle and top priority’ (fazhan caishi ying daoli he 
shouyao renwu), or in other words, ‘economy first’ (youxian fazhan jingji). 
This was not an invention; rather Deng drew support from history and culture. Similar 
strategies were brought forth every time China was in times of upheaval in history. For 
example, after centuries of humiliation by the West in the Opium wars and the Second 
World War, it was nationally acknowledged that under-development left China vulnerable 
to attack (luohou jiu yao aida). A number of scholars (Chen, C., 2007; Jin, 1999) further 
suggested that becoming rich, powerful, and modernised had become the constant and 
priority pursuit of the Chinese since modern times. Development was the real need to feed 
the world’s largest population, whereas constant humiliation by the West fostered a strong 
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sense of nationalism. Thus, developmentalism and nationalism came to the fore to provide 
new sources of legitimacy for the party-state (Lee et al., 2007). In virtue of the cultural and 
historical heritage, Deng’s snappy, rhyming, slogan-like phrases could readily gain 
consensus among the ruled. In this sense, ‘economy first’ (jingji wei xian) played a 
hegemonic role. The party increasingly attached overriding importance to economic 
development. Thus, media commercialisation started at the time when the party was 
looking for all possible ways to reactivate the economy.  
Subsequently, a brief introduction to Chinese media commercialisation is provided here to 
give a general view. Chinese media commercialisation is not the party press simply being 
replaced by a commercialised media as had happened in the United States and United 
Kingdom in the nineteenth century. It was the theoretically party-owned media that were 
being commercialised (Zhao, 1998). Like the West, advertising became the dominant 
business model for mass media. However, the media’s ownership was not handed over 
from the party to private enterprise. Ironically, the party’s ownership contradicts the logic 
of the market in practice. First, the ownership is not for sale. Second, the media are not 
first and foremost an economic entity. Although economic interests, efficiency, and scale 
merits are highlighted, the media’s primary survival skill in the market is not its economic 
success but its political obedience. The party arbitrarily intrudes into media, sometimes 
impeding the media’s pursuit of economic interests; sometimes compromising with the 
media on a win-win deal; sometimes pushing the media for mercenary journalism. Thus, it 
shows a rather murky trajectory with various powers entangled in a Gordian knot that 
could only be understood on a case-by-case deconstruction (Thomson, in Grenfell ed., 
2008). Thus, a number of scholars argue that it is incomplete commercialisation, 
conditional commercialisation, semi-commercialisation, commercialisation with Chinese 
characteristics (Zhao, 1998), or commercialisation without independence (Chan, in Yu-
shek and Brosseau eds., 1993). Huang et al. (2008) further question whether 
‘commercialisation’ is a suitable term to depict the changes in the media for it was not a 
free media market. In this research, commercialisation is used in its broad sense to refer to 
the ongoing process starting in the late 1970s characterised by the media’s explicit pursuit 
of profits that brought forth a series of changes in the media financing and management 
sectors. The next part of this chapter explores the first phase of media commercialisation: 
the adoption of business management systems. 
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The adoption of business management systems 
It is generally acknowledged that media commercialisation started when the first 
advertisement reappeared on 28th January 1979 in the Jiefang Daily (jiefang ribao), the 
party organ of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China. In 
fact, scholars argued that there was one earlier step that laid the groundwork for future 
commercial reforms (Chen, H. L., 1999; Zhao, 1998): the adoption of business 
management systems.  
In the 1970s, media finances were fully controlled by the corresponding governmental 
bureaus. For example, the China Central Television (CCTV) did not have its own financial 
department. All its expenses were met and its budget was allocated by the Ministry of 
Finance (MF). As a consequence, there was no need to allocate advertising time. 
Additionally, staff were paid at the organisation’s administrative level (xingzheng jibie). 
For example, copy editors working for the People’s Daily and the Economics Daily were 
paid the same amount for the two were both vice-ministerial level (fu buji) newspapers. 
There were no economic incentives for job-hopping.  
In 1978, the People’s Daily and a number of other major media organisations reported to 
the MF applying to employ a new business management system under which the individual 
media organisations could manage their own finances. The MF gave permission and 
selected a number of media organisations as pilots. The pilot media organisations were 
able to keep the surplus after turning in the assigned tax and spend the surplus on staff 
welfare and equipment upgrades, which presumably promoted their development in the 
market. This privilege, however, was selectively given to politically loyal media. In this 
sense, the political advantages were proportionally converted into economic benefits under 
the party’s manipulation. Thus, the party managed to interlink political resources with 
economic results. For the media, in order to benefit, news organisations would follow the 
party’s guidelines. This is a key strategy that the party employed in the process of media 
commercialisation. In virtue of the interlocking between political forces and economic 
forces, it was possible that the vested interest groups would become ‘silent partners’ in 
sustaining the current party-dominated media system (Zhao, 2000). Lee et al. (2007) 
insightfully depicted this interlink as ‘clientelism’ which is ‘a pattern of (particularistic and 
asymmetrical) social organization in which access to social resources is controlled by 
patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various kinds of support’ 
(Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 184-185). For Lee et al. (2007), clientelism, on the 
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one hand, reveals the purposiveness of the party’s policy, while on the other hand it depicts 
the interlocking complexity between the media and the party. This characteristic also 
marks future reforms, which will be detailed in later parts. 
Another notable change at that time was that ‘the journalistic partisanship tilt[ed] away 
from the state and toward public interests and demands’ (Polumbaum, in Lee ed., 1990: 
36). The Cultural Revolution seriously depleted the party’s legitimacy. It would be 
improper to strengthen media control just after the Cultural Revolution. Thus, China 
enjoyed a period of political relaxation. Besides, the party was also aiming to improve the 
administrative management, since it might facilitate economic growth. Scholars viewed the 
span from 1978 to 1989 as the best period for journalism since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Zhao, 1998; Tong, 1994). Journalists began to embrace 
‘petitionary communication’ (Schudson, 1989) by contending public interests.  
A prominent example is the reporting of the sinking of the Bo Sea No. 2 drilling ship 
(bohai erhao chenchuan shigu). On 25 November 1979, a drilling ship sank during moving 
operation on the Bo Sea, which caused huge economic losses and 72 fatalities. It was a 
typical case of a bureaucratic bungle, partly due to the poor management which violated 
working regulations. However, the governmental agency in charge covered up the 
wrongdoing by contending that it was caused by natural disaster. Eight months later, the 
Workers’ Daily published a lengthy investigative report exposing the officials’ negligence 
in this tragedy. The report provoked wide public criticism towards the governmental 
agency, which led to the sacking of a minister and a public apology from a vice prime 
minister.11 Critical coverage like this and ‘journalism of a quantity and breadth that had 
never before been seen in Communist China could be found in the newspapers’ (de Burgh, 
2003: 63). In 1981, the party issued propaganda guidelines, which advocated opinion 
supervision and public scrutiny (yulun jiandu) to expose and correct wrongdoings by 
officials. The reports of this kind boomed. A famous case is the report on the 1987 Greater 
Hinggan fire (daxing’anling dahuo), which took nearly a month to put out. The China 
Youth Daily published three consecutive reports disclosing the officials’ malpractices and 
poor management. The reports forced the dismissals of two ministers.12 Thus, the 1980s 
was marked with greater autonomy and freedom to conduct investigative reporting until 
                                                 
11 A reflection report on this is available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-11-
25/104916720870.shtml, accessed 10 April 2014.  
12 Reports on this are available at: http://zqb.cyol.com/gb/special/2004-06/-1/content_880396.htm, 
accessed 10 April 2014.  
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1989 when journalists joined the soaring crowds to walk on the street calling for press 
freedom and political democracy for the very first time in Chinese history. 
At the same time, journalism education was westernising with objectivity, neutrality, 
detachment, and other tenets of professionalism being introduced into curricula and 
textbooks (Polumbaum, in Lee ed., 1990). Even press freedom was seen as an overt issue. 
A draft of media law was discussed by the delegates of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China in 1989. According to one 
of the drafters, Hu, Jiwei, who was former editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, the core 
idea of media law was to protect freedom of expression (Zhao, 1998). The draft of media 
law in China was warmly welcomed, for the law would help restrain the interventions from 
the party-state. The Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, however, aborted the media law 
process and the media’s pursuit of press freedom virtually ceased. After rectification from 
1989 to 1992, commercialisation became the order of the day from 1992 onwards (Zhao, 
1998). The commercialisation from 1992 to the end of 1990s was marked by skyrocketing 
development of media advertising, which is discussed in the next part. 
Advertising as the new business model 
The advertising industry expanded at an unprecedented rate. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
more than one-third of the 2,039 officially registered newspapers were self-sufficient, and 
many of those made handsome profits (Pan, in Lee ed., 2000). In late 1992, the party 
required all major newspapers to achieve self-sufficiency by 1994 (Zhao, 2000). However, 
the party continued to subsidise a small number of national party organs and national 
broadcasts. This support was rather symbolic. Take China Central Television (CCTV) as 
an example. CCTV received 8.27 million Yuan (approximately £0.83 million) in 2001, 
while its advertising revenue in the same year reached 5.18 billion Yuan (approximately 
£518 million), more than six hundred times the party’s subsidy (Miao, in Shirk ed., 2011: 
94). At the beginning of the 2000s, it is estimated that 95 per cent of press revenue came 
from advertising (ibid.). Thus, advertising revenue became the new lifeblood of mass 
media (Zhao, 1998) replacing the party’s patronage. The media were then required to remit 
a portion of their revenues to the government as taxation or as donation. In 2004, it is 
widely appraised that the media jumped to the forth-largest industry in terms of its taxation 
contribution (The Annual Revenue of the Media Industry Reached Over 100 Billion Yuan, 
2002).  
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The impact was twofold. First, advertising changed journalistic culture. A number of 
media organisations became financial giants, being able to use the surplus to build lavish 
office mansions, such as the Beijing Youth Daily, the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, some 
of which were once the most magnificent buildings in the city. The media’s handsome 
profits also significantly benefited journalists. One interviewee recalled, ‘in the middle of 
the 1990s, my media organisation was so profitable that I got 3,000 Yuan (approximately 
£300) on my birthday annually’ (Personal communications No. 6, 15 January 2012). 
Another interviewee said, ‘I am really grateful to my media organisation. In the late 1990s, 
I was given a two-bedroom flat in Beijing for free plus a free car.  Most of my colleagues 
got the same as I did. That was indeed a golden time for journalists’ (Personal 
communications No. 5, 14 January 2012). Journalists entered into the ‘new rich’ class. One 
interviewee in the focus group said, ‘journalists got well paid in the late 1990s with the 
monthly salary reaching over 10,000 Yuan [approximately £1,000], ten-fold compared 
with the average worker’s month wages’ (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 
2012). On the one hand, journalists’ ideal pursuit of a democratic system was crushed in 
the 1989 crackdown, but on the other hand, the sudden economic boom provided a new 
ideal for the journalists: material gains (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005). Echoing the 
discussions in Chapter 1, surveys found that in the late 1980s, the majority of journalists 
were frustrated by lack of autonomy and the party’s intrusion (Polumbaum, in Lee ed., 
1990). In the 1990s, however, journalists seemed to be less sensitive to job autonomy (Lee, 
in de Burgh ed., 2005) and became increasingly more concerned with material gains 
(Zhang & Su, in Weaver and Willnat eds., 2012). More importantly, a concomitant of 
media commercialisation was pervasive journalistic corruption, which is discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
Advertising also facilitated a shift in journalistic practices. As the competition for 
advertising was fierce, media organisations spared no efforts in gaining more audiences in 
return for more advertisements. They endeavoured to provide better news reporting. A 
range of cash awards were introduced to encourage better reporting, such as exclusive 
news awards, best story awards, and so forth. In some cases, the awards were even 
thrilling. It was widely circulated that a journalist in the Guangzhou Daily who published a 
phenomenal report was awarded a two-bedroom flat in the city centre (The Crazy 
Newspaper Man: the Red and the Black of Li, Yuanjiang, 2008). This climate pressed 
journalists to improve their journalistic skills such as through polished writing, better 
photography, and unearthing exclusive stories. In addition, media organisations began to 
refine their internal structures. Operational and financial departments were set up which 
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directly reported to the publisher. The editors-in-chief were then mainly responsible for 
news making. The financial department, which took charge of soliciting advertisements, 
became more powerful overriding the news-making department. A vice editor-in-chief 
complained that ‘they [the financial staff] called occasionally and just ordered us to 
withdraw some fantastic stories in order not to offend the advertisers. We had no choice 
but to listen to them’ (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012).  
Second, the new business model changed the media structure. The prosperous advertising 
industry provided financial support for a media boom. The newcomers flooded in. In 1979, 
only 186 newspapers existed in Mainland China (Rosen, in Lee ed., 2000: 152), most of 
which were party organs. By 1993, openly circulated newspapers had reached 2,000 and 
have hovered around 2000 since then (ibid.). It is documented that from 1992 to 1994, a 
new title was published every 1½ days (Zhao, 2000). These new titles were mainly 
supervised by governmental bureaucracies and non-party organisations. As most of the 
new titles did not get any funds from their superiors or the party, they had to finance 
themselves. They put more emphasis on daily life stories and entertainment stories to 
appeal to the urban class. Thus, they were generally called ‘mass-appeal media’. This was 
also the case for the broadcasting sector. More and more channels were set up mainly 
covering daily life information.  
The most significant change is that the leading status of the party media in the market was 
eroded by the mass-appeal ones. At the early ages of economic reform, the editorial pages 
were too limited to accommodate advertisements. Advertisers who wanted their 
advertisement on the Xinmin Evening News, a mass-appeal newspaper in Shanghai, had to 
wait one and a half months until advertising pages became available (Chen & Huang, 
1997). Consequently, a number of newspapers attempted to publish weekend pages. And 
then, the weekday pages also expanded. These pages, mainly about human interest stories 
and investigative reports, attracted large audiences, which in turn obtained more 
advertisements. The party media, however, had mandatory propaganda topics to cover, 
which were less attractive to audiences. Thus, they were less favourable to advertisers. The 
revenue figures further indicated the party media’s declining tendency. Before 1990, the 
top party organ, the People’s Daily, had been the top newspaper in terms of its advertising 
revenue. However, after 1990, it dropped to the bottom, and from 1995 onwards, 
disappeared from the top-ten advertising revenue list (Chen & Huang, 1997). Additionally, 
over 70 per cent of the party organs were in a loss at the beginning of 2000s (Li, 2004). 
More and more journalists who used to work for the party media jumped to more profitable 
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mass-appeal media causing the party media to experience a brain drain. This was not only 
the case for ordinary journalists but for senior workers as well. For instance, the editor-in-
chief of the Huaxi Metro Daily, a new mass-appeal newspaper, used to be the vice editor-
in-chief of the Sichuan Daily, the party organ of Sichuan province. To some extent, the 
mass-appeal newspapers and channels deconstructed the orthodox party media’s power. 
However, the declining tendency of the party media turned around when the party initiated 
media conglomeration. 
Notably, advertising fostered a change in propaganda information as well. As the party still 
attached propaganda tasks to mass media, the media tried to dress them up in order not to 
annoy audiences. For example, the Beijing Youth Daily shortened propaganda information 
into less than three sentences placed on the top left corner of the front page. This smart 
tactic managed to highlight the political importance meanwhile leaving more space for the 
non-propaganda reports. The propaganda information was softened to cater to the public. 
For instance, the party set up a local official as the new moral model and ordered the media 
to propagandise his dedication to his job. One mass-appeal newspaper interviewed his wife 
to dig out his personal life which formed a touching and interesting story. This article was 
then widely circulated. The editor proudly concluded that the propaganda information 
could be dressed up into a newsworthy story (Personal communications No. 4, on multiple 
days). In this case, the boundary between news and propaganda is blurred. Furthermore, 
propaganda was able to become a commodity ‘for sale’ (Stockmann, 2007).  
In order to reverse the downsizing situation of the party media, the party-state initiated a 
new policy, media conglomeration, thus allowing the profiting mass-appeal media to cross-
subsidise the party media. The next part of this chapter looks at conglomeration. 
Conglomeration, diversification, and capitalisation: a 
strategy led by the party-state 
In the second half of 1990s, the party media suffered a downturn both in circulation and in 
influence. The party media began to publish spin-offs or to launch new channels to turn 
things around. For example, the Nanfang Daily, the party organ of Guangdong province, 
set up Nanfang Metro Daily, a mass-appeal newspaper. These subsidiaries targeted the 
urban family with juicy infotainment. The handsome profits were then allocated to support 
their ‘mother’ party media. The party tacitly approved this practice for it was in the favour 
of the party. In other words, the money was virtually appropriated from the market to feed 
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the party’s propaganda. In this sense, the market and the party reached a fusion. The fusion 
was further enhanced when conglomeration started. 
In 1996, one of the most commercially successful party organs, the Guangzhou Daily, was 
handpicked by the party to pilot a media group. Actually, the paper had already 
experimented with running six subsidiaries (Zhao, 2000). Given further operational 
autonomy, the paper began to diversify its business area. At the end of the 1990s, the paper 
invested a large sum of money in buying land from relocated enterprises and soon became 
the top real-estate broker in Guangzhou (The Crazy Newspaper Man: the Red and the 
Black of Li, Yuanjiang, 2008). Moreover, the paper set up dozens of kiosks which 
vigorously promoted its sale.  
This conglomeration was principally driven by the party which presented a top-down 
trajectory. Party media officials viewed conglomeration as a means to realise political and 
economic coalition. The purpose, as the party leaders explicitly put it, was to ‘enable party 
organs to consolidate a powerful economic base through the market mechanism and ensure 
the better fulfilment of the Party’s propaganda objectives’ (Tan, 1997: 254, cited in Zhao, 
2000). The party planned roughly ten groups in the first stage, which enclosed profitable 
mass-appeal media organisations and politically important party media. Through 
conglomeration, profitable party organs were strengthened; unprofitable ones were cross 
subsidised by commercially successful mass-appeal ones; chaotic competition was 
weakened; and the proliferation of minor media outlets was limited (Zhao, 2000). The key 
characteristic was that the conglomeration was led by the party-state instead of a 
spontaneous market imperative (ibid.). The merger was at the party’s will rather than 
according to market imperative. 
Conglomeration brought joy to some and sorrow to others. In the case of the Xinmin-
Wenhui Group, the marriage proved to be a miserable one. In 1998, Shanghai authorities 
forced the Xinwen Evening News to merge with the Wenhui Daily. The former was the 
second mass-appeal newspaper in terms of advertising revenue, and the latter was destitute 
but elitist. The consolidation centralised the advertising management and shuffled the 
managerial personnel. After this feudally arranged marriage, both suffered downward 
circulation. Moreover, the present whole advertising revenue is smaller than the sum of its 
former parts (Lee et al., 2007: 29). Another case, the Beijing Daily Group, also showed 
this predicament. A journalist in the Beijing Evening News, the top driving force and a 
mass-appeal one within the group, said, ‘it is so annoying that we had to feed other poor 
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publications. We used to have quite a comfortable life. But after the merger, our salaries 
were reduced to make odds even within the group’ (Personal communications No. 6, 15 
January 2012). Yet the party organs gained considerable benefits. They obtained financial 
support from the profitable mass appealing newspapers. In virtue of this, the propaganda 
information on party media was paid for by the advertisements on mass appealing papers. 
The mass-appeal media were hit badly by this coalition. An interviewee complained that 
‘journalists’ wages had never been raised since the middle of the 1990s’ (F-6, a mixed 
group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012). In fact, after the conglomeration started, journalists 
working for mass-appeal media organisations suffered a downgrade in terms of the salary 
and welfare benefits. However, the party media increased their salary levels thanks to the 
money appropriated from the mass-appeal subsidiaries. Thus, the party media enjoyed a 
reverse exodus.  
From the beginning of the 2000s, the party further initiated media capitalisation. Only a 
few of the major media groups were allowed to pilot this. As mentioned above, the party 
owns the media theoretically. Nevertheless, the most bizarre and odd part is that no one 
specifically exercises rights and duties as the owner of a title. In 2007, the Jiefang Daily 
Group was listed on the stock market, putting the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda 
Department as its property owner (Chen, L., in Pan & Wu ed., 2008: 20). In practice, it is 
normally the chief propaganda official who exerts the decisive power on behalf of the 
party. The executives of the media groups are less engaged with the final decisions. They 
are appointed by the party and perform duties under the directives from the propaganda 
official. One executive of a media group said wryly, ‘the party is the boss. I am merely a 
wage earner authorised by the boss to take care of state assets’ (Cited in Lee et al., 2007). 
Another added, ‘It does not matter whether you yield decent profits or not as long as you 
are not in a loss. The profits have nothing to do with your own purse, but may promote you 
into a political path. If you choose to stay in journalism, it must be the ideals instead of any 
material incentives that support you’ (I-6, Beijing, 17 January 2012).  
It is sometimes not as attractive as it looks to be a media executive. In spite of lacking 
material incentives, they constantly encounter dilemmas: to defer to the propaganda 
official’s will or to follow the market imperative. For instance, a vice editor-in-chief 
complained, ‘money in your pocket does not mean you can spend it. The propaganda 
superiors often ask you to buy unprofitable propaganda units. We were told to buy a 
theatre. After we successfully turned it into a good business, the official ordered us to 
transfer it to another performing arts group at an unbelievably low price’ (I-1, a vice 
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editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). Another case is more illustrative. The Wenhui-
Xinwen Press Group in Shanghai was told to remit 300-400 million Yuan to the party 
every year as taxation and donation (Lee et al., 2007: 36). However, this was not enough. 
Occasionally, the group was forced to support other propaganda units. Once, the chief 
propaganda official ordered the group to finance the infrastructure of an opera house 
(ibid.). Another broadcasting group was forced to donate 100 million Yuan (approximately 
£10 million) to refurbish a theatre to be used by Fudan University from which the official 
himself had graduated (ibid.). Furthermore, in order to implement orders smoothly, the 
chief propaganda official and executives of the media had to foster good relationships. In 
reality, the relationships were built on personal ties. For instance, the president of the 
Wenhui-Xinwen Press Group used to be the classmate of the chief propaganda official. 
Additionally, the assistant of the official was promoted to the executive of a broadcasting 
group (ibid.). This is not unusual in the Chinese context where the interpersonal connection 
plays an essential role in everyday life. 
This chapter has examined the development of media from its origins to its most recent 
state. This chapter now explores media structure and media administrative control in the 
present day. 
2.3 Media structure and administrative control in 
the present day 
This section first examines the scope and structure of the media and then discusses the 
administrative control over the media. 
Media scope and structure 
According to the annul report published by the World Association of Newspapers and 
News Publishers, China was one of the top five press markets in the world based on copies 
of newspapers sold per day (Chen, Z., 2010). Based on the statistical communiqué from 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (China Statistical Yearbook, 2012), the numbers of 
newspaper titles, magazine titles, and broadcasting media are illustrated in figures 5, 6, 7 
respectively. 
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Figure 5 The number of newspaper titles from 1978 to 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 6 The number of magazine titles from 1978 to 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 7 The number of radio and television programmes  
 
 
As shown in the above figures, the number of newspaper titles was climbing from 1978 
until the end of 1990s. From the 2000 onwards, the total number of newspapers stopped 
rising and hovered around 2,000. This is principally due to the conglomeration and 
consolidation of the media sector at that time. As discussed above, the party managed to 
keep the scale of newspapers steady making it easier to control. The number of magazines 
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showed a striking increase. This is partly because of the statistical method in which trade 
journals and academic journal were all included. The number of broadcasting programmes 
remained relatively steady. 
In terms of circulation, the Chinese media are large. Yet the real influence of the Chinese 
media is essentially under question due to its unique media system which is examined 
subsequently. For example, the People’s Daily, the top party organ, sold approximately 
2.35 million copies per year which is among top ten best-selling paid-for dailies in the 
world (Chen, Z., 2010). The high selling figure is actually based on the mandatory 
subscription which is imposed by propaganda departments at each level (cf. reports about 
subscription mobilisation13). 
In terms of the media structure, it is considerably predictable, for it is more or less 
replicated at national, provincial, prefectural, and county level (Zhao, 1998). At the 
national level, the top four party media include one broadcaster, the China Central 
Television (CCTV), one news agency, the Xinhua News Agency, one radio station, the 
Central People’s Radio Station (CPR) and one press, the People’s Daily. Particularly, the 
Xinhua News Agency is also a component of the state council. At the provincial level, there 
is typically one radio station, one TV station and one party organ. These three usually play 
an agenda-setting role, especially in big events. For example, only journalists from these 
three are permitted to interview senior officials. The reports and editorials are often 
transmitted to other local news outlets for reprint. There are also mass-appeal newspapers 
circulated nationwide. Yet the majority of such newspapers are circulated within provinces 
or cities. 
In terms of the typology of the media, the press can be classified into four levels according 
to circulation region: national, provincial, prefectural, and county. By function, the press 
can be grouped into three types: party organ, mass-appeal newspaper, and special interest 
newspaper. The special interest newspapers are normally funded by governmental agencies 
or quangos serving as propaganda instruments for such agencies. For example, the China 
                                                 
13 ‘Seven Moves to Accomplish the People’s Daily Subscription Mission in Xi’an’, [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/14562/2255675.html (Accessed: 18 
September 2011). It is reported that propaganda officials required that governmental agencies 
should appropriate financial budget funds if needed to accomplish the subscription. Several cases 
available as follows: ‘Mobilizing the People’s Daily Subscription in Shangrao’, [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper40/8073/764516.html (Accessed: 18 September 2011); ‘The 
Video Phone Meeting to mobilise Subscription of the People’s Daily in Shanghai and Other Cities’, 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.aiyoubian.com/youbiannews/3/353/ (Accessed: 18 September 
2011).   
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Transportation Newspaper is funded by the Ministry of Transportation, which is 
specialised in reporting achievements in the transportation system. By revenue basis, there 
is the market-driven press, or in other words, the mass-appeal press, and party subsidising 
press. Normally, the mass-appeal press does not receive subsidies from the party. Yet the 
revenue basis of the party organ is a mixed one. It not only receives subsidies from the 
party but also gains advertising revenue from the market. Additionally, the party organ also 
gets revenue from its subsidiary mass-appeal newspapers.  
The broadcasting media are heavily controlled by the party-state, for it is the primary 
instrument to deliver propaganda into every household. Zhao identified two characteristics 
of the broadcasting media: hierarchic and monopolistic (1998: 94). The former is reflected 
in the structure of the broadcasting media. The party-state designed a four-layered 
broadcasting structure (siji ban tai), which closely resembles administrative bureaucracy 
(Huang et al., 2008). That is, the broadcasting media were established at national, 
provincial, prefectural, and town level and affiliated to propaganda departments at each 
level. The broadcasting media are monopolistic in that only one television and one radio 
station is permitted to set up at each administrative level.14 As indicated, there is only one 
television station in Beijing, the Beijing Television Station. Thus, there exists no inter-
organisational competition. In the 1990s, the broadcasting media began to multiply its 
channels. For instance, CCTV has over 10 channels. Thus, intra-organisational competition 
began between different channels. The party still subsidises the broadcasting media. 
Meanwhile, the broadcasting media also makes handsome profits from advertising. Thus, 
its revenue basis is a mixed one as well. Yet it is fair to claim that the broadcasting media 
are digital version of party organs since they must only be set up by governmental agencies 
or propaganda offices. A typology of media is provided as follows: 
Figure 8 The typology of Chinese media 
 
  By region By function By revenue basis 
Newspapers and 
magazines 
National/provincial/prefectural/town Party organ/mass-
appeal/special interest 
Market-driven/mixed 
revenue 
Broadcasting National/provincial/prefectural/town Party organ Mixed revenue 
 
As discussed above, the media are set up to resemble the bureaucratic structure of the 
governmental agencies. This chapter now turns to look at how the media are 
administratively controlled by the government. 
                                                 
14 Shanghai and Guangzhou are two exceptions, for there are two television stations in the two 
megacities.  
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The administrative control of media 
The Chinese media control system was originally patterned after the former Soviet model 
created by Lenin. Its core argument is that the mass media should be the party’s collective 
propagandist, agitator, and organiser (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2012). CCP media 
control theory was based on Lenin’s legacy. Just after the CCP was founded in 1921. The 
party issued its media control rules: ‘journals, daily publications, books and booklets must 
be managed by the party’s central executive committee’ and ‘no central or local 
publications should carry any article that opposes the party’s principles, policies and 
decisions’ (Zhao, 1998: 19). Later on, the party systematically elaborated its media control 
theory in ‘the party principle of journalism’ (xinwen shiye de dangxing yuanze). The 
principle has three basic components (Zhao, 1998): 
• The media must accept the party’s guiding ideology as its own 
• The media must propagate the party’s policies and directives 
• The media must accept the party’s leadership and stick to the party’s 
organisational principles and press policies 
 
In sum, in the party’s view, the media should be the mouthpiece of the party. This is 
accomplished by two means: ideological control by the Central Propaganda Department15 
(CPD) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and administrative 
control through corresponding governmental agencies, such as the General Administration 
of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT).16 This chapter focuses on administrative control measures, which are 
explicit and often drafted in written documents. The ideological control mechanism, 
however, is relatively implicit or even insidious, which is explored in detail in Chapter 4.  
Administrative control is achieved through three main measures: a licensing system, 
administrative level control, and staff control. As discussed above, there is no law 
regarding media establishment issues. Consequently, the GAPP and SARFT issued 
managing rules to regulate the press, magazines, broadcasters and radio stations in 2005 
and 1997 respectively: the Press Publication Regulation and the Broadcasting 
                                                 
15 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the official English name of this institution used to be the Central 
Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China. Recently, ‘Propaganda’ was replaced 
by ‘Publicity’ in order to lessen the negative connotation. Its Chinese name did not change because 
‘xuanchuan’ in Chinese can be either propaganda or publicity. 
16 These two institutions were merged into one in 2013 when this research was in drafting. The 
GAPP was originally supervising the press, whereas the SARFT oversees the broadcasting media. 
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Regulation.17 According to the regulations,18 all of the press are obliged to be affiliated 
with a party cell, governmental agency or admissive organisations which are politically 
qualified for publication and answerable to the propaganda departments at the 
corresponding level. The party cells then apply for the license from the GAPP. If approved, 
the press will be set up under the direct supervision of the party cell. Radio stations and 
broadcasters must only be set up by the administration of radio, film and broadcasting at 
the corresponding level. Therefore, private ownership of media is prohibited. Furthermore, 
private investment into the media is also blocked.  
Furthermore, all media are built into the administrative bureaucracy and organised 
according to the ranks similar to governmental institutions. Each medium stands one level 
below its licensing sponsor and must be supervised locally. For example, the Beijing Youth 
Daily (BYD) is a mass-appeal newspaper sponsored by the Beijing Communist Youth 
League (BCYL). The BCYL is at the departmental level (ju ji) in Beijing, and so the BYD 
is at the vice departmental level. All governmental agencies and party cells that are above 
the level of the BYD can issue orders to the BYD. The BYD is directly supervised by the 
BCYL in theory. In reality, however, the BYD is directed by the Beijing Propaganda 
Office.  
In terms of staff control, the key measure is that the publishers and the editors-in-chief are 
appointed by the joint efforts of the party’s propaganda office, the party’s organisational 
office, and the licensing sponsors. Furthermore, all media workers must take courses and 
pass exams, which centre on the party principle of journalism, organised by the GAPP and 
the SARFT to get the certificate. A journalist card with personal ID photo is then issued. 
Unlike Western journalists who are normally against a state-sanctioned certificate, Chinese 
journalists are commonly in favour of the certificate and the journalist card in that the right 
                                                 
17 ‘The press publication regulation’, the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), 
[Online]. Available at: 
http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=7DtDCpACBfk7pv2dWqYZrnTEn8VZxL0wzaxeOY3WSTIUsryTCts
n3tANf9lCwxow (Accessed: 11 February 2011). ‘Broadcasting regulation’, the State Administration 
of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), [Online]. Available at: 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/438163.htm (Accessed: 11 February 2011). 
18 In the Chinese context, the regulations issued by governmental agencies often have law-like 
status, not to mention that certain governmental agencies have the power to make laws. In 
general, the National Congress of the People’s Republic of China and its Standing Committee has 
the power to make laws. Yet in reality, congress has authorised a number of governmental 
agencies to make laws. For example, congress has authorised the central government to make 
laws regarding levying taxes. The issue of law-making in China is not a concern in this research, 
yet it is necessary to point out that the difference between the regulations and rules issued by the 
governmental agencies and the laws issued by the congress is rather vague. Ordinary people often 
regard the regulations and rules as the laws.     
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to interview is somehow better guaranteed if such certificates are presented. This is 
because it is commonly required to present the journalist card to enter some gated 
governmental buildings. Interestingly, it also exists because some people may disguise 
themselves as journalists and blackmail businessmen by threatening to expose their illegal 
activities. After such cases were widely reported, journalists found it difficult to approach 
interviewees. Thus, the GAPP and the SARFT set up a public website which listed 
registered journalists (related discussion given in Chapter 5). This chapter now concludes 
by summarising key historical elements that have left footprints on contemporary 
journalism. 
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has first explored the historical origins of Chinese journalism. Exploring the 
origins is significant not only because the origins have laid the foundation for the 
journalistic patterns in the present day, but also because historical evidence is often 
employed to validate the existing order (cf. Chapter 1). Furthermore, as a centuries-old 
country, China has an essentially bureaucratic historiographical tradition (Jenner, 1994: 5). 
The most influential histories are exclusively complied by the central governments who 
have taken history much too seriously to allow the future to make its own unguided 
judgements about them (ibid.). In this sense, Jenner argued that history has a homogenising 
effect (ibid.). In short, history provides sources of legitimacy, and the sources have been 
approved by the state.  
This chapter has revealed that journalistic practitioners in the early days regarded 
themselves as literati characterised with a strong sense of social responsibilities, getting 
involved in social affairs as an elite class. The historical context and the traditional culture 
created a specific journalistic genre: political commentary from the literati, which mixes 
personal emotional opinions with news. This genre is a variant journalistic form compared 
to Western professionalism. This form still pervades contemporary journalism and 
journalists still regard themselves as intellectuals (Lu, 2004), which can be traced back to 
the literati. This research discusses the implication of this cultural tradition in more detail 
in Chapter 4. 
This chapter has also discussed media commercialisation in great detail, which started at 
almost the same time as other social reforms enacted by the Reform and Opening-up 
policy. The party-state loosened its economic control by introducing the market 
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mechanism into the media. Simultaneously, the party-state contends that the media should 
continue to be the party’s ‘throat and tongue’ (hou she). More importantly, although 
advertising revenue became the business model of Chinese media similar to that of the 
Western media, the media’s ownership is still in the hands of the party-state. The 
proprietorship, however, is symbolic as vividly illustrated in the case of the Jiefang Daily 
Group, which put the local propaganda office as its proprietor when listed on the stock 
market. Yet nobody can exercise proprietor’s rights.  
It is commonly believed that tight media control contradicts the free market logic which 
may deter media development. The case of Chinese journalism, however, presents counter 
evidence. The party-state managed to reconcile the two poles by deliberately granting 
market-friendly policies to politically loyal media. By virtue of this, the media can achieve 
a leading place in the market. Lee et al. (2007) have identified this as clientelism, in which 
the party offers patronage in exchange for conformity. ‘Clientelism’ seems to hold strong 
explanatory value for some of the key measures taken in the process of Chinese media 
commercialisation, such as the adoption of business management systems, conglomeration, 
and capitalisation. In the case of capitalisation, the party allows a small number of media 
groups to be listed on the stock market. The party grants opportunities for lucrative returns, 
meanwhile the media expect more profits. This is not a fair trade in that the party controls 
the social resources and owns the media theoretically. Thus, the media’s material gains 
benefit the party’s purse.  
This research has constructed a conceptual framework by reviewing the existing 
scholarship regarding journalistic culture in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, the historical context 
has been examined and the current drivers of media change have been located. This 
research now reports on the methodology in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodology employed in this research, which is composed of 
two stages: desk research and fieldwork. Thus, the first section reports on the aspects of the 
desk research. In terms of the fieldwork, two research traditions are available: the 
quantitative and the qualitative. This research embraces a qualitative approach. The second 
section gives an overview of qualitative research as an effort to elaborate on the reasons 
behind the researcher’s choice of methods. To be specific, focus group interviews and 
individual interviews are employed as the main data collection tools. The third section 
delineates the key features of the focus group interviews and the individual interviews 
respectively. This chapter concludes by providing a summary and a self-reflection on the 
fieldwork. The next part of this chapter reports on desk research. 
3.1 Desk research 
The desk research was carried out from October to November 2011. Initially, the 
researcher intended to have a general view of what qualitative research entails. 
Consequently, the first stage of reading mainly focused on the theoretical writings, such as 
Denzin and Lincoln’s Handbook of Qualitative Research and Bryman and Burgess’s 
Qualitative Research. Second, the researcher turned to read guidebooks illustrating ‘how to 
do’ focus group and individual interviews, such as Morgan et al.’s The Focus Group Kit. 
Morgan et al. have supplied exhaustive procedures to conduct focus group interviews with 
extensive examples. Whereas the Kit (1997) is predominantly designed for conducting 
market-oriented focus group interviews, and is therefore relatively lacking in theoretical 
concerns. 
Thereafter, the researcher aimed to locate specific studies conducted by media researchers 
with detailed fieldwork considerations. Unfortunately, it seems that fieldwork issues are 
somewhat ignored by media researchers. Lunt and Livingstone (1993) have provided a 
summary of focus group interviews in communication research, but this lacks a practical 
guide to conduct one. The Nationwide Audience (Morley, 1980) is regarded as a 
remarkable piece of research employing the focus group interview in media research which 
merely presents a one-page explanation for how the interviews were organised. Notably, 
Schlesinger (in Christian ed., 1980) has provided a detailed report on fieldwork aspects 
such as the access and the relationship between the researcher and the subject. The method, 
however, is participant observation, which is excluded in this research. This research has 
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provided a description of the fieldwork proceedings. The researcher believes that, on the 
one hand, a faithful account of the fieldwork is valuable for further research, but on the 
other hand, it facilitates the researcher to articulate on self-reflection during the fieldwork.  
This research employs a qualitative approach. Thus, the reading work heavily concentrated 
on this. In the United States, the quantitative method dominates communication research. 
The decennial survey of American journalists conducted by Weaver and his colleagues 
(1986; 1996; 2007) is representative of quantitative studies. Owing to the standard and 
systematic questionnaire data, Weaver (1998) was able to compile similar journalist 
surveys worldwide for comparison, which infers journalism to be a non-profession. 
However, the ‘nomothetic’ (Bryman, in Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999: 36) nature of 
quantitative findings, referring to the ‘general law-like findings irrespective of time and 
place’ (Bryman, in Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999: 41), is questionable in the perspective of 
the present-day qualitative research. Qualitative research claims that all inquiries and 
writings are inextricably selective (Peshkin, 1993; Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999). 
Furthermore, since meanings are socially, historically, and contextually constructed, it 
would be inadvisable to pursue a ‘nomothetic’ explanation.  
Accordingly, a number of methodological options are available, such as participant 
observation and different forms of interview. Schlesinger (in Christian ed., 1980: 363) 
highly recommends an ethnographic approach, namely participant observation, to examine 
news production. Participant observation ‘permits the theoretically informed observation 
of the actual social practices which constitute cultural production’ (ibid.). Schlesinger 
further claims that ‘all forms of external analysis of products face intractable problems of 
inference concerning the production process as such, and therefore contain an explanatory 
lacuna’ (ibid.). This research, however, employs focus group interviews and individual 
interviews as the main data collection methods, for the researcher believes that the two 
methods are well fitted to the researcher’s personal background. The researcher worked as 
a political journalist for four years in Beijing and Shanghai, which has armed the 
researcher with sufficient knowledge of newsroom jargon, norms, and news production 
processes that would alternatively be provided through ethnographic methods. In the 
fieldwork, the researcher acted as an insider who was knowledgeable of professional 
norms and a collaborator who was working with the subjects to generate meanings. In 
other words, this research views the subjects as the active agents whom the researcher 
learns from and co-operates with.  
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As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, this research is largely based on the 
researcher’s personal experience as a political journalist for four years. This working 
experience facilitates mutual understanding between the researcher and the participants. In 
fact, the research questions are somewhat sensitive in the Chinese context. Before the 
fieldwork, the researcher worried that the participants might be reluctant to disclose any 
corrupt practices they had taken part in. The fieldwork discussions proved that the 
researcher was over-anxious. Due to similar working experiences, the participants regarded 
the researcher as an insider who shared similar feelings with them rather than an outsider 
who came to judge and exploit from them. Although the researcher very much regrets the 
corrupt practices she conducted during her working years, the researcher would not judge 
the participants ‘using hindsight’ (Ellis et al., 201119) but try to understand the reasons 
behind their practices.   
The project is also a self-reflection journey for the researcher. The researcher who breathes 
the same air as the participants is emotionally engaged with this project. The research is 
driven by the researcher’s own desire to find out the answers to her own questions. 
Furthermore, what the researcher intends to probe is also what the researcher hopes to 
improve in reality. However, the emotional engagement with the subjects has its costs as 
well, as the researcher may lose her awareness of being a researcher and ‘is seduced by the 
participants’ perspectives’ (Bryman, in Byrman & Bungess eds., 1999: 38). To resovle 
this, the researcher frequently reported progression to her supervisors, who reminded her to 
maintain distance both from the research sites and from the participants’ perspectives. 
Such engagement was not always negative in that it enabled the researcher to collaborate 
with the subjects and to understand their concerns. The following section provides an 
overview of the qualitative research in order to lay the foundation of the enquiry’s stance. 
3.2 An overview of qualitative research 
Nowadays, there has been considerable growth in the usage of qualitative research, 
although its definition is certainly not an easy matter (Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999). 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 576) argue that qualitative research originates from diverse 
subject areas and is continuously influenced by various thoughts and theories. 
Consequently, qualitative research is featured with multi-faceted connotations and multiple 
                                                 
19 Ellis, C., Adams, T., & Bochner A., 2010. ‘Autoethnography: An Overview’, Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 12 (1) November [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1589/3095 (Accessed: 30 December 
2013) 
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focuses which leads to an uneasy task of definition. Alternatively, some scholars have 
endeavoured to identify key features of qualitative research. Chen, X. (2000) concludes 
with five key features of qualitative research: it tends to be conducted in natural settings; 
the meaning construction of the subject should be interpretively understood; the researcher 
is the ‘bricoleur’ of social reality providing simultaneous meaning; inducement is usually 
employed to examine data, and the relationship between the researcher and the subject is 
highly regarded. Others (Walker, 1985) infer the elements which constitute qualitative 
research through comparison with quantitative research. Generally speaking, the latter 
argues that the social reality can be understood neutrally and objectively through scientific 
approaches, whereas the former advocates a contextual, inter-subjective understanding of 
social reality (Chen, X., 2000:1, preface). Bryman (in Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999) has 
listed eight categories of differences between the two research traditions. For example, 
quantitative data is generally hard and reliable, whereas qualitative data can be rich and 
deep. Besides, the scope of findings from quantitative research is ‘nomothetic’ whereas 
qualitative is ideographic. After scrutinising each category, Bryman claims that the 
division of the two research traditions is more of a convention than it ought to be. An 
integration of the two would ensure more complete accounts of social reality (Bryman, 
1988). In contrast, a number of scholars reject this integration (Chen, X., 2000; Filstead, 
1979). They underpin this rejection by referring to the two research traditions as 
contrasting ‘paradigms’ representing mutually exclusive epistemological positions, instead 
of being only a technical issue. A representative description of this view is as follows: 
Quantitative and qualitative methods are more than just differences between 
research strategies and data collection procedures. These approaches represent 
fundamentally different epistemological frameworks for conceptualizing the 
nature of knowing, social reality, and procedures for comprehending these 
phenomena. (Filstead, 1979: 45) 
Furthermore, quantitative research is committed to employing scientific methods for 
gathering information from the subject, which is seen as the reservoir of knowledge to gain 
access to the authentic reality based on positivism. Qualitative research, however, 
advocates the idea that social reality is contextual and historically and politically bounded. 
As a result, the researcher merely investigates relative knowledge to interpret ideographic 
reality which is supported by constructivism and criticism. 
More importantly, the transformation of qualitative research, which took place in the early 
1990s, seems to sharpen the division between the two traditions. The changes are mainly 
driven by postmodernism, constructivism, and ethno-methodological enquiry which 
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highlight the relationship between the researcher and the subject. In other words, the 
researchers become more and more sensitive to the relationship between the researcher and 
the subject in the process of enquiry. The matter of representation has inspired a host of 
attempts to deconstruct research to reveal its reality-constituting practice (Gubrium & 
Holstein, in Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999:127). The research process is seen as an effort 
to empower the subject to collaborate with the researcher in the construction of meaning. 
Besides, it is generally acknowledged that all enquiries, even writing itself, are political 
rather than innocent practices (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Gubrium & Holstein, in Bryman 
& Burgess eds., 1999; Peshkin, 1993). To sum up, Guba and Lincoln (1994:105) argue as 
follows: 
Questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, which we define 
as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in 
choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental 
ways. 
This research embraces a qualitative perspective because the researcher believes that the 
meaning of professionalism is socially and historically constituted. Second, the qualitative 
method fits well with the researcher’s personal background. As mentioned above, the 
researcher used to be an insider, a journalist, which presumably favours better 
collaboration with the subject both physically and emotionally. Additionally, another 
technical reason is that there has been high volume of quantitative research regarding 
Chinese journalists. An alternative qualitative account seems lacking in present-day 
academic currency. As a result, this study adopts a qualitative perspective. Specifically, 
individual and focus group interview methods are employed in the data collection process 
which are detailed later. 
However, it is necessary to remember that ‘every method of data collection is only an 
approximation to knowledge. Each provides a different and usually valid glimpse of 
reality, and all are limited when used alone’ (Warwick, cited in Peshkin, 1993: 28). The 
qualitative method is useful in providing a ‘detailed portrayal of a small sector of social 
life’ (Bryman, in Bryman & Gungess eds., 1999: 45), but it is often questioned over its 
random sampling, or in other words purposive sampling, for being unscientific. Actually, 
this research employs purposive sampling when recruiting research participants. It is a 
limitation of this research that the participants came from only a tiny handful of all the 
media outlets that exist in China. Furthermore, purposive sampling may affect the 
representativeness of research subjects, which will then influence the reliability and 
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validity of the research findings. However, the researcher endeavoured to recruit 
participants from various types of media, ranging from party organs, mass-appeal 
newspapers, and broadcast media in order to cover the media spectrum. In this sense, the 
composition of the participants has a certain degree of representativeness. Additionally, the 
researcher chose Beijing and Shanghai as the fieldwork sites, which excluded Guangdong. 
This is yet another limitation of this research. Generally speaking, the Guangdong media 
are more open and forward-looking compared with the media in Beijing and Shanghai. 
However, the fieldwork sites were a pragmatic choice, since the researcher had worked in 
the two cities facilitating the reach to research participants. Moreover, the researcher had 
only two months to organise six focus groups, six elite interviews, and a number of 
personal communications. Thus, future research with a longer time frame could take the 
Guangdong media into account in analysing Chinese journalistic norms.  
3.3 Focus group interviews and individual 
interviews 
This section first introduces the features of focus group interviews and then discusses its 
pros and cons. The second part of this section looks at individual interviews. 
Focus group interviews 
There has been a remarkable upsurge of interest in focus group interviews in social science 
research since the 1980s (Morgan, 1996; Lunt & Livingstone, 1993). Nowadays, focus 
group interviews can be used either as a self-contained method or in combination with 
surveys and other research methods (Morgan, 1996: 129). The focus group interview was 
originally employed as a market evaluation method in the 1920s (Kitzinger, in Bryman & 
Burgess eds., 1999). It is Robert K. Merton who takes credit for developing focus group 
interviews for research purposes in the 1950s, although he saw focus groups as a precursor 
to further quantitative research (Lunt & Livingstone, 1993:81). Focus group research 
disappeared after World War II only to re-emerge in the 1980s with a particular link to 
communication research. The most notable case is the research conducted by Morley 
(1980) about the Nationwide audience which shifts the paradigm of media effects and the 
conception of audiences. To some extent, the resurgence of the focus group interview is 
somewhat in tune with the current transition in audience research which is redefining the 
audience as a plural entity rather than single one. Nowadays, the focus group interview is 
extensively used in social science studies.  
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A preliminary definition 
Generally speaking, a focus group is a group interview which is focused on a specific 
topic. Morgan (1996: 130) has provided a widely accepted definition which views focus 
groups as a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic 
determined by the researcher. This definition points out three key elements of focus group 
interviews: the active role of the researcher; the primary aim of data collection; and group 
interaction as a source of data. However, scholars diverge on whether the focus group 
interview should be distinguished from other kinds of group interviews. This study 
embraces the idea suggested by Boyle (2010) that focus groups require interaction between 
participants allowing a multi-directional flow of information, whereas group interviews 
tend to have a one-to-many or one-to-one format.   
Key features of focus group interviews 
The most distinguishing feature of the focus group interview is the explicit use of 
interaction as research data (Kitzinger, in Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999: 138). The 
interaction is highly regarded for the primary reason that it occurs in the group context. 
Besides, the interaction entails a participant synergy effect which makes the unearthed 
information visible. The group context is of value in two dimensions. First, the meanings 
constructed within a group context are socially constructed. A comparison with the 
individual interview would make this point more comprehensible. In individual interviews, 
many of the social interactions, which constitute social practices, are stripped away. In 
contrast, the group context of focus groups can mimic social settings which bear sufficient 
resemblance to the social relations (Lunt & Livingstone, 1993). Second, Moscovici (cited 
in Lunt & Livingstone, 1993) claims that social representations are generated not so much 
through individual cognitive processes, but through everyday conversations. As with 
discourse-based approaches, focus group interviews are viewed as a simulation of 
everyday conversation, which is understood to be socially generated, rather than simply an 
articulation of an individual’s thought process. In this sense, it is an ideal research method 
to examine topics involving social representations. Furthermore, good interactions help the 
research participants to act as co-researchers who both query each other and explain 
themselves to each other, which in turn facilitates unvoiced accounts (Kamberelis & 
Dimitriadis, in Denzin & Lincoln eds., 2005; Morgan, 1996). Morgan (1996) stresses this 
interaction has a ‘synergy effect’ which makes the discussion in focus group interviews 
more than the sum of individual interviews. Through this synergy effect, the consensus and 
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diversity among participants can be identified. Moreover, the researcher has the 
opportunity to ask for further explanations of personal views regarding the divergence 
between participants. 
Group interaction can be further categorised into two types: complementary and 
argumentative (Kitzinger, in Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999). The complementary side 
indicates agreement and shared common experiences. It is believed that, in contrast with 
individual interviews and observation, the focus group interview facilitates the exploration 
of collective memories and shared stocks of knowledge that help to reveal group norms 
and normative assumptions (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, in Denzin & Lincoln eds., 2005: 
903). On the other hand, the process of argumentative interaction allows the researcher to 
observe how people theorise their own accounts in relation to competing perspectives 
(ibid.). 
Debates about advantages and disadvantages 
At the practical level, the focus group can probe a range of topics in a given time. In this 
sense, it is efficient for generating large quantities of material from a sizeable number of 
people in a relatively short period. Besides, the free flow of information might inhibit the 
authority of researchers to allow participants to take over and own the interview space 
(Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, in Denzin & Lincoln eds., 2005: 903). 
Criticisms of the focus group are mainly directed against its reliability and validity. Since 
the sample process of focus group is not that rigid compared with survey studies, it is 
criticised and questioned for lacking representativeness. Moreover, data gathered through 
the random sample cannot be used to speculate on the generalised situation. Counter 
arguments claim that both reliability and validity are introduced to evaluate quantitative 
research. Consequently, they are not applicable to qualitative research. Furthermore, it is 
also argued that the focus group is inappropriate for sensitive or taboo topics. However, 
vivid case studies prove that participants being with others who share similar experiences 
can encourage expression. In particular, participants support each other when they 
encounter the same situations or difficulties. Consequently, the focus group has the 
capacity of empowerment which has a special niche in feminism studies. 
As discussed above, the most salient strength of focus groups is their ability to promote 
socially constructed interaction which is a direct outcome of the group context. Opposed to 
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this beneficial argument is the idea that all of the interactions are contextual (Dahlgren, 
1988: 292). Additionally, personal behaviour is not cut off from public discourse and 
personal action does not happen within a cultural vacuum (Kitzinger, in Bryman & 
Burgess eds., 1999). In this sense, the group context is not that significant. Additionally, 
the group context also has the disadvantage that it may censor certain views that deviate 
from accepted norms, which could inhibit people from expressing divergent thoughts. 
However, these muted voices are of great value for the research. Instead, Kitzinger (in 
Bryman & Burgess eds., 1999) argues that the participants can provide mutual support in 
expressing feelings which are common to the group, but which may be considered a 
deviation from mainstream culture. 
This research highly regards group interaction due to its potential ability to facilitate a 
synergetic effect. In this respect, the more homogeneous the composition of each group is, 
the better the interaction should be. This research has set up six focus groups made up of 
full-time journalists as participants. Each group consists of journalists with similar social 
backgrounds maximising the homogeneous aspect. Notably, one group is made up of news 
workers from internet content providers in order to draw a comparison with journalists 
from traditional media outlets. The description of the composition of each group is 
provided in a later section. The following part discusses the individual interviews. 
Individual Interviews 
Interviewing is undoubtedly the most widely applied technique for conducting a systematic 
social enquiry. It is estimated that ‘90 per cent of all social science investigations employ 
different kinds of interviews’ (Holstein & Gubrium, in Byrman & Burgess eds., 1999: 
105). Largely influenced by postmodernism and constructivism, as has previously been 
discussed, the interview for qualitative research has three distinctive features: the active 
subject, the contextual meaning construction process, and focusing on the ‘how’. A 
comparison with news interviews will illuminate these particular characteristics.   
The news interviewer views respondents as repositories of knowledge to be passively 
exploited, whereas the qualitative interview conceives of the interviewee as a co-operator 
who is actively involved in a collaborative process of meaning construction. Furthermore, 
the former believes that the proper way of asking questions will result in desired 
information as reliable social facts. Notwithstanding, the latter holds the view that 
scientific neutrality and the techniques to achieve it are largely mythical. To take it further, 
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the interviewer is a person, carrying unavoidable conscious and unconscious motives, 
desires, feelings, and biases – hardly a neutral tool (Scheurich, 1995, cited by Fontana & 
Frey, in Denzin & Lincoln eds., 2005). Besides, the spoken or written word always has ‘a 
residue of ambiguity’ (Fontana & Frey, in Denzin & Lincoln eds., 2005: 697) which could 
colour the meaning interpretation. Thus the interview is inextricably biased by its very 
nature. Furthermore, the news interview is keen to obtain ‘what’ has been said. However, 
the qualitative interview does not only focus on the ‘what’ but emphasises ‘how’ this 
information is constructed through interaction between the researcher and the subject. The 
meaning of qualitative research is socially, interactionally, and dynamically constituted. In 
this respect, the interview can be seen as ‘a site of producing reportable knowledge itself’ 
(Holstein & Gubrium, in Bryman and Burgess eds., 1999: 106). As a result, Holstein and 
Gubrium (in Bryman and Burgess eds., 1999: 107) argue that the qualitative interview may 
not be assessed in terms of reliability and validity. Instead, reliability and validity can be 
gained if situated experiential realities which are conveyed can be locally comprehensible.  
The individual interviews of this research comprise two parts. The first part was conducted 
before the focus group interview. The second part was personal communication with 
journalists who had regular contact with the researcher either online or face-to-face 
throughout the three years in writing this thesis. The final section of this chapter concludes 
with aspects of the fieldwork. 
3.4 Aspects of the fieldwork 
This research has conducted 6 focus groups, 6 individual interviews, and 10 personal 
communications, which have involved 41 journalists and editors in total. This section 
provides a summary and reflection on the fieldwork. Figures presenting demographic 
features of the participants are provided at the end. 
The fieldwork started with the individual interviews, of which the interviewees are all in a 
senior position: three are editors-in-chief and the other three are senior journalists or 
editors. They are all male and hold an undergraduate degree or above. The three editors-in-
chief are in their forties and the other three are in their thirties. Notably, all of them are 
CCP members echoing the argument in Chapter 1 that job rank is closely associated with 
party membership. The interviewees were selected on the purposive sampling based on the 
objectives of the research and the personal background of the researcher. The individuals 
interviewed are familiar with the researcher. The individual interview list is given in 
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appendix I. The research postulates that job ranks and different job responsibilities may 
colour views regarding propaganda control and journalistic corruption. The findings, 
however, indicate the opposite answer. The elite media workers generally share the same 
views as ordinary journalists about the two issues (details in Chapters 4 & 5). 
The focus group interviews were conducted in Beijing and Shanghai respectively. Beijing 
is the capital of China and it is also seen as the centre of politics and culture, whereas 
Shanghai is the most economically developed city in China. Both of the cities play leading 
roles in the progression of China’s Reform and Opening-up. Presumably, the fast-changing 
political and economic circumstances may impact upon the journalistic culture. Notably, in 
the 1980s and the 1990s, a number of media outlets in Beijing and Shanghai pioneered 
news reform (cf. Chapter 2). The media in Beijing and Shanghai have set the reporting 
models after which a great number of media outlets in other cities are explicitly patterned. 
Another practical reason to select these two locations is related to the researcher’s personal 
background. The researcher used to work in the two cities making it much easier to gain 
access to the subjects both physically and psychologically. 
This research conducted 5 focus groups in Beijing and 1 group in Shanghai. All the 
participants are full-time journalists working for mass media. The research employs a 
purposive sampling method to select the participants. The researcher first contacted the 
informants and sent them the research information sheet. Then the informants spread the 
sheets in the newsroom and invited their colleagues or peers to join the research. Before 
each group started, the participants were required to sign a consent form (appendix IV) and 
a registration form (appendix V). All the participants stressed that they needed to keep 
their names confidential. Some participants required keeping their employers confidential 
as well. Thus this research does not name any participants. Instead, their accounts are 
coded as shown in the appendices. All groups were directed through standardised questions 
in order to make comparisons between each group. 
The media type was also taken into account in forming the groups. Thus, the participants in 
focus groups covered a range of media including national party organs, mass-appeal 
newspapers, national broadcasting media, local broadcasting media, and news websites. A 
list of the composition of groups is presented in appendix II. Among all the groups, three 
are relatively homogeneous in that the participants of each group come from the same 
media organisation. The other three are heterogeneous for the participants come from 
different media organisations. Morgan (1997) argue that a homogeneous group would 
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greatly facilitate discussions, which would further contribute to identify group norms, 
while the heterogeneity within each group adds more value to the comparative work which 
may discover different norms caused by organisational culture. Before the first focus group 
started, the researcher worried that participants might have concerns regarding the 
questions about media control or journalistic corruption given that they come from the 
same party organ. The proceedings of the first focus group, however, exceeded the 
researcher’s expectations. The participants not only commented on media control but self-
exposed their unethical behaviours. This reminds the researcher to discard any pre-
judgement or bias before going into the field (Chen, X., 2000). Self-exposure also 
prompted other participants to reflect on their own behaviours. A participant said to the 
researcher after the discussion: ‘this is a really good talk. It is the first time I truly know 
how my colleagues view the existing system’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 
2013). The participant also intended to learn this method from the researcher. Furthermore, 
the comparison between different groups also achieved fruitful findings. These issues are 
discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The focus group interview is rarely used in existing Chinese journalism research. This is 
one of the reasons that this research employs it. During the focus group interviews, the 
participants were reasonably active. In some cases, the researcher was even invited into the 
discussion and the researcher took the opportunity to join. In the view of quantitative 
research, this may be against the objective rule and so labelled as unscientific. This 
research, however, claims that objectivity is a highly questionable concept in social 
research in the present day. As discussed previously, this research adopts the view of 
constructivism. Thus, the researcher participated in the focus group discussion. In light of 
this, the barrier between the researcher and the subjects was removed. The researcher was 
not working as an arbitrator to judge the participants’ accounts and behaviours but as a 
collaborator working with the participants. Therefore, a ‘fusion of horizons’ was realised. 
This research also shows that focus group interviews are promising in exploring shared 
values or beliefs, which should be given more attention in future. 
Another notable method in this research is personal communication. The participants in 
this part are former colleagues or peers of the researcher. Through online chat, Skype 
video calls, or face-to-face chat, the researcher managed to maintain regular contact with 
the participants. Throughout the contact, the participants provided vivid evidence and 
frontline information, which the researcher greatly appreciated. In this part, the researcher 
occasionally became a participant in that the researcher shared the agony and joy and 
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discussed the career options with the participants. Thus, the research is empowered both 
with mutual understanding and encouragement. Subsequently, this chapter ends by 
providing figures illustrating the demographic features of the interviewees. 
Figure 9 Sex ratio                                              Figure 10 Age ratio  
           
Figure 11 Educational status                            Figure 12 Media type ratio  
 
             
Figure 13 Political affiliations20 
 
 
                                                 
20 Democratic parties are the joint name of nominally eight minor political parties, which are 
sanctioned by the party-state. They merely function a symbolic role, with the leaders being chosen 
by the CCP.  
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As shown in the figures, the majority of the participants are male, aged from 30 to 39, 
holding an undergraduate degree. Most of them are from mass-appeal newspapers. 
Notably, the majority are CCP party members. The demographic features of the 
participants show discrepancies with those in the survey findings in Chapter 1 in that the 
predominance is not of female journalists but for CCP members. This does not affect the 
validity of the findings of this research. As mentioned previously, this research does not 
aim to make generalisations but to provide vivid cases and in-depth descriptions and 
facilitate multi-faceted understandings of present day journalism.  
This research has now built up the theoretical framework, historical context, and a 
methodological guide. The thesis reports next on the main findings in the following three 
chapters. First, the subsequent chapter looks at the norms of practising journalism under 
control.
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Chapter Four: Practising Journalism Under Control 
This chapter explores the implications of practising journalism under tight media control. 
As mentioned previously, this chapter focuses on ideological control exerted mainly by the 
propaganda offices. The first section looks at the forms of ideological control in the present 
day. This research does not intend to provide an all-encompassing checklist including all 
control methods in contemporary Chinese journalism. Instead, drawing upon the fieldwork 
data, the frequently mentioned forms and new techniques are highlighted. A typology of 
control forms is also provided. The second section looks at self-censorship. A number of 
scholars argue that it is self-censorship that effectively keeps the media in line (Brady 
2008; Hassid, 2008; Lee, 2000). Most studies regarding Chinese media control stop here 
failing to identify how self-censorship works in daily journalistic practices. Based on the 
fieldwork data, this chapter provides a detailed description regarding how self-censorship 
works in the news production chain. As to the drivers inducing self-censorship in Chinese 
journalism, almost all studies attribute self-censorship to mystery and uncertainty about the 
permissible boundaries (Stern & Hassid, 2012; Hassid, 2008; Zhao, 2008; Link, 2002). 
This claim was supported by a number of interviewees in the fieldwork but was countered 
by others, which indicates that more causal explanations are needed to demystify self-
censorship. Additionally, it is generally argued that journalists are critical of censorship. 
Yet this assumption was only echoed by a number of interviewees. The majority of 
interviewees make efforts to validate censorship. Paradoxically, in the meantime, a large 
number of interviewees also argue for objective reporting and watchdog journalism. 
Caught between the ideals and the reality, journalistic practitioners may adjust or adapt 
themselves to the existing system. Thus, the third section explores the reactions and 
strategies employed by journalists towards the existing system. This chapter concludes by 
discussing the implications of practising journalism under severe control.  
It is first necessary to specify the differences between censorship and propaganda. The 
analyses are largely based on common sense and a contextual basis. In Chinese journalism, 
censorship is more associated with negative reporting (fumian baodao), whereas 
propaganda is normally associated with positive reporting (zhengmian baodao). The 
prominent form of negative reporting is investigative reporting which exposes the 
malpractices of the authorities. Positive reporting is committed to extolling or glorifying 
the achievements of the party-state with the aim of creating long-term favourable effects. 
Journalists normally view censorship as a way of blocking bad news, and propaganda as 
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steering good news. In practice, the two are generally complementary. The following 
section firstly investigates the general forms of ideological control. 
4.1 Forms of ideological control 
A vice editor-in-chief of a national party organ told his colleague, after he retired, that he 
would publish two books based on the daily propaganda directives (xuanchuan yaoqiu) he 
received: ‘one will be named “must report (bixu baodao)”; the other will be called “must 
not report (buxu baodao)”’ (F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2013). These were the 
two most common forms of control acknowledged by interviewees in the fieldwork. 
Before looking at common forms, a brief reflection on how the media are supervised in 
China is needed. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no media law in China. The media are 
owned by the party-state in theory. In practice, however, the media operates under the 
jurisdiction and regulation of the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) 
and the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT). All media must be 
affiliated with sponsoring institutions, which are approved by the party-state to obtain 
licences. However, it is the propaganda department that has the final word on the media’s 
survival and content at each corresponding level. Each media organisation is hierarchically 
located within the administrative bureaucracy system (xingzheng jibie tixi), which holds 
one administrative level lower than its sponsoring institution and presidial propaganda 
office. Furthermore, senior leaders of the media are originally chosen by propaganda 
departments and nominated in coordination with organisation departments. The functions 
of the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) are not only confined to supervising the 
media, but also range from propagating Marxism, guiding public opinion, overseeing 
textbook writing, and administering cultural activities (Spokesman Introduced Eight 
Functions of the CPD, 2010). The CPD is the cardinal supervisor of all media in China. In 
practice, propaganda departments at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels oversee 
media organisations at their corresponding levels.  
Propaganda directives are currently issued to media organisations on a daily basis. 
‘Normally they came to us before five pm everyday’, a vice editor-in-chief of a newspaper 
said in the fieldwork (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). Directives could 
be of two kinds: a banning order or a must-do order. Almost all interviewees identify this 
as the most common form of control. The following section explores each form mentioned 
by the interviewees respectively. Then a typology of various forms of control is given. 
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Banning order 
The first and foremost form of control is the banning order, issued on a daily basis, which 
forbids or limits certain topics from being reported or commented on. This part first 
delineates how it works and its content and then explores the changes in banning orders 
identified by the journalists in the fieldwork. 
Procedure and content of banning orders 
Generally, the orders are issued following an official procedure. The propaganda officials 
on duty will first make landline calls to its inferior media organisations to notify the 
issuing of the orders. Then the office of the editor-in-chief of each media organisation is 
responsible for receiving orders by fax. The files are classified and stamped with red 
official seals. The office of the editor-in-chief will then distribute orders to all news desks. 
Normally, the orders will be announced at the editors meeting in the afternoon at which all 
the editors on duty will be present. After the meeting, the editors inform the journalists 
affected by the orders, who then stop writing or retreat from the topic. If journalists have 
already finished writing, the articles will be killed (bi gao) without any hesitation. In this 
case, all journalists’ efforts would have been in vain, which often seriously upsets them. A 
number of interviewees mentioned that banning orders are normally pinned up on bulletin 
boards in the newsroom (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-4, a 
national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012). In one newsroom, the orders are 
put in the most prominent place next to chief editors’ cash awards notice. In light of this, 
all journalists and editors are made fully aware of these orders. An interviewee said his 
superior, a chief editor of local news, preferred to read out the orders in full at meetings 
(Personal communications No. 5, 14 January 2012). He reckoned that his superior intended 
to lessen his responsibility by passing the orders on. Nowadays, in order to block the rapid 
spread of online information, propaganda officials tend to make phone calls or send text 
messages to notify media workers about banning orders.  
Banning orders generally arrive as one sentence with no reasons being given. According to 
the interviewees, banning orders are layered in terms of their discourse strategy (F-2, a 
mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 
2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012; F-5, a news website 
group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). The most rigid one is ‘not allowed to be published with 
no exceptions’ (yilv bu yunxu baodao) which means no words can be put into the public 
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domain. Drawing upon journalists’ personal experiences, the taboo topics in this category 
include political reform, religious conflicts, minority conflicts, military affairs, the issue of 
Taiwan, and collective protests. Certain information related to the Politburos is also 
limited. The second type usually prohibits other media organisations except the party-
organs and the state-run broadcasting to report certain events (bu yunxu zicai). This 
method gives the state-run Xinhua News Agency, the top party-organ People’s Daily, and 
the party broadcaster CCTV the priority to report certain events. Other media organisations 
are only allowed to reprint reports from the above two. It is a tacit rule that reports about 
the Politburo Standing Committee members are exclusive of the three. The interviewees 
also mentioned that the coalmine disasters, and even breaking incidents that caused heavy 
causalities, are exclusive to the three as well (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 
2012; F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). Then comes the third type 
which usually arrives in a row with three ‘no’s: no comments, no sensationalisation and no 
exaggeration (bu pinglun, bu chaozuo, bu xuanran). For example, it was recently suspected 
that a primary school principal had raped several pupils by taking them to a hotel 
overnight. The local people were outraged. Thus, the CPD issued the three no’s order (A 
Weekly Summary of Directives from ‘the Truth Department’, 2013). At face value, ‘no 
comments’ is easily comprehended, while the other two orders are rather ‘obscure and 
ambiguous’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). The extent to which 
something might be considered sensationalisation or exaggeration varies highly on a case-
by-case basis. However, in practice, media organisations seem to have reached a generally 
accepted resolution: to take the story off the headline or the front page to obey the order (I-
2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012; I-5, an editor-in-chief, Beijing, 11 January 
2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 
January 2012; F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). 
Changes in banning order  
A significant number of journalists acknowledged that banning orders are changing in that 
they have become ‘more professional and cunning’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 
January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting 
group, Beijing, 14 January 2012; F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012; I-1, 
a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). An editor working for a news website said, 
‘you may even be surprised to find how expert they are’ (F-5, a news website group, 
Beijing, 15 January 2012). He explained, 
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In the past, they simply ordered not to report. But there is nowhere to hide 
information in the internet age. Thus, they became smarter in supervising us. 
For example, sometimes, they required that this topic could not hit the 
headline. Sometimes, they told us not to put this headline in red and bold. I 
remember once they told us to put two stories side by side; meanwhile 
highlighting one of them by using bold fonts which is an apparently extolling 
story and weakening the other investigative report through zooming out. (F-5, a 
news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012) 
Journalists from two focus groups were also surprised by the working efficiency of 
propaganda departments. ‘In the past we used to think the banning orders were on their 
way after we arrived at the incident locale. But now we are on the way when the banning 
orders are issued’, one journalist said (F-2, a party organ group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). 
Another journalist echoed similarly, 
Banning orders are actually good news sources. You may even learn what had 
happened only through their orders. Moreover, media did not know the 
incident. But how did they know? I guess they must have some channels to 
work so efficiently. (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012)  
However, the above comments, which are provided by traditional media workers, are 
downplayed by journalists from news websites. A representative counter-argument is as 
follows, 
They are still learning the internet. Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter) is 
only two years old. Some officials do not even know how to use it. Besides, 
information spreads quickly online. You are deleting it; meanwhile netizens are 
uploading it. It cannot be easily blocked altogether online. (F-5, a news website 
group, Beijing, 15 January 2012) 
Furthermore, a vice editor-in-chief of a market-driven newspaper said that ‘banning orders 
are also changing to target different sectors of audiences’ (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, 
Beijing, 5 January 2012). His newspaper received more banning orders than his 
competitors due to its larger readership of officials. Similarly, journalists in the 
competition paper said that they are more restricted in reporting scholars’ criticisms of 
governments presumably due to its popularity among intellectuals (F-2, a mass-appeal 
group, Beijing, 9 January 2012).  
A party-organ journalist approved these changes positively, ‘they are at the moment trying 
to draw a better fine line between prohibition and conditional permission. At least, we can 
report some issues although under certain limitations’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 
January 2012). Her colleague added,  
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It is not suitable to continue with the old way of managing media. Simple and 
bold prohibition is out of time. We are happy to see these new changes. 
Propaganda departments also need to keep up to date. (F-1, a party organ 
group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
Actually, propaganda departments also keep up to date with economic development. An 
editor in a market-driven press complained,  
In some cases, there are brokers making profits out of banning orders. They 
take money from companies and then sweep unfavourable reports for the 
companies. Some banning orders have no relation with our party. They do it 
for the benefits of their staff welfare or for personal gains. (Personal 
communications No. 3, on multiply days) 
Two journalists in the focus group interviews also doubted whether there might have been 
some under-table deals behind banning orders. One journalist always wondered ‘merely a 
phone call can kill an article. Sometimes I feel that there are behind-the-scene dealings’ (F-
6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012). Another journalist said with sarcasm, 
They do not tell you why this topic is banned. You may find the CPD is the 
most mysterious institution. Their address and phone numbers are highly 
secret. I am always suspicious they might make hoax calls. Some banning 
orders might not be organisational decisions. Anyone who works in that 
building can just make a phone call to kill an article. He also might do it for his 
relatives and friends. All he needs to do is just to pick up the phone. (F-3, a 
mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012) 
A journalist reporting congress affairs shared his real experience, 
I remember that day I received a phone call shown as six zeroes. I thought it 
was the national congress. A woman said on the phone: “a secretary of a top 
leader requires you to stop reporting this issue”. I asked who this leader was. 
Then the woman replied with resentment: “you do not need to know”. Finally, 
we did not run the story. But how can you know who killed your article. The 
real problem is how dare you. (I-4, a senior journalist, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
His colleague added there was one courageous editor who intended to find out who the 
person was, 
Anybody who attended the internal meeting yesterday should know the 
propaganda chief was outraged. The editor-in-chief of an internet company had 
been dismissed simply because he requested an official fax of a banning order. 
He received a text message requiring him to delete an article. But he was not 
sure whether the text message was really from the propaganda department so 
he did not delete the article. It turned out to be a real order. It is said the 
propaganda chief heard of this and instructed his subordinates to teach him a 
Xu, Di, 2013 
 
98 
lesson. Now everybody learned the lesson: do not take risks; just follow 
instructions from anybody’s texts and calls. Isn’t it ridiculous? (I-4, a senior 
journalist, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
The opposite side of banning orders are the must-do orders (bi ling), which is discussed in 
the following part. 
Must-do Orders 
As suggested by its name, must-do orders require that certain events or topics must be 
reported with a positive tone extolling the party-state. Journalists normally call such 
reports ‘command reports’ (zhiling baodao) (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 
2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 
January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting, Beijing, 14 January 2012). Compared with the 
banning order, the must-do order is relatively less frequently issued, and it normally lasts a 
longer period. Such orders can be divided into two types depending on their duration: 
cultivating favourable reports (pudian baodao) and propaganda campaigns. 
Cultivating favourable reports 
The first type is issued before certain political events, such as the 18th Party Congress 
meeting and the annual national congress meeting. These orders aim to orient media 
coverage to create a favourable public opinion (yingzao lianghao yunlun huanjing). This 
kind of order normally expires by the end of the political event. The orders are issued by 
the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) or local propaganda offices over briefing 
meetings or through official documents. 
Journalists tend to view such orders as boring reports with little news value. One journalist 
dubbed must-do orders as ‘chicken ribs’, which are tasteless although it would be a pity to 
throw them away. He explained,  
When the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress held elections, the Beijing 
propaganda department demanded that we publish special reports about this 
consecutively on the front page. But I can hardly find valuable things to report 
on a daily basis. Valuable things, such as candidates campaigns, were not 
allowed to be reported, whereas tedious procedures of elections are nonsense 
yet the only thing available to be reported. (I-4, a senior journalist, Beijing, 9 
January 2012) 
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Although most of the interviewees in the fieldwork viewed must-do orders with disdain, a 
small number of them highlighted positive aspects of must-do orders. A party-organ 
journalist said,  
I have to admit must-do orders do help us sometimes. You may never get an 
interview opportunity with some big figures either in politics or in companies 
through normal channels. But under must-do orders they must cooperate with 
us. Actually, they would like to work with us for they know you are going to 
praise them. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
A vice editor-in-chief emphasised that journalists should find news values from must-do 
orders and write the ordered reports in a readable way (Personal communications No. 2, on 
multiple days). However, one journalist counter claimed,  
Does it really have news value? Journalists from different media organisations 
interviewed the same person at the same time in the same room under the same 
arrangement. Then published the article on the same day. You may find the 
same words in every newspaper except the author’s name. (I-4, a senior editor, 
Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
Propaganda campaign 
The other type can be seen as a propaganda campaign, which normally lasts for a longer 
period and comes in a series. This type is normally initiated by the CPD, which employs 
multiple methods aiming for long-term favourable effects with all media organisations 
engaged. A recent representative campaign is called ‘go to the basic unit, alter life style, 
change reporting style (zou jiceng, zhuan zuofeng, gai wenfeng, abbreviated as ZZG)’21 
which was extensively discussed in the fieldwork. The campaign ordered all media 
workers to go to the basic units such as factories, farms, and countryside units to dig out 
gems from ordinary people’s lives. Media workers should gain first hand information, such 
as working with farmers, blue-collar workers, and other workers, to report on them. 
Newspapers and broadcast media should set up serial columns and special programmes to 
report such stories on notable pages or at prime time. The reports should glorify China’s 
                                                 
21 The ZZG campaign was initiated on 19 July 2011 when the CPD issued the official notice to all 
media-related organisations nationwide. The main aims as stated in the notice were to follow the 
instructions and spirits from the top party leaders; better implement mass work under new 
situations; strengthen the mass-line education; better publicise the party’s opinions; improve 
propaganda reports quality; and adhere to correct orientation of public opinion. Propaganda 
campaigns have long been employed by the party-state to strengthen its thought control. In the 
Mao era, propaganda campaigns were also used as a political struggle tool to implement Mao’s 
ideas. The ZZG campaign was initiated just after Hu, Jintao, the top party leader, launched his talk 
on 1st July 2011, which emphasised the media’s role in new situation and argued for strengthening 
mass work. The official notice can be accessed at http://www.dongman.gov.cn/cygc/2011-
09/15/content_27350.htm.   
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rise and the improvement of people’s living standards. Moreover, the stories must be 
readable and lively to achieve wider audiences.  
The CPD also formulated multiple methods to achieve its goals. As stated in its official 
notice and confirmed by journalists in the fieldwork, the first step is political education. 
Actually, political education is to some extent a voluntary action long employed as a 
thought control method in China (Lynch, 1999). All institutions including universities, 
hospitals, and even joint venture companies organise political education sessions to learn 
talks of top party leaders. The aim of political education is to make sense of new trends, 
indoctrinate participants, unify thoughts, and provoke collective actions. Forms of political 
education are varied across media organisations. A party-organ journalist said, ‘our 
editors-in-chief are learning instructions from the central party committee every day. They 
have regular meetings with propaganda officials to know new trends’ (F-1, a party organ 
group, Beijing, 8 January 2012). A journalist working for a market-driven newspaper said 
that, after the campaign was launched, the editors-in-chief from local newspapers were 
called together into propaganda departments to learn the party’s instructions. The meetings 
are generally known as briefing meetings or update meetings, and provide background 
information and guidelines for the media to follow (I-4, a senior journalist, Beijing, 9 
January 2012). Subsequently, the office of the editor-in-chief of each media organisation 
invited specialists and professors on party issues to give a talk to all editors and journalists 
(ibid.).  
Another more practical method is to tie material gains with performance in the campaign. 
This is another common method for the party-state to control the media. The CPD had 
introduced a grading system to supervise the media. The propaganda achievements in the 
campaign would improve the media’s grade which would potentially solicit subsidies and 
other contract deals. As for the media’s senior leaders, this was also a good opportunity to 
show their propaganda talents which could help them achieve promotion. The CPD also 
launched the ZZG news prize to award journalists with money and promotion (Notice of 
the ZZG Campaign, 2011). A journalist working for a market-driven newspaper said, 
The prize was generous. Our newspaper will double your award if you hit the 
ZZG news prize list. Sometimes you even get an additional bonus. One of my 
colleagues was awarded 5,000 Yuan (approximately £500) after he hit the first 
grade ZZG news prize. This is good business. The winning journalists also 
have better chances of being promoted. (Personal communications No. 5, 14 
January 2012) 
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One journalist working for the state-run broadcasting media approved of the ZZG 
campaign as follows, 
Themes have been given. We do not need to do more desk research. Local 
propaganda departments have arranged all things for you. We had thought that 
there was no news value in such programmes. But we did not expect that 
ordinary people welcome these. You can never imagine a state-run broadcast 
journalist working in the farm fields with peasants. Such programmes are 
funny and lively. Party leaders like to watch it. Audiences like to watch it. 
When ratings reports arrived, we were surprised to find that such programmes 
are really popular appealing to both party leaders and ordinary people. (F-4, a 
national broadcaster, Beijing, 14 January 2012) 
His superior made a personal comment just after the focus group interview, 
The command reports are journalists’ favourites, which are well-planned, low 
risk, much better than investigative reporting. The command reports must be 
aired. Thus your efforts get paid. In terms of investigative reports, you 
normally put in more effort but cannot guarantee it to be aired. (I-3, a senior 
editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012) 
Aside from the above two main forms, a number of journalists also mentioned other forms 
which are discussed subsequently. 
Submission for Review (song shen) 
A number of key scholars on Chinese media control claim that there is no formal and 
systematic pre-publication censorship in China (Brady, 2008; Hassid, 2008; Zhao, 2008; 
Link, 2002). This is one of the differences between the Chinese media control system and 
the former Soviet Union system (Brady, 2008). Hassid (2008) argues that there is no need 
to launch pre-publication censorship organs, since political education and pervasive 
indoctrination activities can keep the media in line. However, evidence has emerged from 
the fieldwork showing that pre-publication censorship exists systematically. Journalists 
like to refer to such censorship as ‘submission for review’. That is, to submit the news 
draft to the authorities to get approval for publication. A journalist reporting congress 
affairs stated, 
Political news is different from other news beats. I usually report congress 
news. The news office of congress requires us to submit our drafts for review 
before going to print. It is an unspoken rule. All journalists on this beat must 
respect this rule otherwise they will not issue the security card for you to enter 
into the congress building. As far as I know, congress news, party committee 
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news, and political consultative conference news must be pre-censored. (I-4, a 
senior journalist, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
In addition, political events and political conferences normally have formal pre-censorship 
requirements. One journalist shared his own experience, 
Almost all political meetings require pre-censorship, such as party committee 
meetings, congress meetings, and political consultative conference meetings. 
Propaganda officials will set up site offices and a temporary censorship group 
at the meetings. All drafts must be printed out and attached with submission 
cover letters which contain news titles and signatures of editors on duty. If the 
drafts survive, the propaganda officials will sign their names on the cover 
letters. The letters will be kept well for further reference. If the article offends 
party leaders, the propaganda officials who approved it will also take 
punishment responsibility. (Personal communications No. 2, on multiple days) 
Submission for review sometimes delays the production process. In the case of Beijing 
Municipal People’s Congress meetings, there are normally four to five propaganda 
officials reviewing over one hundred articles everyday. The journalist commented, ‘it is 
highly intensive work. Journalists always struggle to finish writing as quickly as possible 
to submit for review earlier in order not to postpone the editing process. On the other hand, 
editors have to prepare spare articles in case some articles will be killed’ (ibid.). Although 
submission for review adds a further burden to the news production process, journalists 
still find positive value in it. One journalist in the focus group said, ‘in fact, submission for 
review protects the media. Media organisations will be exempt from ex-post punishment 
after submission’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). His colleague in the 
same focus group added, ‘it actually protects senior leaders. Nowadays, senior leaders of 
media will voluntarily ask for review to secure their positions. This is virtually self-
censorship’ (ibid.). 
Journalists also mentioned coercion as a key ex-post form of control, which is the most 
severe punishment. According to the press freedom report by the international 
nongovernmental organisation Freedom House in 2012, China stood close to bottom, 187th 
out of 197 countries (Freedom of the Press, 2012). The figures provided by Journalists 
Without Borders shows that 29 journalists were jailed under the name of ‘subversion’ or 
‘divulging state secrets’ in 2012 (Press Freedom Index, 2013). As indicated by Hassid 
(2008), the jailing of 29 journalists, however, is out of over 170,000 registered journalists. 
Thus, it is 0.017 per cent, a vanishingly small number. This indicates that coercion is not a 
frequently used method to control the media. Furthermore, this may imply that other 
control means have already kept the media in line. Almost all the focus group discussions 
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stressed the role of coercion although the journalists could not name any exact cases 
regarding the jailing. Moreover, the journalists did not know the number of jailed 
journalists, for such information is normally kept secret. This indicates that coercion, as the 
most severe control method, has powerful psychological implications.   
Two focus groups discussed writing self-criticism reports, a minor punishment, which is to 
discover your own faults through self-reflection (F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 
2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012). Two focus groups 
mentioned dismissal (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-5, a news 
website group, 15 January 2012). In such cases, journalists get fired due to politically 
unfavourable reports. Based on what has been discussed above, this research provides the 
typology of the forms of control as follows. As emphasised previously, this is not an all-
encompassing typology. This typology merely focuses on frequently mentioned forms that 
emerged from the fieldwork. 
Figure 14 The forms of control 
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The following section discusses how censorship and propaganda control affect the news 
production process. As confirmed by interviewees in the fieldwork, media control directly 
solicits pervasive self-censorship in news production.  
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4.2 Self-censorship  
As far as self-censorship has been examined, ‘the analyses tend to focus on the political 
and legal conditions that cause self-censorship instead of journalists’ own experience of 
the practice and how they reflect on it’ (Skjerdal, 2010: 98). This research can be seen as 
an effort to fill in the gap based on Chinese journalistic practitioners’ own perceptions and 
reflections. Furthermore, the current research that is based on accounts from journalists 
tends to present self-censorship as a personal psychological activity (Skjerdal, 2010; Lee, 
1998). This research discovers that self-censorship is institutionalised in the whole news 
production process. Similar patterns of self-censorship cut across the boundaries of various 
types of media. This section firstly investigates how self-censorship works in the news 
production chain and then explores the factors that lead to self-censorship.  
First of all, it is necessary to define self-censorship in news production, which is not an 
easy task. The critical point where normal news production activity ends and self-
censorship begins is difficult to determine. Furthermore, self-censorship is usually 
insidious making it hard to detect, which further complicates efforts to define it. This 
research defines self-censorship in a broad way. Based on definitions provided by Lee 
(1998: 57) and Skjerdal (2010: 99), self-censorship in this research denotes a set of 
editorial activities, such as deliberately fine-tuning discourse, withholding journalistic 
materials, and distortion, by journalists and editors due to certain or uncertain pressures. 
This research is principally concerned with self-censorship activities in relation to political 
pressure.  
Self-censorship in the news production process 
The journalists and editors in the fieldwork generally acknowledged that self-censorship is 
pervasive in Chinese journalism. This part discusses how self-censorship works throughout 
the news production chain, from journalists to editors, and then to chief editors. 
Evidence from the fieldwork also showed that self-censorship penetrates the news 
production process. A party organ journalist used ‘gate-keeping’ to describe the 
penetration, 
We have set up a multi-layered checking system which works pretty well. In 
terms of important reports, a journalist should check factual errors himself. 
Then his news desk editor checks again. When the article arrives at the office 
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of the editor-in-chief, the general editor checks firstly. The chief editor at the 
office comes fourth. Subsequently, the director of the office is the fifth filter. 
The proofreader then checks typo errors. Finally, the vice editor-in-chief who 
is on duty has the final checking. You may see we have at least seven barriers 
to barricade against any types of risks. Each gatekeeper has his own strength 
and focus. For example, journalists themselves should guarantee the accuracy 
of facts. Whereas the vice editor-in-chief is principally responsible for 
eradicating political risks. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
Almost all interviewees agreed with this account of the gate-keeping process. Notably, the 
extent of self-censorship is varied depending on hierarchical positions in the newsroom. It 
is generally argued that journalists should not pre-censor themselves. A representative 
argument is as follows, 
Journalists themselves should not pre-censor themselves. This is the job of 
senior media leaders. As a journalist, you just follow the general rule of 
making news. You cannot excuse yourself by not going to the locale simply 
because you reckon the reporting will be banned. As long as you do not receive 
banning orders, you must go to the locale. (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 
5 January 2012) 
However, in practice, journalists who had not pre-censored themselves got the blame for 
‘burying a land mine’ (mai lei), which means planting the seeds of future problems. 
Journalists in three focus groups had mentioned this; one of them shared his experience, 
Chief editors always say that journalists should just carry on writing. They will 
take care of balancing political risks. But when something went wrong after 
publication, they would blame you for burying a land mine. Recently two of 
my articles had issues with ministerial level officials. Our chief editor was not 
happy. I had heard that he said privately I was troublesome. I was depressed. It 
was also he who said that journalists should not pre-censor. I would never be 
so naïve again. (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
A number of veteran journalists advised that a better way is to reduce self-censorship to the 
minimum level. At the same time, it is journalists’ responsibility to notify editors or senior 
leaders about potential risks (F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012; F-6, a mixed 
group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012). However, journalists usually found they were more 
cautious than their senior leaders (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012).  
As for editors, typesetting also involves self-censorship work. In terms of certain sensitive 
topics, editors working for market-driven media often make reference to party-organs, 
especially the People’s Daily. This tactic is generally known as ‘dui biao’ in Chinese 
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which had been extensively employed in the Cultural Revolution era. One editor working 
for a market-driven publication explained, 
The aim of dui biao is to avoid any hidden risks. In the case of key political 
events such as the once-in-a-decade leadership transition, we will wait until the 
People’s Daily completes its typesetting work. The People’s Daily is a 
broadsheet whereas our newspaper is a compact paper. But we will put the 
same story at the same place roughly with the same proportional size. This 
tactic is especially useful for putting the images of party leaders. As you know, 
it would be deadly horrible if you were mistaken about the order of top party 
leaders. But if you copy the typesetting of the People’s Daily, you should be 
safe. Besides, CCTV Xinwen Lianbo22 can also be used as a compass. If one 
story runs over fifteen minutes in this programme, we will then leave half of 
the front page for the same story. (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 
2012) 
As for chief editors, they are supposed to take primary responsibility for blocking political 
risks. However, political risks are usually uncertain. As one party-organ journalist stated, 
‘there might be no exact order the very first time when the incident took place’ (F-1, a 
party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012). Furthermore, sometimes banning orders are 
rather vague. ‘Whether and how to report an incident is very much based on the chief 
editor’s personal choice’, a market-driven media worker said (F-6, a mixed group, 
Shanghai, 11 February 2012). Different chief editors may give different weights to the 
same material. One market-driven media worker said, 
In the case where there is no banning order or a banning order is obscure, it is 
the chief editor’s personality which determines how the news is reported. If the 
chief editor is conservative, he may even delete safe reports. (ibid.) 
As has been discussed above, propaganda departments and organisation departments 
nominate senior media leaders, which further determine their career paths. Thus, the career 
goals of media elites also affect how news is reported. A state-run broadcast journalist 
stated, 
Risk control is top priority in our media. If you cross the line, not only will 
your job be at risk but also your superior’s future career will be affected. We 
are the central state-run television, not a market-driven medium. Our superiors 
all aim to step into official careers. (F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 
14 January 2012) 
                                                 
22 Xinwen Lianbo is a daily news programme aired by China Central Television which is broadcast 
at 7pm on CCTV channel 1. This programme is principally used as the mouthpiece of the party-
state reporting the daily activities of party leaders and announcing major policies. All terrestrial 
television channels must simultaneously broadcast this programme. 
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In addition, journalists working for the market-driven media also claimed that their 
superiors were too timid to offend the authorities in that they intend to build up their career 
into officialdom. A journalist working for a market-driven media organisation explained, 
It is not surprising to find that the majority of media leaders intend to step into 
officialdom. It is not to achieve political ambitions. Instead, I guess our leader 
is simply in search of better living standards, for example, better pension, 
better educational resources for their children, and a better welfare system. (I-
4, a senior journalist, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
However, senior media leaders are not only expected to be capable of keeping the media 
safe, but also to be able to push the media forward (tu po). Some journalists from both 
party-organ and market-driven media outlets expressed a similar anticipation. An editor 
working for a market-driven organisation commented, 
Gate-keeping in terms of political risks might be the most difficult job. Two 
choices in front of you: go for it or just step aside. This is a real challenge for 
your wisdom. If you always turn your back, you may find fewer and fewer 
topics to report. Thus leaders always encounter such dilemmas in China. You 
need to report this within a safe realm. This is indeed very challenging. (F-2, a 
mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
Echoing the above comment, a party-organ editor said, 
Gate-keeping is the basic capacity, whereas this is definitely not enough. A 
leader must also be able to break through which would be extremely valuable 
for future development. But this breakthrough must be within the acceptable 
realm. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
One of his colleagues in the focus group added ‘media leaders must possess both political 
insight and political courage in China’ (ibid.). A number of chief editors in the individual 
interviews (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012; I-5, an editor-in-chief, 11 
January 2012; I-6, an editor-in-chief, 17 January 2012) commented that being a senior 
leader has never been an easy job, for the senior leader always needs to balance the 
dilemma of the market imperative and the party imperative. Actually, the party also 
employs the market as a parameter in evaluating media senior leaders’ performance. If a 
media organisation proves to be a market failure, its leaders will not get promoted. Thus, a 
media leader who is looking for a promotion cannot always step back in front of 
potentially risky reports in that such reports may produce market returns. A journalist who 
had personal communication with the researcher revealed a real story (Personal 
communications No. 2, on multiple days). The journalist got a scoop exposing the fact that 
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the Beijing government’s deficit far exceeded the budget. The informant clearly stated that 
this information could be published only when the propaganda officials gave their consent. 
Yet the journalist published the article without the propaganda officials’ consent. Her 
superior instructed her to do so as the story was not only an exclusive one but also of great 
news value, which might promote sales on the newsstands. In this sense, the market force 
opens a wider space for journalism. Yet it is always the political side that has the final 
word.  
The chief editors need to employ different strategies to resolve this paradox. Clues 
emerging from the fieldwork indicate that the personal ties between propaganda officials 
and the chief editors are conducive to handling the dilemma. Actually, the two are easily 
allied based on mutual interests. The chief editors are appointed on the approval of the 
propaganda officials and the propaganda officials need the chief editors to cooperate and 
subordinate. In addition, the two often have personal connections. Lee et al. (2007) found 
that the propaganda chief and the chief editors in Shanghai had close personal 
relationships. They went to the same university or had worked for the same media 
organisation. Thus, they may have close bounds. Moreover, to a larger extent, they came 
from the same social stratum and presumably have similar views.  
In practice, personal ties help to resolve the dilemma. A vice editor-in-chief (Personal 
communications No. 4, on multiple days) for a mass-appeal newspaper provided an 
interesting case. Some time last year, a rumour spread widely that the chief propaganda 
officer in Beijing was demoted due to corruption. The foreign media also reported this. 
One day, the party media in Beijing were ordered by the local propaganda office to report 
an event in which the propaganda chief was present. The event was of no news value, yet 
the propaganda chief was there which indicated that he was still in his position. Thus, the 
rumour was cleared. This is of great news value. Based on the general rule, however, the 
mass-appeal newspaper was not supposed to report such event and activities of the top 
party officials. The editor on duty was given instruction from the chief editor to carry on 
reporting this but not to highlight this item. Finally, the news was put at the left-handed 
corner on page 4 in three hundreds words. The vice editor-in-chief worried that the local 
propaganda office might have a problem with this. But later on, it proved that he worried 
too much. The vice editor-in-chief then asked the chief editor why they should process the 
news in this way. The chief editor explained that he reckoned the propaganda chief 
intended to clear the rumour. But he did not want to do it in a high-profile way, so he only 
ordered the party media to report. A low-key way to process this story accorded with the 
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will of the propaganda chief. Besides, the report on a mass-appeal newspaper actually 
helped the propaganda chief by clearing the rumour among ordinary people. In light of 
this, it would be fine to do so. The vice editor-in-chief commented:  
It is not easy to guess what the propaganda superiors are thinking about. You 
have to admit our chief editor has political wisdom. But this is not enough. 
They are former colleagues and they worked together for quite a long time. So 
the chief editor can get the idea of the propaganda chief correctly. (Personal 
communications No. 4, on multiple days) 
In addition, a journalist provided a case indicating that self-censorship had been 
institutionalised into media organisation. The newspaper hired a number of veteran 
journalists who had retired to work as in-house censors (shen du yuan) (F-3, a mixed 
group, Beijing, 13 January 2012). These censors will provide personal suggestions 
regarding potential political risks to the editor-in-chief. It is the editor-in-chief who will 
make the final decision on reports. The newspaper was known for its investigative reports 
and sharp criticisms of the malpractices of the government. In light of this, the newspaper 
had to be reshuffled several times due to punishments which seriously damaged its running 
and circulation. In order to achieve long-term development and obtain a stable personnel 
system, the newspaper employs this self-censorship method. One of the in-house censors 
explained that his work is to ‘help the paper dodge political risks, rather than to strangle 
freedom of speech’ (Li, 2012). In this case, the in-house censor works as an extra 
gatekeeper in the news production process. The following part explores the factors leading 
to self-censorship. 
Factors leading to self-censorship 
Link (2002) argues that Chinese media control has relied primarily on inducing self-
censorship which is too effective to set up any prepublication censorship organs. 
According to Link, it is the use of vagueness which makes self-censorship pervasive. There 
exist no explicitly stated banned list or written rules explaining what is unacceptable. 
Based on the succinct findings of Link, Hassid (2008) attributes self-censorship to 
uncertainty, which also creates a pro-self-censorship environment in the newsroom. It is 
also suggested that uncertainty is a deliberate strategy employed by the CPD to control the 
media (cf. Chapter 1). Evidence from the fieldwork agreed partially with the above 
findings. A number of interviewees confirmed that ambiguity and speculation induced self-
censorship. Additionally, journalists who do not pre-censor their articles may be labelled 
troublemakers. However, a small number of interviewees counter claimed that the 
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boundary is fixed and their superiors were able to handle potential risks. This section 
testifies the findings of Link (2002) and Hassid (2008). In the mean time, the reasons 
leading to self-censorship are presented. 
In the fieldwork, one party-organ journalist expressed her anxiety: 
Risks are everywhere. Everybody might be deterred by unknown dangers. The 
reason is that there is no fixed boundary. You will never know when danger 
hits you. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
A number of interviewees confirmed that uncertainty induces self-censorship. Yet the real 
uncertainty, as one journalist suggested, is not due to a lack of written rules but because of 
the ‘rule of man’ (ren zhi) tradition. The rule of man originally referred to the ruling 
system in feudal China when the country was arbitrarily ruled on the will of the emperor. 
This ruling system is strongly supported by the Confucian tenet. In Confucianism, an ideal 
society should be ruled by a benevolent and wise emperor. It is his personality and ability 
that directs the country. In the present day, China is still run by one person or a group of 
people, namely, the Politburo members. The phrase is commonly used by ordinary people 
to satirise China as a despotic society. Although there exists the law, the officials stand 
outside the law. Moreover, the governmental administration is largely based on the 
officials’ own will. The journalist explained how this tradition affected journalism, 
Sometimes you may find that a story you thought of as safe may offend some 
officials. It then really depends on your luck in terms of punishment. If the 
official turns a blind eye, you will be saved. But if he takes it seriously, you 
will be punished. So there is an arbitrariness in this which creates uncertainty. 
(F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
A state-run news agency journalist echoed as follows: 
I personally think the fundamental problem is the “rule of man” (ren zhi) which 
leads to self-censorship. In fact, it is hard to come to a set standard. Every 
leader has his standard. Besides, every leader has his understanding in terms of 
the same problem. Everything is judged subjectively. (F-3, a mixed group, 
Beijing, 13 January 2012) 
To solve this problem, a party organ journalist shared his own experience, 
Different leaders may have different views on the same problem. In the case of 
one of our editorials, some party leaders openly criticised us for printing this 
editorial. There are also a great number of party leaders who showed their 
support. With such a dilemma, you should take two standards into account. 
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First, you should follow the general path of the party-state. Second, you should 
check with your superiors. If they expressed various views, you should further 
check with the relevant authorities. That is the CPD. If the problem is still 
unsettled, then you should listen to what the Standing Committee members 
said. Our country is led by the elite group, seven members of the Standing 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. If the elite group members said 
yes, you are definitely fine. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
The above personal experience further confirms that the decision making process is in the 
hands of the top-level party leaders. Actually, the problem regarding arbitrary judgement 
has not been solved, for the judgement criterion is still based on the will of a small group. 
Herein, the tradition of the ‘rule of man’ functions as the subtext.  
From what has been discussed above, the interviewees confirmed that uncertainty induces 
self-censorship. It is not the lack of written rules but the tradition of ‘rule of man’ that 
results in uncertainty. As journalists convincingly pointed out, the ‘rule of man’ makes a 
generally accepted rule even impossible. Yet a small number of interviewees counter 
claimed that ‘the boundary is clear’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-
2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). A party organ editor said, ‘we know 
where the risks exist. Common risks can be filtered by common sense. Besides, we have 
multiple gates to keep risks outside’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012). A 
journalist working for a mass-appeal publication also confirmed that ‘there is a chip 
implanted in your brain. When potential risks arrive, the chip subconsciously runs to erase 
risks’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). Evidence from the fieldwork 
suggested that common sense and the subconscious are primarily derived from the banning 
orders (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, 
Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012). As 
one journalist said, ‘anything once on the banning list will be self-censored from future 
reports forever’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). A representative 
account is as follows, 
Topics which had been on banning order lists must be crossed out. This is the 
fixed line. But this does not mean that items not on the lists can be reported 
freely. The issue of Taiwan, strikes and corruption with relation to top party 
leaders are all over the line. Even though there exists no booklet listing all 
banning topics, you must have the feeling which is similar to common sense. 
Actually, every adult in China should know the boundary. (F-4, a national 
broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012) 
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The journalist further explained that ‘culture, education, your family and peers all 
contribute to give you a sense of boundary’ (ibid.). Thus, it would be natural to know 
where the boundary lies.  
Furthermore, journalists also mentioned that the payroll is directly linked to the number of 
stories that are published. Thus, they have monetary incentives to self-censor their stories 
in order to ensure publication (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; I-1, a 
vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). Here, it is necessary to delineate the 
payment structure of journalism in the present day. As discussed in Chapter 2, before 
media commercialisation, a journalist’s salary was mainly composed of the fixed base 
salary. The base was determined by the job title and the administrative hierarchy of the 
media (xingzheng jibie). After media commercialisation, the salary was no longer mainly 
determined on a fixed basis. Instead, the author’s remuneration (gao fei) and bonus have 
taken the lead in the salary (Xia & Yin, 2009). It is estimated by some journalists in the 
fieldwork that the two parts account for over 70 per cent of the total salary (F-2, a mass-
appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; I-3, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012). The 
author’s remuneration is based on the number of published articles. That is, the more 
articles published, the better a journalist gets paid. Moreover, the bonus is also linked to 
the quality of published articles. As both parts link to the articles that have published, the 
journalists are under an economic imperative to conduct self-censorship. 
Journalists in the fieldwork also attributed self-censorship to a lack of protection. As 
mentioned previously, there is no media law to protect media workers. Journalists 
mentioned cases in which journalists were capriciously fired due to offending the 
authorities (I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 
9 January 2012).  
Practising journalism under routine media control and pervasive self-censorship, the 
majority of journalists felt obliged to adapt themselves to the social milieu which is the 
focus of the next section. 
4.3 Reactions to the existing system 
As discussed above, censorship, propaganda control, and self-censorship are widespread in 
Chinese media practices. Control and self-censorship are not particularly different between 
party-organ and mass-appeal media. A large number of interviewees expressed their 
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disappointment with journalism (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-3, a 
mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 
January 2012, F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012;). A party-organ journalist 
expressed his feelings over control as follows, 
There is no doubt that rigid control hits journalism seriously. You usually feel 
powerless and foresee no hope for the future. It feels like scrambling in the 
Buddha’s palm (ru lai fo).23 You can never escape from that giant five-finger 
mountain (wu zhi shan). Many scholars and audiences criticised us as 
unprofessional and sensational. But this is due to the abnormal news 
environment. Under normal circumstances, political reports should hit the 
headlines. But in our country, it is the twisted political reports. Can you 
imagine what it would be if you put a rock on a bamboo root seed. The seed 
struggles to sprout from other directions bending its knees. That’s us. (F-3, a 
mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012)  
The depressed feeling is not only confined to ordinary journalists; media elites also 
expressed their frustration. As one vice editor-in-chief said, ‘you have no choice but to 
compromise with reality’ (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). In the 
fieldwork, this research found that journalists and editors have employed various strategies 
to react to the existing system. The strategies show three positions: concessional, 
negotiated, and adaptive. Each position involves different strategies that are explained in 
the following section. 
Concessional reaction 
A small number of journalists react to control in a concessional way. Evidence from the 
fieldwork shows that some journalists would be willing to quit their jobs. Other journalists 
would transfer to other news desks with fewer restrictions, such as sports or entertainment 
news. A vice editor-in-chief said, 
Once a journalist told me he would quit his job and find another career. The 
reason is that he cannot tolerate day-to-day censorship. I can understand his 
                                                 
23 The Buddha’s palm is a literary allusion which comes from the novel Journey to the West, also 
known as Adventures of the Monkey God in English-speaking countries. The novel was written by 
Wu, Cheng’en in the 16th century (the Ming Dynasty). The novel is one of the four classics read by 
almost all Chinese people. In the novel, Sun Wukong, a monkey with a human brain, was born with 
talents and had learned to use magical powers. The monkey rebelled against the rule of the 
Heaven. The Buddha was one of the safeguard gods in the Heaven who was also talented with 
magic. The Buddha seized Sun Wukong in his giant palm. Then the Buddha trapped Sun Wukong 
under the mountain and sealed the mountain with a talisman for five hundred years. The five-finger 
mountain denotes both the Buddha’s giant palm and the shape of the mountain which trapped Sun 
Wukong. When the five-finger mountain is referred to, there is an undertone that it denotes an 
ultimate power that ordinary people cannot escape from.  
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feeling. But I still persuaded him not to quit for no jobs are immune from 
censorship. (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012) 
A journalist who used to report on the political beat recently transferred to the management 
department in the newspaper. He commented, 
I have lost all my drive through years of censorship and directives. In the early 
years after graduation, I still made efforts to push forward. Several years later, 
I found I was just repeating myself. I decided to go to the management 
department. It should be more psychologically relaxed. (I-4, a senior journalist, 
Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
In China, journalism tends to be a short career path more appealing to youngsters and job-
hopping is common in this business. A journalist said ‘your friends and relatives may look 
down on you if you reach thirty-five years old and you are still an ordinary journalist’ (F-6, 
a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012). This is partly due to harsh controls that make 
the journalistic job mentally exhausting and difficult to endure in the long term. 
Furthermore, this is also related to the payroll and welfare systems which are discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.  
In the above cases, media workers took practical action to react to control. There are also 
cases in which journalists reduced their commitment to journalism to react to control. This 
research views this as a psychological action in retreating from journalism. A vice editor-
in-chief working for a market-driven organisation admitted that he regarded his job as just 
a means to make a living. This claim was popular among a number of interviewees (F-2, a 
mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 
14 January 2012; F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012). A chief editor 
working for a state-run broadcast media organisation concluded, 
You should bury your dashing spirits and the so-called news ideal in the ivory 
tower after graduation. Do not associate too much meaning with your work. 
This is only a job to feed your family. If you attach your ideals to your work, it 
will end up driving you mad. (F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 
January 2012) 
The above actions can be seen as passive reactions to control. The following paragraph 
explores a relatively active position taken by journalists in response to control. 
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Negotiated reaction 
A number of journalists take a negotiated position by finding an alternative way in the face 
of control. A Chinese saying goes that ‘there is always a way to circumvent bans’ (shang 
you zhengce, xia you duice) which is commonly quoted among journalists. An editor-in-
chief of a magazine provided a vivid case, 
You do not always need to take a directly oppositional position. There are 
many ways to present your wisdom. When you are not allowed to report 
certain topics, you need to find another way to speak it out. For instance, 
propaganda departments issued a banning order on reporting demolition related 
to Yan, Lianke,24 a famous Chinese writer. However, we thought this was a 
valuable case. In a country without rule of law, even the elite class may suffer 
from injustice. In this case, we interviewed Yan, Lianke without mentioning 
anything about demolition. But we wrote his view of home. Readers can get 
the underlying meanings from the report. (I-5, an editor-in-chief, Beijing, 11 
January 2012) 
Another vice editor-in-chief also confirmed this method by saying that ‘if the incident is 
blocked then you can report the victims’ (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 
2012). This research further discovers other tactics to negotiate with control. A media 
worker from a major internet company said that his company would pay propaganda 
departments in exchange for wider space.  
Sometimes we thought the story was really of value and had nothing to do with 
politics. But they still issued banning orders. In such cases, we would like to 
pay 30,000 Yuan to propaganda departments in exchange for keeping the story. 
(F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012) 
This is not an exceptional case. Zhang and Lu (2008) also discovered this tactic existed in 
a well-known weekly newspaper. The newspaper regularly pays the local propaganda 
department in exchange for more tolerance on investigative reports. This monetary 
exchange has profound implications, which are discussed in the final section. 
                                                 
24 Yan, Lianke is a famous Chinese writer who had owned a house in a Beijing suburb. However, 
the local government planned to relocate residents from that area. Yan, Lianke wrote an open letter 
to top party leaders appealing to stop the demolition plan. Yet he failed to save his house. His 
house was destroyed without notice in advance. A press report from the New York Times can be 
found at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/asia/harassment-and-house-evictions-bedevil-
even-chinas-well-off.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Adaptive reaction 
On the basis of the fieldwork, this research has found that a great number of journalists 
make efforts to justify censorship, propaganda control, and self-censorship. Journalists 
working for party-organs and market-driven media organisations seem to hold similar 
views. This research views this justification effort as an adaptive reaction to control 
employed by media workers. The justifications mainly follow four lines which are 
presented as follows. Notably, the justifications are expressed in journalists’ own accounts. 
The first and foremost justification is related to nationalism. As a party-organ journalist 
commented,  
I feel that media control is necessary especially in terms of foreign policy 
issues. Ordinary journalists usually do not have enough knowledge regarding 
international issues. Under such circumstances, the authorities should issue 
directives to the media in order to protect national interests. (F-1, a party organ 
group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
Resonating with the above claim, a state-run broadcasting journalist added, 
In some circumstances, you must listen to what the authorities say in order to 
protect national interests. You cannot follow what the Americans say. The 
Americans always criticise our foreign exchange policy. If we follow their 
suggestions we will be doomed. There must be some level of orders to tell us 
how to report. (F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012) 
This justification is not only confined to party-organs or state-run media. Furthermore, the 
protection of national interests is not restricted to foreign policy issues. Journalists from 
market-driven organisations also expressed similar views in relation to internal issues, 
I think banning orders and must-do orders did some good for our country. You 
cannot report however you like in terms of minorities or national security 
issues. Otherwise the reports might induce fatal damage to our nation. As a 
Chinese citizen, you cannot do this. (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 
January 2012) 
It is evident from the above comments that strong nationalism underpins the justifying 
argument. In light of this, self-censorship, censorship, and propaganda control have been 
justified in the name of the national good. This also reflects the media’s role held by 
journalists. The media should protect national interests and support national development. 
Journalists see themselves as partakers in the national building process. To achieve these 
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ends, journalists adapt themselves to the existing system by justifying media control and 
self-censorship.  
The second justification is borrowed from the official discourse. A number of journalists 
justified media control and self-censorship by saying ‘at this complicated development 
stage, media control is indispensable’ (I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012).   
This discourse actually evolved from the official discourse, originally used by Deng, 
Xiaoping, the former top party leader. Deng initiated the reform and opening-up policy (cf. 
Chapter 2). As part of the reform, Deng argued for a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics (you zhongguo tese shichang jingji). This slogan-like discourse was 
originally employed as a tactic to counteract conservative forces within the party who 
regarded the market economy as an enemy of socialism. Subsequently, the discourse was 
attached by multiple meanings. Chinese characteristics were further developed to include 
sub-discourses: development stages, particularity, and other similar discourses. 
Particularity emphasises that China is unique in terms of its large population, diverse 
geological conditions, and great regional differences making it inadvisable for China to 
simply follow the general Western development path. This discourse is commonly 
employed by the communist party to defend its monopoly on political power. Furthermore, 
Deng claimed that China stood at a primitive stage of socialism. Taking this discourse into 
account, the malpractices of authorities and the underdevelopment of rural areas should be 
viewed as provisional problems. Resonating with the official discourse, a state-run 
broadcast journalist said, 
At this development stage, I tend to view media control as indispensable. 
China is the most populous country in the world with many complicated 
problems. Frankly speaking, the majority of Chinese people are not well 
educated and are easily agitated. Even the literati were easily manipulated. 
Therefore, media control is necessary to keep our country on the normal track. 
(F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012) 
The argument indicates that the journalist holds an elitist view regarding the ordinary 
people as lacking education. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a legacy of the Confucian 
tenet. Similar to this view, a media worker from an internet company said, 
China is extremely complicated. There is conflict between central and local 
governments. Different administrative agencies also have issues. Thus China 
has a strong particularity. In this complex situation, media control facilitates 
the development of our country. You definitely would not expect China to 
repeat mistakes of the former Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union lessened 
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media control and collapsed immediately. (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 
15 January 2012) 
More than one focus group mentioned the mistakes of the former Soviet Union (F-1, a 
party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 
2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012), and journalists from 
different types of media held similar views as presented above: the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union further justified media control. 
The third justification comes from the ownership situation of the media in China. A party-
organ journalist said that ‘all media are owned by the party-state. Therefore it is 
unquestionable that the party would issue orders’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 
January 2012). Another state-run broadcasting journalist further explained, ‘in theory, we 
are more like civil servants than professional journalists’ (F-4, a national broadcasting 
group, Beijing, 14 January 2012). A number of market-driven journalists supported this 
justification. One journalist said that ‘in theory we are owned by the party-state. Although 
we do not receive subsidies as we used to from the party-state, we still get some benefits. 
In this sense, it is natural to listen to the party-state’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 
January 2012). 
The final justification emphasises that there exists no perfect freedom in the world. A 
party-organ journalist made a convincing argument as follows, 
Freedom is always relative. Western media are also confined to various 
controls. The difference is we are more controlled by the party-state. However, 
they are more controlled by advertisers and media owners. It is reported that 
Murdoch occasionally interferes with news production. (F-1, a party organ 
group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
From what has been discussed above, journalistic practitioners employ four justifications 
to validate media control. The four justifications are sometimes complementary in practice. 
The final section discusses the implications of the above findings. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This research has found extensive censorship and propaganda activities in daily journalistic 
practices. Banning orders, which forbid or limit the reporting of certain topics, are issued 
by propaganda departments to media organisations on an almost daily basis. Journalists all 
confirmed this as the most common form of censorship. Notably, a number of journalists 
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mentioned that the banning orders might be issued by propaganda officials for personal 
gains. This further exacerbates the news environment. Must-do orders, which require 
certain topics to be reported, are also common in controlling the media. This method aims 
for long-term propaganda effects and does not focus on changing people’s minds. Instead, 
it intends to integrate social members by promoting sanctioned ideology and creating a 
certain social climate. Using this method, all the media are engaged. It has embodied the 
characteristics of total propaganda and sociological propaganda as discussed in Chapter 1. 
This research has also discovered that pre-publication censorship systematically exists, 
which counters the generally acknowledged idea that China does not have systematic pre-
publication censorship. Such censorship is embodied in ‘submission for review’ activity. 
This research has found that certain news beats, such as congress news, and certain reports, 
such as the national congress meeting, have set up a pre-publication censorship system. 
Journalists either send the drafts to the propaganda officials or submit to the on-site 
censors for approval before publication. Journalists also mentioned coercion as a key 
controlling method as well. China had jailed 32 journalists in 2012 and stood at the bottom 
of the press freedom list produced by international organisations (Journalists in Prison 
Reach Record High: Turkey, Iran, and China among Leading Jailers, 2012). Yet 
considering the large number of journalists, the jailing ratio is really small. Besides, 
journalists cannot name any exact cases of coercion although they frequently referred to 
coercion (Hassid, 2008). This indicates that although coercion is seldom used, it is a 
powerful psychological deterrent.  
Journalists in the fieldwork also pointed out that media control is more professional and 
cunning. The propaganda offices are working efficiently in scrutinising the media. 
Additionally, new tactics, such as spin and public relations, have been introduced to 
control the media which has virtually turned China into a propaganda state (Brady, 2008) 
or public relations state (Schudson, 1989). Mass persuasion and propaganda are essential 
tools in sustaining the rule of the party-state.  
This research discloses that self-censorship is pervasive in Chinese journalism. Evidence 
from the fieldwork shows that journalists primarily self-censor their articles based on 
knowledge of banning orders. Although journalists are advised not to pre-censor their 
articles, they felt obliged to conduct self-censorship in order to be responsible to their 
editors and superiors. In the news production chain, each division has different 
responsibilities in filtering political risks which function as multiple gates to block risks. 
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This research has found that senior media leaders take much of the responsibility in 
dodging political risks. Furthermore, it is highly dependent on senior media leaders to deal 
with hidden or potential risks. If the editor-in-chief is conservative and intends to pursue an 
official career, he may be inclined to conduct more self-censorship activities. The chief 
editors, however, are also expected to safely break through the existing boundary and open 
more space for investigative reports. Caught between the propaganda prohibition and the 
market imperative, the chief editors need to employ strategies to resolve the dilemma. 
Evidence from this research shows that the personal bonds between the chief editors and 
the propaganda officials may dilute the paradox.  
The factors leading to self-censorship are a key focus of this research. Link (2002) and 
Hassid (2008) have insightfully pointed out that the vagueness and uncertainty, a lack of 
written rules and punishment without transparency, induce self-censorship. Some 
journalists in the fieldwork generally acknowledged that uncertainty leads to self-
censorship. However, it is not a lack of written rules or fixed terms that leads to 
uncertainty. The journalists in the fieldwork attributed the uncertainty to the tradition of 
‘rule of man’, which means that the country is arbitrarily ruled on the will of one person or 
a small group of people. This tradition carries the Confucian tenet, which argues that an 
ideal country should be ruled on the will of a benevolent and wise emperor. This tradition 
makes punishments unpredictable as journalists said that punishments were largely 
dependent on individual cases. In addition, the tradition also makes it difficult to reach a 
generally accepted rule, for different superiors may have different views on the same 
situation.  
This research has further discovered that the payment structure and the lack of protection 
also facilitate self-censorship. A predominant part of a journalist’s payment is from the 
author’s remuneration, which is based on the number of published articles. Thus, 
journalists have monetary incentives to self-censor their drafts to ensure publication. It is 
still unknown whether this payment structure is deliberately employed to provoke self-
censorship. However, in practice, this payment situation benefits media organisations. 
First, operational costs have been reduced. Through journalistic self-censorship, human 
resources and money are directed towards publishable articles, which facilitates a higher 
rate of investment returns. Second, by virtue of journalistic self-censorship, all staff inside 
media organisation take on the responsibility of risk control. Therefore, the political risks 
encountered by media organisations have been reduced and transferred to the staff (Xia & 
Yin, 2009). The payment structure links political risks with economic returns. Thus, 
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political risks have been transferred to individual practitioners. By virtue of this, the party-
state control has been implemented through organisational control by means of economic 
interests. 
This research has also explored how journalists react to the existing media control system. 
A number of journalists metaphorised self-censorship as self-castration (F-2, Beijing, 9 
January 2012), which shows their resentment over censorship. However, they often 
endeavour to justify media control. This research has discovered four main means of 
justification. First, journalists justify media control in protecting national interests. Strong 
nationalism underpins such justification. As Brady (2008) claims, after the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown, the party transformed its legitimacy primarily on nationalism and 
economic development. Evidence shows that the underlying nationalism integrates 
journalists into the existing control system. Journalists also expressed a need for media 
control when processing cross-national information. This finding resonates with what Ellul 
(1965) has argued that propaganda is the natural need of ordinary people in modern 
society. He also mentions international issues to explain his argument. He argues that 
ordinary people are usually unable to process complicated international information. 
Therefore, propaganda fills the niche by subsidising people psychologically. Although 
Ellul’s argument is highly contested, especially in the Anglo-American countries, the 
journalists in the fieldwork expressed a similar argument. That is, journalists’ inability to 
deal with international reports creates their appeals to media control. Second, journalists 
employed official discourse to justify media control by saying that media control is 
indispensable at this complicated developmental stage. Third, a number of journalists 
claimed that the media are owned by the party-state. In this sense, it is unquestionable that 
the media should listen to the party-state. Finally, the Western media are also under 
various controlling forces. Thus, Chinese journalists justify media control as existing 
everywhere in different forms. 
As mentioned above, media control depends largely on the will of the top party leader. 
Thus, this research suggests that the way in which the media will be controlled in the 
future is highly unpredictable. A number of scholars (Zhan, 2013; Sun, 2012) argue for 
media law or written rules, which explicitly state banned topics. In light of this, topics 
outside of the law and the rules may be freely reported. However, this research highly 
doubts the possibility of this. First, self-censorship is profoundly and systematically 
embedded in Chinese journalistic practices. Although topics are available to be reported, it 
is equally possible that they will be self-censored. Second, the tradition of ‘rule of man’ 
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further complicates and prolongs the efforts in drawing up the law and the rules. 
Furthermore, even though the law or written rules were set up, in practice, they are usually 
less effective than high-level political intervention. As discussed previously, officials are 
often not bound by the law and abuse the written rules. Third, in daily newsroom practices, 
courageous senior leaders may find opportunities to report certain sensitive topics without 
written restrictions. However, if rules and boundaries are fixed, they might have no chance 
to touch on such topics.  
Additionally, the existing scholarship seems to view journalists as victims of media control 
(Xia & Yin, 2009; Brady, 2008; Hassid, 2008). This research argues that journalist can 
also be the active agent in sustaining the media control system. As discussed previously, 
journalists would like to conduct command reports. Such reports are easily handled, and in 
processing such reports, journalists are well treated. Most importantly, such reports must 
be published or aired. Just as one superior admitted, command reports are journalists’ 
favourites (I-3, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012). The monetary news prize set up 
by the propaganda department further tempts journalists to voluntarily embrace 
propaganda reports. One journalist argued the prize was generous and the winner could 
have better chances of being promoted (Personal communications No. 5, 14 January 2012). 
Furthermore, the payment structure contributes to the alignment between journalists and 
the controlling system. Moreover, cultural elements, such as elitism and nationalism, all 
strengthen the alignment. Additionally, the inability to process complicated information in 
modern society also facilitates the need of journalists for media control. 
In reality, since the Chinese media started its commercialisation process, journalists began 
to work under dual suppression: political and commercial. The next chapter discusses the 
side effect of media commercialisation: journalistic corruption.
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Chapter Five: Journalistic Corruption 
The soaring media commercialisation in Mainland China was accompanied by a prominent 
by-product: journalistic corruption. Descriptive words such as routine, systematic, 
structural, institutional, and rampant corruption are indicative of the extent of this. 
Actually, journalistic corruption has become ‘a way of life’ (Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005: 
121). ‘Unethical practices in journalism are not confined to China, but the degree and 
scope is perhaps China’s unique contribution to world journalism’ concluded Zhao (1998: 
83) in her thorough investigation. Fifteen years on from Zhao’s study, this situation has not 
changed, and is in fact worsening. A number of interviewees gave similar evidence. A 
representative example is: ‘nobody could escape from conducting corruption if only he or 
she works for Mainland China media’ (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012).  
This chapter provides accounts from the journalistic practitioners themselves. Enquiries 
into how they conceptualise corrupt practices and what the contributing factors are in their 
view will be considered. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on three themes. First, the most 
common forms of corruption are examined. Meanwhile, the attitudes of journalists 
themselves towards corrupt behaviour are examined. Second, this research explores 
journalists’ own accounts about the roots of corruption. This chapter concludes by looking 
at the implications of corrupt journalism. The most important task is to investigate whether 
journalistic corruption is a transitional phenomenon or not. This enquiry will also 
illuminate whether commercialisation can take predominant responsibility for the 
corruption in journalism.   
First of all, it is necessary to clarify what this research means by journalistic corruption. 
Chinese journalistic corruption attracts considerable scholarly attention (Chen et al. 2010; 
Lin, 2010a; Lin, 2010b; Xia & Yin, 2009; Zhang & Lu, 2008; Chen, L., 2007; Chan et al., 
2004; Zheng & Chen, 2004; Lu & Yu, 2003A; Luo et al., 2001; Yu, 1998; Zhao, 1998). 
However, seldom do scholars pay attention to its definition. Some prefer to define it by 
reference to the forms of corruption (Chen et al., 2010; Yu, 1998). Yet the problem is that 
the forms are ever changing. Additionally, what corrupt behaviour comprises is bundled 
with cultural and historical elements. In light of this, it is necessary to take the social 
context into account in defining journalistic corruption. This research provides a definition 
exclusively applicable to the Chinese context. The World Bank has provided a useful 
definition, in which corruption is defined as ‘the abuse of public office for private gains’ 
(Helping Countries Combat Corruption, 1997: 8). Drawing upon this, journalistic 
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corruption is referred to as the abuse of publicity power for private returns. The definition 
helps differentiate unethical practices from corrupt practices. For example, paying a source 
is not a corrupt practice but an unethical one, in that it does not directly involve the abuse 
of publicity power. In the Chinese context, corruption usually involves power-for-money 
transactions (quan qian jiaoyi). The following section looks at forms of journalistic 
corruption.  
5.1 Forms of Journalistic Corruption  
Corrupt practice emerged in the early 1980s, just after China had recovered from the 
Cultural Revolution and begun its economic reform (Zhao, 1998: 72; F-3, a mixed group, 
Beijing, 13 January 2012). The forms of corruption are diverse and exhaustive since they 
are ever changing and sometimes disguised. This research concentrates on the most 
prominent forms. More than ten years ago, Zhao (1998) identified five main forms of 
Chinese journalistic corruption:  
• All-expenses-paid news reporting 
• The blurring of advertising and editorial functions 
• Journalists moonlighting 
• Bribery and extortion 
• Advertising-as-news and news-as-fabrication  
Later on, Zheng and Chen (2004) pointed out four prevalent types of corruption:  
• Taking ‘freebies’, such as free lunches, free travel packages, and free trial 
usages 
• Soliciting advertisement and auspices 
• Taking cash wrapped in an envelope  
• Reports flattering advertisers  
This research also looks at changes of corrupt forms through the comparison between the 
current forms obtained from the fieldwork with findings from the above research. The 
following section first explores the most common forms of corruption identified by 
journalists: taking cash wrapped in a red envelope (hong bao). 
Taking red-envelope-cash 
It is estimated that over 90 per cent of the journalists in China take red-envelope-cash (F-5, 
a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012), and some interviewees claimed that all 
Chinese journalists accept it. To some extent, it has become a professional routine (F-1, a 
party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 
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January 2012; F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012; I-5, an editor-in-chief, 
Beijing, 11 January 2012). One interviewee explained,  
Taking red-envelope-cash emerged in the mid-1980s. In its early days, it was 
only 3 to 4 Yuan towards the transportation subsidy. However, the amount has 
surpassed the currency inflation climbing to 50 Yuan, 200 Yuan, or even more 
than 1,000 Yuan. In this sense, red-envelope-cash has gone bad. (F-3, a mixed 
group, Beijing, 13 January 2012)  
Giving a red envelope is originally a cultural tradition, in which a monetary gift, usually 
contained in a red envelope symbolising good luck, is given on festivals such as the Lunar 
New Year or on special occasions such as weddings. It is important to note that if the red 
envelope is from a peer it is a courtesy to reciprocate. The cash accepted by journalists, 
however, is not placed in a red envelope, but usually in a white or brown envelope so that 
it remains less noticeable. Additionally, the envelopes are handed over in a cunningly 
graceful way. Generally speaking, journalists sign in at the reception. Then there will be 
staff in charge of allocating a pack to the journalists. A pre-prepared article and a red 
envelope will be sealed in the pack. The signing list will be well guarded for future 
reference, which will involve keeping in contact with journalists and to check whether the 
article has been aired or printed. In most cases, journalists will rewrite the story based on 
interview information, and the prepared article is only for reference. However, sometimes, 
the prepared article fosters lazy journalists who form the news story almost entirely out of 
this material. Journalists themselves prefer to call it the transportation subsidy (che ma fei) 
to make it more acceptable. One interviewee described the red-envelope-cash as follows: 
The red-envelope-cash can be categorised into two types: the first is given in 
general interviews with no relation to any negative or muckraking reports. This 
can be called the transportation subsidy, normally not too much money; the 
second is given in large amount of money in exchange for keeping silence on 
scandals. (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012)  
This view was shared by nearly all of the interviewees. The cash is generally paid by 
companies to call attention to their new products or publicity conferences. According to 
the interviewees, ‘it is a general rule to hand out red-envelope-cash no matter whether the 
story is of news value’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 Jan 2012; F-5, a news website 
group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). Nowadays, governmental agencies are regular payers of 
red-envelope-cash. Ironically, the General Administration of Press and Publication 
(GAPP), which is responsible for dealing with journalistic corruption and even launched an 
anti-corruption campaign in journalism, has joined the paying group (I-5, editor-in-chief, 
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Beijing, 11 February 2012). One interviewee described his astonishment when receiving 
red-envelope-cash at a press conference organised by the United Front Work Department25 
at which a State Councillor who also holds a seat on the Politburo was present, 
Someone tapped my shoulder and passed me an envelope with an impressive 
heading: the United Front Work Department. 50 Yuan was in it. He said it was 
the transportation subsidy. We argue against taking red-envelope-cash; but can 
you imagine such a high level department would like to pay you this. (F-3, a 
mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012)     
Compared with previous findings, it seems that journalists are more tolerant with taking 
the red-envelope-cash nowadays. Journalists call it as the ‘de facto tacit rule’ (qian guize). 
Sex, age, educational background, social status, job titles, and all other background 
information do not make a difference to this view. Furthermore, it is not only held by 
journalists but also acknowledged by sources. One interviewee claimed that ‘it would be 
abnormal if the transportation subsidy were not provided’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, 
Beijing, 9 January 2012). 
Although a few admit that this practice should not be permissible in rigid terms, they 
would add a ‘but’ to this point. A typical ‘but’ statement emphasises that the money does 
not affect professional judgement: 
Strictly speaking, journalists should not take red-envelope-cash. But the money 
is not too much and is not very harmful. Moreover, it is based on mutual 
willingness. Actually, the most important thing is the money cannot affect how 
you process the reports. If the event is of news value, you must go to report it 
even if no money is for you. On the other hand, taking money does not mean to 
guarantee the publicity. It only shows willingness to keep a good connection. 
(F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2013) 
The media elites also hold a similar view. A representative one is as follows: 
It does not matter whether you take the transportation subsidy, whereas it does 
matter whether the story is of news value. (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 
January 2012) 
On the contrary, a small number of participants acknowledged that the ‘money does make 
subtle differences’: 
                                                 
25 The United Front Work Department is under the direct supervision by the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China which is in charge of managing non-party and minor political party 
relationships. The department also relates to issues over Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. 
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Before you go to the press conference, you might anticipate there will be a 
transportation subsidy. Actually, you already know you are going to say 
something nice instead of bad. Well, at least something constructive. (F-4, a 
national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012) 
It is ok if you take the money and do not put it into print once. But it is 
awkward if you do it twice. I might feel guilty. I will try to promote the article 
to an editor who is easy going on weekends because there are less journalists 
working and more boring articles printing on weekends. (F-6, a mixed group, 
Shanghai, 11 February 2012) 
Even so, the participants agreed that this practice is trivial. Furthermore, the dominant 
view highly doubts whether taking a transportation subsidy counts as corrupt practice. An 
editor-in-chief said again and again: ‘it is a sophisticated cultural custom instead of being a 
form of corruption’ (I-5, an editor-in-chief, Beijing, 11 January 2012).  
In their view, taking a large amount of money to remain silent is completely corrupt. Some 
call it ‘beneficial commission’ or ‘hush money’. The interviewees agreed that this money 
is harmful, dangerous, and unacceptable. The amount ranges from 1,000 Yuan to over 
100,000 Yuan. This form has received little attention in previous research (Zheng et al., 
2004; Yu, 1998; Zhao, 1998) probably because this form is closely related to the mining 
disasters, which became noted at the beginning of this century. A number of interviewees 
also made the link between hush money and the mining disasters. Even today, one can see 
a line of journalists waiting to pick hush money after a mine explosion. Interestingly, some 
idle people pretend to be journalists in the line and get their precious rewards (F-1, a party 
organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012). 
A telling example is as follows, which has provoked national debate. 
On 22 June 2002, a gold mine in Fanshi County of Shanxi Province exploded and killed 38 
people and caused more than 10 million Yuan of direct economic losses. The mine owner 
and the local officials removed most of the corpses, hastily burying some and burning 
others in the wild. They then reported 2 deaths and 4 injuries. The desperate family 
members of the lost men were threatened not to utter a word to journalists. The Xinhua 
News Agency, the most authoritative state-owned news agency, dispatched four reporters 
from its Shanxi branch to investigate the disaster, including the deputy director of 
reporting and editing and the deputy director of photography. The four reporters received 
an overwhelming welcome. They were invited to fake a new version of the disaster in 
reward for 20,000 Yuan (approximately £2,000). Several local journalists also pocketed 
8,000, 7,000, and 5,000 Yuan (approximately £800, £700, and £500). It is reported that 
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three journalists from the Shanxi Life Morning Post were originally given 10,000 Yuan 
(approximately £1,000), which they claimed could not be shared between three people 
equally. As a result, they exacted another 5,000 Yuan (roughly £500). All the journalists 
accepted the cash offer and published the article reporting 2 deaths and 4 injures. On 25 
June 2002, the family members of the victims made a phone call to the China Youth Daily, 
a quality national newspaper, calling for help to search for the bodies of their beloved ones. 
Two journalists then set about digging out the under-table transactions. Finally, they broke 
the scandal and revealed the site where the dead bodies were buried. Top party leaders in 
Beijing were furious. A special investigation group was initiated to further probe the 
malpractices. After an investigation lasting ten months, the group revealed that 11 
journalists had accepted bribes in the form of cash and gold ingots from local officials and 
owners of the illegal mine. The four journalists from the Xinhua News Agency were 
dismissed. Additionally, all the media organisations were ordered to learn their lesson and 
to launch campaigns against corrupt behaviour. However, this issue is a chronic problem. 
There are scandals breaking constantly that some journalists are still taking bribes to keep 
silent.26   
The predominant affirmative attitudes of taking the transportation subsidy contradict the 
finding of Yu (1998). Yu reported that journalists have a clear-cut idea of what constitutes 
wrongdoing showing a high ethical standard (ibid.) with 79.7 per cent of journalists 
arguing against taking cash from sources. Yet 34.8 per cent of journalists regarded such a 
practice as pervasive in journalism. Thus, there exists a discrepancy between perception 
and practice (ibid.). This research, however, has discovered that journalists tend to hold an 
obscure view of corruption. Based on the definition provided in this research, taking red-
envelope-cash is indeed corrupt behaviour. It exchanges the power of publicity for cash. 
Yet journalists disagreed. An interviewee (F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 
January 2012) contended that taking red-envelope-cash could not be regarded as corruption 
for it is normally a small sum. According to the governmental rules, taking 5,000 Yuan 
(roughly £500) qualifies as taking a bribe (ibid.). Although the majority of interviewees 
agreed that taking hush money is indeed corruption, they still preferred a case-by-case 
judgement. A number of interviewees said that ‘you cannot be too harsh to Chinese media 
organisations which are already under severe political torture. At least, you have to leave 
some privileges for the media to enjoy’ (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 
                                                 
26 Reports about the Fanshi scandal: ‘War on Corruption Catches Journos in Crossfire’, [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EK04Ad01.html (Accessed: 8 May 2012); 
‘Culprits in North China Cold Mine Explosion Punished’, [Online]. Available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-09/15/content_1082625.htm (Accessed 8 May 2012), 
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2012). The evidence that emerged from the fieldwork indicates that the situation is 
worsening. An increasing number of journalists are committing corruption by taking the 
red-envelope-cash. Furthermore, in perception, journalists are more tolerant of such 
practices. Interestingly, journalists endeavour to justify corrupt behaviour on the excuse of 
political torture. The following part focuses on publicity power for rent.  
Publicity power for rent 
The phrase ‘power for rent’ was originally coined to describe the malpractices conducted 
by officials or corporate executives where they abuse their administrative power in 
exchange for personal gains, whilst avoiding regulation and punishment. Applied to 
journalism, administrative power is replaced by the power of making something public, in 
other words, publicity power (Zhang & Lu, 2008). The phrase gained popularity among 
journalists. As one interviewee (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) put it: 
‘the right to publish is a kind of power. Moreover, this power is intoxicating. As long as 
there exists power, there follows the exchange of interests’. Another interviewee expressed 
it more frankly: ‘news is nothing but interests’ (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 
January 2013). The forms of this practice are varied, and some media organisations are 
also involved. Besides, power can be exchanged for money or private gains. This section 
provides a number of telling cases given by the interviewees.  
If this power-interests trade benefits journalists themselves, they tend to excuse themselves 
and embellish this as understandable. For example, an interviewee stated that one piece of 
investigative reporting about the Spring Festival Travel Rush27 (chun yun) had to be 
removed in exchange for guaranteeing that all the staff received train tickets:  
The staff of the Ministry of Railways went to work at our office in the period 
of the Spring Festival Travel Rush. He is exclusively in charge of allocating 
train tickets to my colleagues. You have to know it is impossible to buy a train 
ticket through normal channels. But you can get any train tickets you want 
from him. Certainly, you’d better write supportive articles about the Ministry 
of Railways. But it is a good deal. You know this is not corruption; it is a kind 
of employee benefits. Anyway, it is of no help if you publish negative reports 
about the Travel Rush. The messy transportation is not due to the government. 
                                                 
27 The Spring Festival Travel Rush usually begins 15 days before the Lunar New Year and will last 
for around 40 days. People make the round trip between their working places, normally 
metropolitan, and their hometown, usually inner land counties. The number of journeys at that time 
has exceeded the population of China, hitting over 2 billion in 2008. Obviously, this is a big 
challenge for any transportation system. It has been called the largest annual human migration in 
the world.  
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It is because China is the most populous country. (F-2, a mass-appeal group, 
Beijing, 9 January 2013) 
The above argument inspired his colleagues in the group. They agreed with this and added: 
‘journalists are ordinary people and have to go home for family reunions’ (ibid.). However, 
if this benefit goes to their superiors, the interviewees changed their views: 
The journalist on the transportation beat enjoys the privilege because she 
knows how to appeal to her superior. She used to get the superior an army 
vehicle licence plate.28 Then the superior rewards her a whole page to extol the 
top ten police poll event, which has nothing to do with audiences. This is 
exactly power for rent, disgusting. I think this should be banned. (ibid.) 
The comment aroused nods among the focus group participants. Another corrupt behaviour 
conducted by the superior is to withdraw drafts for personal reasons. A vice editor-in-chief 
constantly encountered this. He claimed that, ‘some top superiors just called you to remove 
a well-prepared draft without giving you any reasons. Even if the superior were not granted 
any cash, he must get rewards in other ways. I think this is corruption’ (I-1, a vice editor-
in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). One journalist also complained that ‘some superiors 
withdrew a draft only for the benefit of their relatives and friends, this is unacceptable’ (F-
3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012).  
Two phenomena that Zhao (1998) revealed have faded out nowadays: journalists 
moonlighting and selling publishing licences being franchised by the government to 
companies. However, some media organisations still sell their editorial pages for 
promotional information. Normally, it is a flattering story to promote a company or a 
product that is not shown on an advertisement page but on an editorial page. The names of 
journalists and the editors are printed on the story. Regardless of whether the story is of 
news value, the important aim is to convince the audience that this information is as 
credible as news. As a result, audiences will be more willing to buy the products. Zhao 
(1998) named this advertising-as-news. Nowadays this trade is more elegantly disguised as 
‘transaction reports’ (jingji wanglai baodao). An editor-in-chief explained: 
We will cooperate with some companies which might involve financial 
exchange. This kind of report is easy to identify. All the other media 
organisations are doing this but we try to present the reports in a special way. 
                                                 
28 The licence plate for army vehicles has privileged access on roads in Beijing, China. Other cars 
have to give way to the army vehicles. In addition, the police have no administrative rights over 
army vehicles. 
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Whatever you call it, maybe public relation reports or anything else. This is 
what it is in China; it is particular in China. (I-5, Beijing, 11 January 2012) 
In fact, most media advertising departments offer the publicity service at a high cost, and 
the price depends on which time slots or editorial pages are selected. Additionally, the 
more famous a media organisation is, the higher the price is to buy a page or slot. 
According to a report in the New York Times (Barboza, 2012) it costs $4,000 (roughly 
£2,500) per minute to be shown on China Central Television (CCTV), the state-run 
broadcaster, and $1 per Chinese character for a flattering report in the Workers’ Daily, a 
national party organ. Most of the interviewees argued against this trade, while a few 
regarded it as understandable in order for the media organisation to survive. Aside from the 
above cases, illegal activities are also involved in journalistic practices, which are 
discussed in the next section. 
Extortion 
According to the focus group discussions, some media organisations require an advertising 
contract to remove a negative report. An interviewee remembered that a colleague who 
was preparing an investigative report about a company was instructed by his superior to 
threaten the company in exchange for an advertisement fee. This kind of practice is 
generally regarded as notorious by all interviewees. Additionally, they called for a more 
severe, iron-fist crack down on this behaviour. A recent case, which has provoked national 
debate and discussed in every focus group, is provided as follows.  
On 10 and 17 July 2011, CCTV aired two reports on its most renowned investigative 
programme, the Weekly Quality Report. This two-series programme, conducted by Li, 
Wenxue, claimed that a luxury furniture retailer based in Singapore, Da Vinci, exported 
Chinese-made furniture parts to Italy and then shipped them back to China as premium 
Italian brands which sell at high prices. Da Vinci maintained that the furniture was made in 
Italy. However, the widespread media coverage hit its sales revenue badly. Later, Da Vinci 
released some unaired material showing that the CCTV journalist, Li, Wenxue, had 
fabricated the story. Additionally, Da Vinci publicised conversational recordings with Li, 
Wenxue and a broker, Cui Bin, from a Beijing newspaper. The broker asked Da Vinci to 
pay Li, Wenxue at 100,000 Yuan (roughly £10,000) in exchange for no further negative 
reports. Actually, Da Vinci had already remitted the money to a Hong Kong account 
provided by the broker on 25 July 2011. On 31 August 2011, the Shanghai Administration 
of Industry and Commerce released the investigation result claiming that Da Vinci was 
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innocent. Then Da Vinci filed the case with the Beijing police and the corresponding 
media regulators including CCTV’s party disciplinary committee. The case was broken by 
the most-respected Chinese magazine, the Caixin-China Economics & Finance in an 
article titled ‘The Case about the Da Vinci Case’. One thing that needs to be pointed out is 
that Caixin was recognised by all the interviewees as the only media organisation in China 
whose journalists do not accept the transportation subsidy. The report of Caixin provoked 
huge national debates not only among the journalistic practitioners but also among the 
public. CCTV was soon under scrutiny. Gaining public support, Caixin further released an 
editorial written by its editor-in-chief, Hu, Shuli, calling for public scrutiny to sweep the 
dirty media rooms.29 On 10 February 2012, the GAPP launched its investigation into the 
case. The investigative report was presented in a rather vague way saying that ‘based on 
the available evidence, there is no extortion involved’. However, the report also revealed 
that Li was not a certificated journalist although he had worked for more than 5 years for 
CCTV. This allegation is of note because it is common for broadcast journalists not to hold 
certificates or employment contracts (details given in next section). Caixin released its 
follow-up evidence which clearly showed that the extortion was underway.  
This case might be seen as exceptional. However, how the journalists viewed the case and 
how the regulators reacted to it are of importance. Most of the interviewees applauded 
Caixin as ‘how courageous and brilliant to uncover the dark curtain’ (F-1, a party organ 
group, Beijing, 8 January 2012). However, a U-turn took place in one focus group after an 
interviewee said the following: 
There must be some backstage protection for Caixin otherwise who dares to 
criticise CCTV. Any staff in CCTV may be relatives of the top officials. (F-5, 
a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012) 
Then the other interviewees who had firstly cheered Caixin changed their positions: 
Why bother to uncover the professional tacit rule. The corruptions conducted 
by the journalists are no more harmful than what the teachers or the doctors 
did. Hu, Shuli is just too idealistic. (ibid.) 
Absolutely, it is of no value to put the professional rule in public. Hu, Shuli 
just stands on a high moral ground overlooking all the other peers while 
flaunting herself as a moral guard. (ibid.) 
                                                 
29 The serial reports about the case in English can be accessed at: http://english.caixin.com/2012-
01-04/100345676.html  
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Another participant resonated: 
I agree. The media will be more cautious and the broker will be more 
sophisticated from now on. Hu is just labelling the profession as disgraceful. I 
heard that the journalists of Caixin have to stay over at their colleagues’ on 
business trips. (ibid.) 
Laughing ensued, and he continued: 
One can only pursue his lofty ideals after feeding his stomach. (ibid.)   
The above discussion shows that journalists are inclined to excuse illegal activity. 
Moreover, the blurred investigation report by the GAPP also implies the regulator played a 
role in this corruption picture. The roots of corruption deserve careful scrutiny which is 
provided in the next section. 
5.2 Roots of Corruption  
As to the reasons behind the corrupt behaviour, existing scholarship (Zheng & Chen, 2004; 
Lu & Yu, 2003; Yu, 1997) provides a rather vague explanation, namely, that it is due to a 
profound institutional factor. Yet it fails to specify the constituents of the factor. Chen, L. 
(2007) offers a more developed argument in which he lists three causal links (cf. Chapter 
1). First, Mainland China’s media are under transition from a pure propaganda tool into 
more market-oriented institutions. At this particular moment, the media are half part of the 
party-state system and half part of the market system. The contradictions between the two 
create the demand and space for corruption. For example, since commercialisation, the 
party-state has cut off its subsidy to most of the media. The party-state also prohibits 
private companies from investing in the media. Thus, the media have limited investment 
sources, which has largely constrained their development (Chen, C., 2003). In order to 
acquire more funding, the media may commit corruption, such as selling editorial pages to 
private companies in exchange for cash. Second, the media have never been independent in 
China, professional norms and values are absent. Third, a more practical reason is that 
journalists lack the protection of rights and interests, which may trigger the corruption.  
Journalistic corruption is not confined to China. Schudson (2011) revealed that envelope 
journalism is a common problem for a number of countries. Moreover, journalists are no 
more corrupt than any other occupational groups, such as officials, teachers, and doctors, 
in China (Zhao, 1998). Zhao (1998) argued that the most important structural reason for 
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media corruption is the simultaneous operation of party logic and market logic (cf. Chapter 
1). Sun (2012) blamed corruption on the absence of media law. Besides, all the 
interviewees in the fieldwork argued that China is unique in terms of its traditional culture: 
as a society of etiquette and favours, and a society of connections (renqing shehui, guanxi 
shehui). The cultural perspective is notably lacking in the existing scholarship. This section 
intends to probe the roots of corruption from the views of the interviewees. As a result, the 
factors are discussed in their own words categorised into four main types:  
• De facto tacit rules (qian guize) and sophisticated society (renqing shehui)  
• Running the beat (pao kou), peer pressure (quanzi wenhua) and the migrant 
news worker (xinwen mingong) 
• The social milieu (shehui fengqi) 
• Institutional factors (tizhi yuanyin) 
 
The first one pays special attention to the cultural and historical indicators. The second 
type refers to journalists’ working conditions. The third relates to the existing social 
environment. The forth focuses on the systematic factors with relation to the 
incompatibility between the party and the market.  
De facto tacit rules and sophisticated society 
Cultural factors serve as the most comfortable resort to which the journalists go in order to 
excuse themselves. The most common explanation is that ‘in a sophisticated society like 
China, taking money is for building up connections’ (F-4, a national broadcasting group, 
Beijing, 14 January 2012). Similar accounts were given in each interview. Two 
representative comments were put as follows: 
It is deeply embedded in the cultural tradition. I am in charge of writing the 
article while you are responsible for providing money. We become better 
friends from then on. (ibid.) 
It is kind of ruthless if you reject taking money. They give you the money only 
to keep a good connection with you. They give you money this time, and then 
you publish the article next time. Again and again, money keeps the 
relationship going. So you really cannot label this practice as corruption. Not 
that serious, it is only a cultural trait. (I-3, senior editor for national 
broadcasting, Beijing, 6 January 2012) 
The key cultural trait the interviewees employed is the ‘connection’ (guan xi), or in similar 
words, ‘sophisticated society’. Maintaining connections is the most important social 
convention in China. Codes of connection direct everybody in each aspect of social life. A 
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vivid example can explain how to keep connections. It is rare for the Chinese to share the 
bill when they eat out. Normally, if A pays the bill this time, then B is expected to pay the 
next time. The essence of pay-by-turn is that this is the best way to keep the connection 
going. It is like a general common sense. A thorough examination of connection was given 
by Liang, Shuming (2003), a Chinese scholar, in his monograph on Chinese culture (cf. 
Chapter 1). Liang argued that Chinese society is based on ethical relationships (lun li ben 
wei), which originate from the family relationship but extend further. Family members, 
father and son, are a natural basic ethical relationship. All the social relationships resemble 
the family one. For example, teachers are usually regarded as the fathers of the students. 
With the expansion of society, connection extends further to include geographical ties through 
hometown associations, schoolmates and so forth. Perkins (in Harrison & Huntington eds., 
2000) argues that, in the 19th  century, it was the geographical connection that helped secure 
business activities, with hometown associations supplementing the lack of law enforcement by 
providing warranty to business transactions. Since the launch of the reform and opening up 
policy in 1978, connection has extended beyond kinship and geography, and has been 
monetized as well as enabled between strangers through the exchanges of favours. Normally, 
connection between strangers requires a relatively longer period of time to be consolidated, yet 
it will be facilitated if an intermediary who has ethical or geographical relationship with the 
two helps to bridge the strangers. 
The essential point of ethical relationship is that it accentuates mutual obligations. For 
instance, the father has to raise his children, while the children are required to follow their 
father’s words. Connections function as a system of building mutual obligations through 
exchanging favours. As a result, all the society’s members are associated through different 
various kinds of connections. However, most importantly, the way to stay connected is by 
exchanging favours. When applied to journalism, paying money to journalists helps the 
sources to build connections with journalists. The sources and the journalists are originally 
isolated from each other. The sources then offer money to connect with the journalists. 
Consequently, the mutual obligation has been built up. The journalists pay off the debt 
with a published article. Then again the source repays, and the cycle continues. Until now, 
this research has argued against what a number of the interviewees had alleged, namely 
that money could not change how they processed the articles, for the simple reason that the 
fundamental rule of connection is mutual obligation. The journalists are required to pay off 
the debt in whatever way in order not to break the social convention. 
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Another cultural trait the interviewees tend to borrow is conformity. Conformity is a 
psychologically global concept. However, the concept is closely related to a Confucian 
ethos, the doctrine of the mean (zhong yong), making it more compelling in China. Zhong 
Yong, has long been regarded as an important guide for social interaction, which means to 
behave in a moderate (middle) way so as to keep harmony and balance. Generally 
speaking, conformity is a way of behaving Zhong Yong. A personal experience given by an 
editor-in-chief of a market driven press in Beijing perfectly reflects how conformity and 
Zhong Yong works: 
I have begun to print a slogan on journalists’ cards: our journalists do not 
accept red-envelope-cash since 2004. But from the beginning of this year, I 
gave up. No more such slogans on the cards. Because I did not anticipate that 
even the media elites have a problem with this. All the other press will not 
print such a slogan. So never mind, do not be special, just be moderate. (I-6, an 
editor-in-chief, Beijing, 17 January 2012) 
There is another key phrase which the journalists employ to excuse themselves, de facto 
tacit rules (qian gui ze). The phrase was originally coined by a journalist who later found a 
career in research, Wu, Si. In his startling monograph about Chinese history (2001), Wu 
discovered the hidden rule actually runs society which is cloaked under formal institutional 
rules. For example, it is common to find that local government takes part of the subsidies 
allocated from the central government to the peasants in China. In this case, the local 
officials may issue ‘I owe you’ (IOU) notes to the peasants. Although it is illegitimate, 
both the government and the peasants take this for granted. Additionally, the IOU notes are 
even the equivalent of legal enforcement. When it applies to explain corrupt journalism, 
the interviewees put it as follows: 
Taking envelope money is actually a de facto tacit rule. Everybody approves 
this, and you must take part in it. (I-1, vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 
2012) 
Another explanation is: 
It is only one of the many de facto tacit rules. There always exists another rule 
under the formal institutional one. Generally, the tacit rule is more effective. 
That is why the tacit rule comes into being. (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 
9 January 2012) 
To be specific, based on the views of the interviewees, the formal rule prohibits journalists 
from taking envelope money. However, the de facto tacit rule allows them to accept the 
envelope. Besides, the latter rule is more effective.  
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Running the beat, peer pressure, and the migrant news 
worker 
As mentioned previously, beat journalists are constantly granted a transportation subsidy. 
In Mainland China, beat journalists are usually veterans who can handle sophisticated 
human relationships. Beat reporting is also known as ‘running the beat’, which means to 
manage the beat and visit the beat face-to-face on a regular base. As a vice editor-in-chief 
emphasises: 
A beat journalist is usually under big pressure. He or she must maintain a good 
relationship with the beat. Besides, he or she has to get on well with other 
journalists on the same beat in case they fail to report something important or 
write something different from the others. The top priority of a beat journalist 
is to build up connections. (I-1, vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012) 
In this sense, if one refuses to take the envelope cash, he or she may hurt all parties. On the 
one hand, the beat may doubt ‘what are you going to write about them, even if you are not 
labelled as an enemy, you are not sealed in the same tent’ (I-2, senior editor, Beijing, 6 
January 2012). On the other hand, all the focus groups’ discussions mentioned that turning 
down the envelope left the other journalists in an awkward position.  
This indicates that peer pressure also triggers journalistic corruption. Existing scholarship 
has noticed the role of peer pressure in journalistic corruption. This research further probes 
how peer pressure works. This research contends that journalistic peer pressure works 
through two interdependent mechanisms. On the one hand, journalistic peer pressure 
functions as a forgiveness system. On the other hand, it operates as a constraining system. 
A personal experience given by a beat journalist perfectly illustrates the constraining 
system: 
I was once invited to report on a new farming technique in a county far away. 
The interview was organised by the propaganda department of the district to 
which the county was affiliated. The people there were rather poor but they 
gave us 500 Yuan as the transportation subsidy. I did not take the money when 
I left. The story was of news value and was published. But I received several 
calls from both the department and the county to take the money the second 
day. After rejecting them again, my superior got calls from the propaganda 
department. They asked whether I had a problem with them. I explained that I 
did not want to take money from the poor. But my superior advised me to take 
it because if I did not, the other journalists would feel obliged to return the 
money. (Personal communications No. 1, on multiple days) 
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This case shows that the constraining force coming from the source, the peers, and 
sometimes the superiors confines the journalists to act under professional conventions; 
otherwise other journalists may get into trouble. And so, the journalists may conduct 
corruption. Hence, through guilt, journalists initiate the forgiveness mechanism justifying 
it because they are doing good for others. Additionally, a prevalent number of interviewees 
excused themselves by saying that all the journalists would take envelope-cash (F-2, a 
mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 
14 January 2012; F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012). If one rejects it, he or 
she will be isolated, so one should just go with the tide (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 
February 2012). The self-forgiveness thereby reinforces the group’s constraining force. 
The following figure illustrates how journalistic peer pressure works.   
Figure 15 How journalistic peer pressure causes corruption (made by the researcher) 
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I must say that the total income has included the transportation subsidy. You 
have to know the largest part of the income is from piece rate/the author’s 
remuneration. That means the more articles you write, the more payment you 
get. The base pay is less than 2,000 Yuan per month. How poor. Not to 
mention the ever-soaring housing prices, making it difficult for you to rent a 
studio at 2,000 in Beijing. (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012) 
Another interviewee in the same focus group added: 
The more important point is that we are less secure about our future. You 
cannot work as a journalist forever. This is very much a job suitable for young 
people. When you get older, you may easily feel physically tired. As you 
know, in order to earn more money, you need to go to more places and 
interview more people to write more articles. Thus, to be a journalist is 
increasingly a manual labour type of work. Besides, a large number of 
colleagues do not keep a Beijing household (hu kou). So you have to save as 
much money as possible for your children and your elderly life. This is why we 
are called the migrant news workers. (ibid.) 
The phrase, ‘migrant news workers’, was coined from ‘news workers’ and ‘migrant 
workers’. The latter originally refers to the peasants who migrated to a metropolitan city to 
seek manual work. Used by journalists, the phrase is actually a self-mockery calling. In the 
focus group, the calling inspired a general nodding. The phrase usually involves two 
implications. First, migrant workers normally get paid on a piece rate and by the hour. 
Second, the migrant workers do not hold household registration (hu kou), so they lack 
social welfare protection. The reverse side to the migrant news worker is the formal 
journalist, implying a hierarchical employment system. Take CCTV as an example: only a 
limited number of CCTV personnel, who are mostly seniors, hold a government-affiliated 
institutional position (shiye bianzhi) associated with better-equipped welfare benefits and 
granted a Beijing household registration. They can get higher pensions and reclaim more 
from the national health insurance. Moreover, household registration secures their children 
places in public school for free. Some participants in the fieldwork had been working at a 
national broadcaster for the last seven years, got their names shown on air, yet they did not 
hold such position. As a result, not only do they have lower levels of health insurance and 
pensions, but, more importantly, their children cannot get equal education. If they want to 
send their children to the public school, they have to pay an expensive extra educational 
contributing surcharge (jiaoyu zanzhu fei). Besides, in the case of the national broadcasters, 
the participants revealed that they signed the contract with a subsidiary of the broadcaster 
instead. The journalist who was suspected of blackmail in the Da Vinci case also held a 
contract with this subsidiary. Ironically, a janitor who has worked there for years holds 
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such a position and a contract with it directly, according to one interviewee (F-4, a national 
broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012).  
This discriminatory employment system is widely utilised by the media organisations 
under a system called ‘new way to the young, old way to the aged (xinren xin banfa, 
laoren lao banfa)’. Actually, all the other occupational groups, such as doctors and 
teachers, undertake the same employment system. Some scholars (Chen, C., 2003) name it 
the ‘dual track system (shuang gui zhi)’, which is the offspring of a planned economy. In 
the past under the planned economy system, all staff in media organisations were well 
benefited by social welfare system. Whilst becoming a more market-oriented economy, the 
public finance cannot afford a better-equipped social welfare system for a large population. 
Consequently, the news workers have to pay their own price.  
Aside from the above, the worst case for the journalistic occupation is that an employment 
contract is sometimes not granted. A survey conducted in 2003 showed that 60.3 per cent 
of respondents did not sign a contract and 61.4 per cent were excluded from any social 
welfare insurance.30  
From what has been discussed above, this research argues that the allegation of 
underpayment can be viewed as a sentiment redolent of an unfair employment system. Due 
to the insecure working status and reduced social welfare, journalists choose to save as 
much money as possible for retirement, perhaps triggering short-sighted or mercenary 
behaviour. A number of interviewees shared the same plan: ‘as long as I have enough 
money, I will go back to my hometown and find a teaching job’ (F-2, a mass-appeal group, 
Beijing, 9 January 2012; I-3, senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012). Some even intended 
to put their plan into action in their thirties. If the employment system, or the dual track 
system, is seen as a transitional phenomenon, then one may expect the mercenary 
behaviour to be phased out in the future. However, some interviewees argued that they 
would not hope the situation would change in the short run, as the literati never get decent 
payment (I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012; F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 
January 2012). It is suggested that the low rate of pay for writing is only a soft method of 
thought control (ibid.). A freelancer31 provided telling evidence: a thousand-word article 
                                                 
30 The survey was conducted jointly by the National Social Welfare Magazine and the Media China 
website from March to April 2003. The survey report can be accessed at 
(http://bbs.cnhan.com/read-htm-tid-9592-ds-1-toread-1.html).  
31 ‘What Does the Low Rate of Writing Imply in China’, [Online]. Available at: 
http://book.sina.com.cn/news/v/2012-03-13/1519295965.shtml (Accessed: 12 April 2012). (Note: 
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for the Beijing Daily gets paid at £9.82, whereas the same length article for the New York 
Times gets £1,241. That is why freelancers are scarce. Presumably, the underpaid 
remuneration is only a chronic approach contributing to the thought control, so the less 
dissident voices are heard.  
The social milieu 
As described above, journalists are no more corrupt than other occupational groups. As one 
interviewee said, ‘it is nowhere clean in China, why not let it be, it is good for everyone’ 
(F-5, a news website group, 15 January 2012). In other words, Weil (1995) argued that 
corruption is not an aberration but the very way that the system, the Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, works, which is deeply embedded in the government itself. 
Actually, governmental agencies launched a number of anti-corruption campaigns and 
issued regulations and codes of ethics to battle corruption. Unfortunately, the efforts were 
in vain (Lu, 2003; Yu, 1998; Zhao, 1998). Despite the weak enforcement, Zhao noted in 
particular, ‘when administrative bodies are corrupt, it is hard to enforce administrative 
orders effectively’ (1998: 82). An illustrative example was given by the interviewees 
working for a news website: 
The Internet Administrative Bureau exists only for collecting dirty money. 
They issued the directive orders telling you not to put certain sensitive articles 
online. But if you pay the bureau 30,000 Yuan, you can keep it online in 
certain circumstances. (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012)  
The research of Zhang and Lu (2008) also exposed that the press regularly pays the local 
department office in exchange for larger space on investigative reporting. In such cases, 
the bribery is laundered clean in the name of pursuing good journalism. 
Institutional factors 
According to Zhao (1998), the simultaneous operation of political repression and market 
orientation is the most important structural reason for corrupt journalism. Journalists and 
media officials are only evaluated on political standards. Under harsh political repression, 
professional norms and aspirations have no grounds to grow. In some cases, corruption can 
be seen as an element of passive political resistance in the practice (Zhao, 1998: 88). On 
the other hand, the market principle is not completely applied. Although the media rely 
                                                                                                                                                    
the currency is originally in Yuan and Dollars, the researcher converted both at the rate obtained at 
GMT 19:48, 12 May 2012, 100 Yuan = £9.82, $100 = £62.05) 
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heavily on advertising revenue, their survival does not depend on market success and vice 
versa. Surprisingly, few interviewees agreed with Zhao’s argument. Notably, over half of 
the interviewees believe that the party logic and the market logic are compatible. The 
general mood is that the media carries too many responsibilities than it should take which 
opens room for corruption. They call it the ‘institutional factor’. One interviewee put it as 
follows: 
You may find in China that, if people suffered from injustice, they will ask for 
help from the media instead of from the police, or the judge, or the government. 
In some circumstances, the media functions as the court, the living ‘Bao, 
Qingtian’,32 Sometimes the media are adjudicating the case. (F-1, a party organ 
group, Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
Another participant in the same focus group added: 
The media are too burdened in China. I think this is partly attributed to the 
chaos of society. In other words, due to the imperfection of the market 
economy, the society as a whole is in a mess at this stage. Idealistically, 
companies are not afraid of the media. If a company has a problem in quality, 
the administrative competent department will in the first place punish it. But 
unfortunately in China, this is not the case. So the companies choose to bribe 
the media in exchange for covering up dirty hands. (ibid.) 
The other participant also believed that the media are frightening even to some local 
governmental agencies: 
As a central party organ journalist, I was once assigned to report an 
environmental pollution incident in a county. The local government told me 
that they gave money to some journalists in order not to be exposed. There is a 
common saying, ‘protect against fire, protect against theft, and protect against 
journalists’. (ibid.) 
The group discussion concluded that the above cases are predominately due to the lack of 
administrative and judicial supervision. However, this cannot explain why the media are so 
powerful and frightening to companies, and even to local governmental agencies. 
Presumably, the power of the media stems partly from its supervisory force. Nonetheless, 
why do journalists complain that the media are taking too many responsibilities, since 
societal supervision is naturally the media’s responsibility? Here it is worthwhile to look 
through the phrases the journalists use to describe the media. One interviewee who works 
                                                 
32 The original name of Bao, Qingtian is Bao, Zhen. Qingtian is a metaphor to denote probity 
quality. He was a much-praised judge in the North Song Dynasty in ancient China who was clean-
fingered and honest. As a result, he stands as a symbol of probity and justice. 
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for a party organ described the media as the ‘low gravy governmental agency (qing shui ya 
men)’ (ibid.). A significant number of interviewees complained that ‘the media are doing 
the job of the government’ (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-2, a mass-
appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 2012; F-4, 
a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012). A few interviewees based in 
Beijing would call a business trip to a county as ‘an interview of an inferior’ (cai fang xia 
ji).  
From what has been described, this research argues that the Chinese media acts as an 
extension of the power of the party-state. This makes more sense of the enchantment of the 
media. The media does not stand as a third party or independent supervisory force; instead, 
it is involved in enforcement. Furthermore, the media plays a leading role. Sometimes, the 
‘media are adjudicating the case’; and sometimes, the ‘media are doing the job of the 
government’. In this sense, the media becomes the target of bribery. In one interviewee’s 
words, ‘there exists the opportunity and the room for corruption’ (F-1, a party organ group, 
Beijing, 8 January 2012). If looked at from the audience’s standpoint, this argument might 
carry more weight. A famous investigative news programme broadcast on CCTV, the 
Focus Interview (jiaodian fangtan), is widely known as ‘focus clear sky’ (jiao qing tian). 
Clear sky, in Chinese Qing Tian, denotes disinterested officials who would bring justice to 
the governed. Moreover, journalists are occasionally regarded as the ‘clear sky governors’, 
in Chinese, Qing Tian Da Lao Ye, which refers to the top officials in ancient China. 
Notably, the media were born to be a part of the party-state system (cf. Chapter 2) and is 
systematically integrated into it which is regarded by Sun (2004) as the governing tactic. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted a range of corrupt behaviours in journalism. This research 
argues that corruption is systematically embedded in Chinese journalism. First, almost all 
journalists in the fieldwork admitted that practices such as taking cash from sources are 
pervasive in Chinese journalism. Second, both frontline journalists and the senior leaders 
in the media view the practices as natural.  
Compared with previous research findings, the situation of journalistic corruption has 
changed in two ways. First, the main forms have changed. This research has found three 
main forms of corruption: taking red-envelope-cash, publicity power for rent, and 
extortion. Journalists’ moonlighting and soliciting advertisements, which was reported in 
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previous research (Yu, 1998; Zhao, 1998), have been phased out. Second, journalists seem 
to be more tolerant of the corrupt practices. In 1998, Yu reported that journalists held 
relatively critical views towards corrupt practices. Yet this research has found a rather 
vague view held by journalists. They tend to view corrupt behaviours as ‘understandable’ 
and excuse themselves by employing cultural elements. This chapter then turned to explore 
the roots of corruption.  
Drawing upon the fieldwork data, journalists conceptualised the roots of corruption on four 
dimensions. First, all the interviewees attributed corruption to Chinese culture, which 
emphasises connection (guan xi) and etiquette. Additionally, taking red-envelope-cash 
evolved from the cultural tradition. Thus, the payment from the sources is regarded as 
etiquette in order to build up connections. Journalists argued that the payment did not 
affect their judgement about the raw material. A number of interviewees, however, 
admitted that accepting cash did sway their judgement. Actually, building up connections 
usually involves an exchange of interests. Moreover, it is also a cultural tradition that 
maintaining the connection requires a reciprocal exchange of interests. Just as journalists 
commented in the fieldwork (F-2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-4, a 
national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012), the sources pay cash to journalists 
expecting favourable reports. Meanwhile, accepting the money, journalists are under 
pressure to return the gratitude by providing flattering reports.  
Second, some journalists mentioned that current working conditions also contributed to 
corruption. A vivid case provided by a beat journalist illustrated that rejecting the red-
envelope-case left payer and peers in an awkward situation and further brought trouble to 
the journalist. Here, peer pressure works as a constraining force pushing the journalist to 
take the money. Peer pressure can also work as a forgiveness force in that journalists may 
excuse themselves when taking money from sources, for all journalists conduct the same 
behaviour. Furthermore, a number of journalists complained that they are underpaid. Yet 
their payment slip showed that they are relatively better paid compared with the average 
payment level in the cities. Even though they get well paid, they still need to save a large 
portion of their salary for the future because they are less protected by the social welfare 
system. This is especially the case for journalists from the mass-appeal media. A 
household certificate, which is closely bounded with many benefits of welfare, is not 
granted to them. Thus, they can only get lower pensions and redeem less from the national 
health insurance. Additionally, they need to pay extra fees for their children’s education. 
The journalists mocked themselves as ‘news migrant workers’ indicating an unstable 
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working status. Therefore, many journalists view journalism as a transitional job, which 
triggers corrupt or short-sighted behaviour. 
Third, corrupt behaviour is pervasive in Chinese society, and so journalists cannot be 
immune from the social milieu. Journalists also complained that the media constantly bribe 
the local propaganda offices in exchange for wider space on investigative reports. Yet this 
behaviour cannot be apotheosised. The bribery is the investment aiming for market returns. 
Just as one interviewee said, ‘the payment saved an excellent story, and then you get 
rewards on visiting traffic’ (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). In this 
sense, the party control is also commercialised. The economic forces can also erode the 
political forces. 
Fourth, the media’s role in contemporary Chinese society also facilitates corruption. 
Journalists named this the institutional factor. The media are viewed not as an independent 
economic entity but as the extension of the party-state. As discussed in previous chapters, 
the party-state not only owns the media, even though it is symbolic, it also managed to 
integrate the media into the governmental bureaucracy. Each media organisation is granted 
an administrative level. Additionally, the party-state also promoted the media to conduct 
public opinion supervision (yulun jiandu) by investigating governmental wrongdoings. The 
supervision, however, is bureaucratised in that the media can only oversee the government, 
which stands one level below itself. To be specific, a local newspaper cannot report the 
malpractices of the governmental agencies at the national level. But it can report 
wrongdoings of prefectural government agencies. In light of this, the media’s supervision 
helps the central government to administer the local governmental agencies. In this sense, 
the media’s supervision became part of the governmental supervision. Sun (2004) called 
this the governing tactic. In such cases, to the local officials, the media becomes the 
representative of higher-level governments and the media becomes the target of corruption. 
Just as vividly embodied in journalists’ own experiences, journalists are constantly offered 
money when they went to interview lower level officials.   
This chapter has explored the corrupt practices conducted by journalists, while 
unavoidably overlooking the corruption of media organisations, which requires further 
investigation. Besides, the work probes how the journalists view corruption, and thus 
leaves the regular payers, such as governmental agencies and companies, unanswered in 
this bilateral relationship. Consequently, it would also be worthwhile to investigate these 
payers in the future. To be specific, future research may investigate public relations 
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companies and international corporations based in China, who regularly pay journalists at 
press conferences.  
This research examined journalistic norms under tight media control in Chapter 4. Chapter 
5 explored corrupt journalistic behaviours. The research now investigates the changes 
brought forth by the so-called new media, especially by social media.
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Chapter Six: The Impact of Social Media 
When the British Journalism Review used the word ‘apocalypse’ (Editorial, 2011: 3-4) to 
postulate the future of traditional journalism in the age of the internet, the Chinese print 
media were still enjoying their ‘authoritative status’ (Wang, 2010; F-1, a party organ 
group, 8 January 2012). This indicates that different social contexts colour the 
consequences that the internet brings about (Curran, in Curran et al. eds., 2012). This 
chapter intends to investigate the dynamic interactions between the old journalistic norms 
and new internet technology in the Chinese context. It does not intend to conduct an all-
encompassing investigation regarding the impact of the internet as the potentialities of the 
internet are still unfolding. At this initial stage, it is difficult to draw assertive conclusions. 
However, by focusing on issues frequently mentioned by journalistic practitioners from the 
fieldwork, this research aims to provide frontline observations.  
Three major sections constitute this chapter. The first section focuses on the evolution of 
online news. Accompanying this evolution, the Chinese party-state rigorously employs 
multiple means to control online information flows. Lessig (1999) has identified four 
mechanisms which can be employed by authorities to control the internet: the law, 
architecture, the market, and social norms. Based on this useful categorisation, this chapter 
looks at these controlling mechanisms respectively. As mentioned previously, the party-
state does not intend to make any laws in the journalistic domain. Instead, the authorities 
constantly issue governmental rules which virtually have statutory status. Thus, in the 
Chinese context, the law is better replaced by the rules. The constraining forces 
simultaneously meet counter-forces, which are discussed as well. Of all the internet 
applications, microblogging has had the biggest impact, and this was frequently mentioned 
by participants interviewed in the fieldwork. Thus, the second section puts the spotlight on 
its impact. After a brief introduction to microblogging in mainland China, this chapter 
explores the changes brought forth by the microblog. The final section intends to draw a 
number of cautious conclusions.  
This research locates the enquiry with relation to the wider social changes. China is now 
‘becoming increasingly pluralist and a more fragmented authority is evolving’ (Ljunggren, 
2010: 462-469). To be specific,  
There is a shift in values taking place. Individual voices are emerging from the 
collective in events that take on their own dynamic. People want to express 
their views. Suddenly, someone does it for the first time on an issue that affects 
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him or her in some way, and takes a step out of the collective. The relation 
between the individual, society and power is no longer a given. (ibid.) 
The traditional media are still heavily suppressed by the party-state as explored in Chapter 
4. Ordinary people who intend to express their own initiatives can hardly get access to the 
traditional media. Under such circumstances, the internet has emerged to fill in the gap by 
providing an online platform for individual voices. Yet again, the online world is 
scrutinised by the party-state. In exploring the impact of the internet, especially social 
media, on the traditional media, this chapter first introduces the evolution of online news. 
Before exploring changes of Chinese journalism in the digital age, it is of comparative 
value to look at changes in Western journalism. A wealth of Western analysis and 
commentaries have laid out the claim that traditional journalism is undergoing a 
fundamental change, driven principally by communication technology. For example, an 
increasing number of people, especially the young, have turned to the internet for news 
instead of paying for a newspaper which leads to job cuts in the newsrooms (Curran, 2010; 
Downie and Schudson, 2009). As Downie and Schudson (2009) pointed out, the dominant 
American newspapers and influential network news divisions are giving way to web-based 
information. Commercial television news has also been losing its audience, its advertising 
revenue, and its reporting resources. Although they argue that newspapers and television 
news are not going to vanish in the foreseeable future, they believe that traditional 
journalism is in crisis. The crisis claim resonates with what most U.K. media employees 
worry about. From January 2008 to September 2009, 106 local newspapers closed down in 
Britain (cited in Curran, 2010: 465). Job cuts in the newsroom have left fewer journalists to 
fill more spaces. Additionally, the last few years have seen a rush from the traditional 
media to get online. Journalists are required to provide reports both offline and online. 
They have shrinking time in which to process the news. Fewer journalists are working 
under heavier loads within shrinking time. This has posed great concern about the quality 
of news (McNair, 2009).   
The internet also brings opportunities for traditional media. The BBC utilised several 
videos from the YouTube website taken by ordinary Japanese people during tsunami 
reports. This is a good example of the internet supporting the mainstream media. 
Journalists cannot be on the spot at any time, so user-generated content can be employed as 
an efficient complement to traditional media.   
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The impact of the internet on traditional media in the Chinese context is more complicated 
in that the party-state occasionally intrudes into the development of the internet. This 
chapter begins by providing the historical context within which the enquiry is located. The 
following part of this chapter delineates the evolution of online news. 
6.1 Online news 
On 20 April 1994, mainland China connected to the world wide web (Min, 2009). The year 
after that, the internet opened for public access (Harwit & Clark, 2001). In less than two 
decades, the internet has grown immensely. Many scholars have explored the trajectory of 
Chinese online news (Brady, 2010; Zhao, 2008; Boas, in Zysman & Newman eds., 2006; 
Peng, 2005; Harwit & Clark, 2001). The research conducted by mainland Chinese scholars 
consists mainly of descriptive accounts that pay little attention to the impact of the 
controlling forces in the development of the internet. The research conducted overseas, 
however, tends to focus on the controlling forces, particularly the design of the internet 
infrastructure, but fails to provide an in-depth description regarding the impact of the rules, 
which may be due to a lack of first-hand information. This research intends to fill this gap 
by highlighting the crisscrossing of controlling forces particularly regulation and the 
development of online news.   
The evolution of online news 
At the outset, the development of the internet in mainland China was driven by academic 
and military causes. Since public access was granted, the use of the internet has grown at 
an unprecedented rate. As of 1994, there were only some 1,600 internet users in the entire 
mainland (Harwit & Clark, 2001: 388). By the end of 2012, the number of internet users 
reached 564 million, and the number of mobile internet users reached 420 million. Of all 
the users, 91.7 per cent had access to the internet at home, and the internet penetration rate 
was 42.1 per cent (Statistical report on internet development in China33, 2013). 
                                                 
33 ‘Statistical Report on Internet Development in China’, China Internet Network Information Centre, 
January 2013 [Online]. Available at: 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201302/P020130312536825920279.pdf (Accessed: 6 
May 2013). The internet user in this report refers to ‘Chinese residents at the age of six or above 
who have used internet in the past 6 months’. The mobile internet user refers to ‘internet users who 
have used mobile phones to access and surf the internet in the past 6 months, but not limited to 
those surfing the internet via mobile phones only’. 
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To some extent, ‘the Chinese government deserves praise for rapidly building the data 
network’ and granting access to its expanding population (Harwit & Clark, 2001: 377). A 
contrasting example is Saudi Arabia where the internet connection was first established in 
1994, but public access was delayed until 1999 allowing the authorities to perfect their 
internet control mechanism (Boas, in Zysman & Newman eds., 2006). In mainland China, 
‘the authorities promote internet services while learning how to control it’ (F-5, a news 
website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). In other words, the internet is seen both as an 
economic accelerator and as a challenge to information control. A good case in point is the 
‘Connecting Every Village Project’ (cun cun tong gongcheng). This was a systematic 
nationwide project initially launched in the late 1990s. In the beginning, the project was 
intended to transmit broadcasting signals to remote villages. As stated in the official 
documents, the primary aim was to propagate guidelines and policies of the party-state 
(General Office of the State Council: Notice of Further Improving Radio and Television 
Coverage in the New Era, 2006). Since 2004, the project was further extended to include 
the construction of internet infrastructure in rural areas. Connecting the rural areas to the 
internet is not only regarded as extending the party’s propaganda reach but also linking a 
new market to e-commerce (An Introduction about the Project, no date).  
As mentioned above, the internet provides a new platform to deliver the party’s 
propaganda. This explains why the first traditional media outlet to move online was 
targeted at international propaganda. On 12 January 1995, the China Scholars Abroad 
magazine, an organ of the State Education Committee, began to publish its online version 
(Peng, 2005: 24). This innovation was motivated to ‘propagate positive information about 
mainland China and attract Chinese overseas talent to return home’ (ibid.: 25). In 1995, 
seven to eight print media organisations moved online, and all involved foreign 
propaganda purposes (ibid.: 33).  
From 1997 to 1998, three major privately owned internet companies were set up: Netease, 
Sohu, and Sina. All three touched on news dissemination and became the main online 
news outlets. By April 2000, there were 273 newspapers online (Wang, 2001: 57). 
However, the news articles that went online were simply copies of the print versions due to 
the fact that the party-state does not allow news websites to produce their own content. 
Thus, at this stage, online news is merely a copy of traditional media, rather than a separate 
distinctive medium that could include content not included in print versions. 
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In 2000, the authorities issued a watershed governmental rule entitled, ‘Interim Provisions 
for Online News Publication’ (hulian wangzhan congshi dengzai xinwen yewu zanxing 
guanli guiding) which set up four gates to control the news going online: 
• Established the administrative body: The State Council Information Office 
(SCIO) 
• Established licence control: All internet websites which intend to provide news 
information must apply for a licence from the SCIO at corresponding 
administrative levels 
• Confined business area: News websites can only relay or aggregate news 
already published in the traditional media, which means news websites cannot 
initiate their own news stories (bu neng zicai). Furthermore, news websites are 
not allowed to reprint news from other sources, which blocks news provided by 
international media organisations unless authorised. Besides, privately owned 
news websites have to make contracts with the traditional media to carry their 
news content 
• Set the entry level: This rule categorises two types of news websites run either 
by traditional news organisations or by privately owned companies. Media 
organisations below the city level cannot set up their own news websites 
 
Due to these restrictions, news websites merely hired editors to polish, adapt, and edit 
news. Online journalists are not supposed to exist in strict terms. In light of this, the space 
for news websites to grow was seriously squeezed, and it was inevitable that media 
organisations would not be keen to invest in their websites. Thus, news websites acted as 
extensions or even affiliations of traditional media. Interestingly, it is documented that 
internet companies advertised heavily in the traditional media (Peng, 2005). A vivid 
description of the relationship between the two at this stage is that ‘the internet works for 
traditional media’ (hulianwang gei chuantong meiti dagong). However, in reality, news 
websites employed various tactics to circumvent these barriers which are discussed in the 
next section.  
Things began to change with an increase in internet users and a shift in the media 
environment. By the end of 1999, the number of internet users in mainland China reached 
8.9 million (Statistical report on internet development in China, 2000), and by the end of 
2004, the figure had soared up to 94 million (Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China, 2005). Furthermore, an increasing number of people went online for news 
information. Surveys show that while traditional media consumption was dropping year on 
year, internet surfing time was increasing (Guo, 2007). In 2007, the average amount of 
time spent surfing the internet in major cities hit a striking 5.43 hours per day (ibid.). 
Traditional media had long been enjoying an annual increase of 33 per cent in terms of 
advertising revenues (Wu, 2005). However, this increasing rate began to drop in 2003, 
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with 23 per cent in 2003, 18.2 per cent in 2004, and 10 per cent in 2005 (ibid.). In 2004, 
the advertising market’s share of print media shrunk from 22.53 per cent to 18.2 per cent 
(ibid.). In contrast, the online advertising market increased 75.9 per cent in 2004 compared 
with that of 2003 (ibid.). In light of this, the publisher of the Beijing Times, a major Beijing 
local newspaper, called the year 2005 the ‘inflection point’ (guai dian) of print media 
(ibid.).  
In 2005, the idea that ‘the internet works for traditional media’ became the very opposite. 
At that time, the three major privately owned news websites usually paid little or even 
nothing to use traditional media content. In the old comfy days, traditional media 
organisations were tolerant of this behaviour. However, as traditional media began to face 
a crisis, they united to demand market share. Over 20 newspapers signed an agreement 
which urged the major three to respect copyright and pay more for relaying news. The 
party-state conceptualised the relationship between privately owned news websites and 
traditional media as contractual and co-operative. However, in practice, the pricing 
mechanism did not work properly due to intervention from the party-state. As the party-
state restrained the privately owned news websites from producing their own news content, 
‘it would be untenable to ask for a profit share’, a journalist working for a mass-appeal 
newspaper commented (Personal communications No. 5, 14 January 2012). Moreover, 
ownership further complicates the situation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional 
media were owned by the party-state in theory. Thus, from the perspective of ownership, it 
is the party-state that intended to reap a portion from the private companies based on the 
rule the party-state sets for itself.  
Actually, the agreement had achieved limited results. There were still a great number of 
newspapers and magazines that keenly provided their content for free to privately owned 
news websites in order to extend their audience reach. Additionally, journalists even 
complained if the media organisation they worked for decoupled from privately owned 
news websites as their occupational fame would be undermined. A journalist said,  
My newspaper sued Sina for piracy and we won the case. From then on, Sina 
could not relay news from my newspaper. But actually, it was we who were 
losing out. We were going to lose younger readers who rarely read a 
newspaper and normally got news online. I keep personal contact with editors 
of Sina and allow them to relay my articles using my penname. I just want to 
continue my reputation through an online platform. (Personal communication 
No. 5, 14 January 2012) 
Xu, Di, 2013 
 
153 
This is a high-profile case illustrating how participants knotted together due to the 
intervention from the party-state. In 2005, the party-state refined the constraining rule with 
two changes (Internet News Information Services Regulations, 2005): 
• Widened business area: The refined rule allowed traditional media 
organisations to set up new websites to release online stories exclusively that 
may not necessarily be published on their print versions. 
• Tightened control: The refined rule required news websites to keep records of 
their online news content and also keep logs of their internet users for the 
preceding sixty days on demand. 
 
The first change seems to have loosened control and allowed online news to emerge. 
Actually, the aim was to extend the reach of propaganda. A telling example is the 
Dongfang news website which was initially set up by Shanghai’s local propaganda 
department. It was one of the first news websites which could produce online news. On 
various occasions, the SCIO stressed its role as propagating positive information and 
guiding online opinion favourable to the party-state (Peng, 2005). However, the privately 
owned news websites are still forbidden from producing their own news content. 
The emergence of web 2.0 services further eroded the status of traditional media. Web 2.0 
generally refers to a participatory web culture which allows internet users to contribute to 
web content (Meikle & Young, 2011). Blogs, microblogs, and social media sites are 
popular web 2.0 applications. From 2005 to 2007, the number of blogs in mainland China 
rose from 16 million to 99 million (2005: the Beginning of Blogging in Mainland China, 
2005). As of January 2008, over 50 million Chinese people read weblogs regularly (Xiao, 
in Shirk, 2011: 203). Although the number is still relatively small out of 1.4 billion people, 
weblogs provided ‘an important channel for people to voice their opinions about important 
events’ (ibid.). More importantly, weblogs began to set the agenda for traditional media 
(ibid.). A good case in point is that, in 2007, freelancer Lian, Yue posted several articles on 
his weblog calling for people living in Xiamen to speak out against a chemical plant to be 
built in the city because the plant could cause disastrous environmental problems. The 
online message soon translated into severe public concern and serial traditional media 
reports. In the end, the original plan was dropped. In 2009, a newcomer, microblogging, 
created the biggest impact on traditional journalism and on contemporary social life as well 
which will be discussed in more detail later. These new web 2.0 applications are tightly 
caged in a virtual intranet enabled through multi-layered controlling forces, which is the 
focus of the next part. 
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The controlling forces  
Bill Clinton, the former U.S. president, once optimistically surmised that controlling the 
internet in China is ‘like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall’ (cited in Brady, 2008: 125). 
Conversely, however, China has built the world’s most sophisticated online surveillance 
system, which successfully blocks and filters information that is unfavourable to the party-
state (Boas, in Zysman & Newman eds., 2006; Harwit & Clark, 2001). The online 
controlling mechanisms not only affect journalists’ daily usage of the internet but also 
impact on their journalistic practices. This part examines the four controlling forces, the 
rules, the architecture, the market, and the social norms based on data gained through desk 
research and firsthand information provided by journalistic practitioners in the fieldwork. 
The rules 
As examined in the previous part, the rules, including governmental rules and regulations, 
has had a direct impact on the evolution of online news. Until now, the authorities have 
issued over 100 bylaws, rules, and regulations to control online information dissemination 
and online businesses (Chen, Hua, 2011). The core rule relating to online news, as 
discussed in the previous part, forbids privately owned news websites from producing their 
own news content.  
According to the rules, a number of governmental bodies and party agencies have 
overlapping responsibilities in overseeing the internet. Generally speaking, the 
governmental bodies deal with technology-related issues, while the propaganda 
departments at corresponding levels are in charge of news content. Considering the 
reduction of governmental agencies in other sectors, the number of institutions overseeing 
the media, communication, and cultural sectors is expanding (Zhao, 2008). In early 2000, 
the Internet Information Management Bureau was set up. In the following year, the State 
Leadership Group on Informatisation was officially established and headed by the Premier. 
An editor working for a privately owned news website said, 
There are at least thirty bodies and agencies overseeing us. The internet is 
actually the most heavily guarded sphere in China. (F-5, a news website group, 
Beijing, 15 January 2012) 
Aside from the rules, the party-state also invests heavily in internet architecture 
construction, controlling its handsomely increasing online users. 
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Architecture 
The internet architecture refers to the hardware and software underpinning the internet. It 
is difficult to outline all of the technological methods utilised by the party-state here, since 
such information is protected as state secrets. This research looks at the major 
technological methods.  
The cornerstone of China’s internet control is its system of interconnecting networks 
(Boas, in Zysman & Newman, 2006). The connections to the global internet have long 
been channelled through a small number of state sanctioned internet companies (ibid.). In 
this sense, it is more like a caged intranet rather than the true internet. Nearly all internet 
servers are maintained by state enterprises (An, 2013). An editor working for a privately 
owned news website provided this case, 
We once put a story online exposing under-table deals of a company which is 
owned by the family of a top party leader. Just after this item was shown 
online, the server we were using was down. Our website became inaccessible 
for several minutes. You may not imagine how huge this was. Our company is 
listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange. This led to tremendous economic loss. 
(I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012) 
China’s internet control system is widely known as the Great Firewall (GFW), a term 
which first appeared in Wired magazine in 1997 (China’s Internet: A Giant Cage, 2013). 
The GFW is a complex system, including a multi-layered technological design, which 
filters, blocks certain content, and monitors user activity. This system mainly provides the 
following functions: 
• Block certain domains, such as the websites of Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube. It is estimated that there are over 500 thousand blocked domains 
(Brady, 2008:131). 
• Filter certain pages within a website that includes content unfavourable to the 
party-state. For example, the BBC website can be accessed, but particular pages 
are out of reach showing ‘404 not found’ or ‘page not available’. 
• Key-word filtering: the system can ban web searches for certain words such as 
the name of the former president, Hu, Jintao. Nowadays, the authority allows 
searching of sensitive words, but only information favourable to the party-state 
is available. In this case, the web search page will show ‘according to laws, 
rules and regulations, some results are not shown.’ For example, if searching 
for ‘Liu, Xiaobo’, a dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, all the results are 
from official propaganda sources which condemn Liu, Xiaobo as a liar and 
traitor.  
• Intercept online instant messages containing sensitive words. For example, if 
online chat messages or emails include sensitive words, the messages will be 
disrupted. 
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There is always a way to circumvent control. For instance, tech-savvy users use alternative 
proxy settings or VPN (Virtual Private Networking) to tunnel through the GFW, which is 
known as ‘climbing over the wall’ (fan qiang). However, the GFW has been updated to 
intercept VPN connections. Aside from the internet infrastructure, the party-state also sets 
norms which encourage internet users to censor themselves. 
Social norms 
In late 2000, the internet police was introduced. Two cartoon figures wearing police 
uniforms are shown on the webpage representing the online police. This creates a sense 
that the authority is watching you, thus eliciting self-censorship (Brady, 2008). A number 
of online chat-rooms offer cash rewards to encourage users to report dubious materials 
(ibid.). In fact, combined with employing the market mechanism, the party-state has 
successfully outsourced its censorship responsibility to internet portals. Internet companies 
which disregard the party’s rules are often shut down or have their business interrupted. In 
order to do business in mainland China, all internet portals must take censorship 
responsibility for the content they carry. For instance, a major commercial website, 
Sina.com provides a microblogging service. Thus it takes responsibility for monitoring 
every microblog its users write. Except for the GFW and online police, Sina also employs 
its own tailored monitoring software and hires over four thousand censors to detect and 
delete sensitive posts (China’s Internet: A Giant Cage, 2013).  
Market  
On the one hand, the market is a tool that can be utilised by the party-state to keep the 
internet companies in line. As mentioned above, cooperation brings in profits, whereas a 
divergence from the party’s may lead to failure in the Chinese market. Google is a telling 
example. Google had long been a target due to its reluctance to filter its search results. The 
party-state employed multiple means to squeeze Google’s market share. Google’s search 
service is unstable due to constant technological intervention. Searching banned words on 
Google will lead to a dead end and will suspend the search engine for about 90 seconds 
(ibid.). Constant intervention and hacking attacks finally resulted in its retreat from the 
mainland Chinese market. Meanwhile, its main rival, Baidu, a privately owned Beijing-
based pro-government Chinese search engine, was delighted to take over the market share. 
However, these controlling forces often meet counter-forces which are explored in the 
following part.  
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The online ‘cat and mouse’ game 
The party-state has set up multiple gates to filter online information dissemination. 
Nonetheless, due to the fast speed and viral circulation, the internet has facilitated the 
spread and penetration of certain information, which is not available through traditional 
media (F-2, a mass-appeal group, 9 January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 
2012). The internet brings new strategies to the ‘cat and mouse’ game which is the topic of 
this part.  
Covert Journalists 
As discussed above, privately owned news websites cannot produce their own news 
stories. Such newsrooms are therefore not supposed to hire journalists. However, in reality, 
online journalists are working in disguise. One editor working for a privately owned news 
website said, 
In theory, our website cannot hire journalists; we can only have editors. 
Basically, what editors can do is editing, rewriting the news title, and moving a 
news item to a higher level in the hierarchy. I feel very much restrained in this 
work, like a robot. But sometimes, editors also do interviews. For example, if 
the news is big but from a less established newspaper, we will make phone 
calls to interview insiders or check facts with the journalists who wrote the 
story. Actually, we also have our own journalists which is in rigid terms 
against the governmental rule. But we have to survive in this competitive 
market, so we do it secretly. The journalist is titled an editor when publishing 
articles online.  (I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012) 
Accounts from the focus groups show that all the major privately-owned news websites 
hire journalists in order to initiate their own news stories (F-5, a news website group, 
Beijing, 15 January 2012). A journalist working for an internet company said,  
We are basically doing the same thing that traditional media journalists do. We 
are assigned to a beat and invited to attend news conferences. We use almost 
exactly the same procedures as traditional media journalist to prepare a news 
article. The only difference is that we are not titled journalists, but editors, in 
order not to publicly offend the rule. (ibid.) 
In fact, the difference is not only confined to by-lines. This covert practice is largely 
conditional. The privately owned news websites enclose their covert journalists in finance, 
sports, and entertainment reporting areas and keep current affairs untouched (F-5, a news 
website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012; I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012). 
Additionally, to keep this covert practice low-key, the number of journalists working for 
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these internet companies is quite low. In the finance news department of a major privately 
owned news website, there are five full-time journalists compared with dozens of editors 
(I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012). An editor complained, ‘even if we have 
devised a feasible project plan to conduct an in-depth or investigative report, it is 
extremely difficult to put it into practice due to our undersized staff of journalists’ (I-2, a 
senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012). As long as this covert practice does not challenge 
the party’s line, the party-state turns a blind eye towards it. In this sense, a mutually 
beneficial tacit agreement has been arrived at.  
Transformational discourse 
Another way to circumvent online control is not only confined to the journalistic field but 
also pervasively utilised by internet users. The party-state employs keyword blocking and 
filtering mechanisms which forbid certain words from being posted or searched. The 
internet users normally call these ‘sensitive words’ (mingan ci). They outwit the system by 
transforming ‘sensitive words’ into analogies, spoof jokes, metaphors, satires, synonyms, 
homophones, and homographs. An example of a homograph is ‘目田’, which literarily 
means ‘eye field’, substituting for ‘自由’ meaning freedom (King et al., 2013). A telling 
example of the use of homophones is the word ‘he xie’, often written as ‘河蟹’ in Chinese, 
meaning ‘river crab’. This is used to refer to ‘和谐’, the official doctrine of building a 
harmonious society (ibid.). The party-state promotes the doctrine of harmonious society 
meanwhile suppressing dissident expression. Thus, the original meaning of harmony is 
shaded by a negative connotation, a deliberate effort of covering dissident voices to create 
ostensible harmony. When online posts are blocked or filtered, internet users mock this 
censorship by saying ‘my post has been harmonised’ (bei hexie). Replacing ‘和谐’ with ‘
河蟹’ further mocks the official doctrine. 
These transformational discourses were originally used to evade the online blocking 
system and were later expanded to include spoof jokes and satires. An interesting case is 
the word ‘兲朝’ to replace ‘天朝’ the two of which look quite similar. The latter refers to 
the old feudal Chinese empire which originally denotes glorious dynasties in Chinese 
history. However, in modern times, particularly when used online, the term involves 
scornful innuendo, implying that the Chinese regime is still run like a feudal empire. 
Although the term ‘天朝’ has not been blocked online, internet users creatively coined the 
term ‘兲朝’ to replace ‘天朝’ which combines multiple undertone meanings. It is 
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necessary to break the term down to uncover its connotation. ‘朝’ refers to the regime 
whereas ‘兲’ is not a real word but coined from ‘王’ and ‘八’. The term ‘王八’ is a 
derogatory term, meaning ‘bastard’, which is not proper to use due to its vulgarity. 
However, combining ‘王八’ into one symbol ‘兲’ reduces the improperiety, while 
strengthening the pejorative connotation. Furthermore, using ‘兲朝’ expresses one’s 
resentment of the regime, while adding a sense of humour to the mockery. 
This smart tactic is also employed by journalists. As discussed above, the blogs posted by 
Lian, Yue, successfully aroused public concern about the potential environmental danger 
of a chemical plant. People who may have been affected thus took to street to protest 
against the local government. As the term ‘go on street to protest’ (shiwei youxing) is 
blocked and cannot be posted online, internet users created the phrase ‘go for a walk 
collectively’ (jiti sanbu) to spread the information online. Protest is strictly banned in 
reports according to propaganda directives. However, replacing ‘protest’ with the phrase 
‘go for a walk collectively’ seems to free traditional media from the cage. The protest 
information was circulated like a virus online, and internet users are therefore 
knowledgeable of the underlying link between walking together and collective protest. 
Moreover, the information was too widely circulated online to be ignored by the traditional 
media. Therefore, a number of print media reported the protest by using the title ‘go for a 
walk collectively’ (jiti sanbu).34 This tactic is also used by journalists themselves when 
they surf online. A journalist named himself ‘敏感瓷’ online which literally means 
‘sensitive China porcelain’. The name is homonymous to ‘敏感词’ meaning ‘sensitive 
words’ (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012).  
This practice profoundly erodes the party-state’s moral leadership and demystifies its 
authority. However, this practice also leads to pervasive cynicism which is discussed in the 
final section of this chapter. The next section looks at the impact of microblogging. 
6.2 Microblogging 
The word ‘microblog’ first appeared in 2005. Tumblr and Twitter were the leading figures 
of microblogging at its earliest stages. Generally speaking, a microblog refers to a short 
                                                 
34 ‘Go for a Walk Collectively’, originally from the Sanjin City Newspaper, [Online]. Available at: 
http://news.163.com/09/0323/15/553P1GQI000125LI.html (Accessed: 12 May 2013); ‘The Story of 
“Go for a Walk Collectively”’, originally from the World Environment, [Online]. Available at: 
http://news.163.com/09/0323/15/553P1GQI000125LI.html (Accessed: 12 May 2013).  
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and simple form of blog, allowing users to share content within a word count limit. The 
first microblogging service in mainland China was launched in 2007. However, due to the 
Urumqi riot in Xinjiang in 2009, the party-state shut down most of the domestic 
microblogging services. Shortly after this incident, Facebook, Twitter, and similar foreign 
social media sites were blocked, and domestic privately owned internet companies filled in 
the market niche by opening their own microblogging sites. In 2009, Sina launched its 
microblogging site called Weibo in Chinese. Almost all major internet companies have 
launched their own microblogging sites since then.  
Microblogging then expanded at a phenomenal rate. By 2012, the number of 
microbloggers in mainland China had rocketed to 309 million, with an increase of 23.5 per 
cent per year (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2013). Microblogging 
sites provide services similar to Twitter, but integrate more functions. Like Twitter, users 
can follow others, use ‘hash-tag’ topics, have @user names, post, repost, and shorten URL 
addresses. Posts are also limited to 140 characters. However, one Chinese word normally 
contains two characters. Thus, ‘140 Chinese characters can have 3-5 times as much 
information as 140 characters in English’ (Zhu et al., 2012). Unlike Twitter, Chinese 
microblogging sites allow embedded images and videos, and users can comment on each 
other’s posts (ibid.). Thus, a longer posting of over 140 words can also be posted on a 
microblog by transforming it into an image. Additionally, users can send instant messages, 
documents, and pictures over microblog messaging services. Notably, microblogging 
allows users to build up their private friend circles which cannot be accessed publicly. In a 
sense, Chinese microblogs combine certain functions of both Facebook and Twitter 
standing both as social media and information dissemination platforms.   
Of all the microblogging services, Sina took a commanding lead, occupying 56.5 per cent 
of the market share based on active users and 86.6 per cent based on browsing time in 
2010 (Sina Commands 56 Per Cent of China’s Microblog Market, 2011). It was also 
frequently mentioned by journalists in the fieldwork. Thus, the following discussion 
mainly focuses on the Sina microblogging platform. Sina’s leading status is largely due to 
its aggressive promotion. A journalist said how he was invited to open a Sina microblog 
account, 
Sina really invests a lot into its microblogging business. I mean not only in 
terms of money. All members of staff in Sina, even its human resources staff, 
are assigned a quota to persuade people to open accounts on the Sina 
microblog. They are really aggressive in pushing you towards their site. I guess 
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this must be linked to their bonus. The wife of one of my colleagues works as a 
news editor in Sina. My colleagues and I all got invited by her to open a Sina 
microblog account. (Personal communications No. 8, 9 May 2013) 
Another successful promotional strategy employed by the Sina microblog is inviting 
celebrities, open-minded officials, well-known public affairs commentators, and media 
workers to open accounts and highlight these accounts through the verification system. 
Sina has two verification types: individual and organisational. Once verified, a V badge 
will be shown beside the account’s name. In terms of individual verified accounts, a 
yellow V badge and job title are shown next to an individual’s account name. Sina is 
extremely keen to invite known people to open verified accounts, which will attract more 
ordinary people to follow them. However, according to Sina’s introduction of the 
verification system, the company is highly selective about the people who can get verified 
accounts. Verified accounts are only open to certain occupations, 34 categories with 542 
occupations at the moment, and professional elites who have certain job titles. For 
instance, in the media category there are 16 sub-sets including newspaper, magazine, 
sports media, finance media, broadcasting media, senior executives and other similar types. 
The newspaper set is further divided into five layers: editor-in-chief, copy editor, news 
editor, reporter, and others. Based on Sina’s setting, verified accounts enjoy higher 
visibility and are easier to find and follow. Besides, Sina also provides bulletin boards 
listing top popular verified accounts. Notably, the verified accounts which have enormous 
numbers of followers are widely called ‘big V’ (da V). Two examples are Yao, Chen, a 
celebrity, and Li, Kaifu, a Taiwanese businessman who was a former Google senior 
executive. They both have over 40 million followers. 
Sina’s online verification system is closely linked to offline social positions held by users. 
Through the verification process, people who have higher social positions are highlighted 
and recommended. In light of this, the power relationship in the real world is translated 
into the cyber world. Moreover, as Sina’s verification is selectively open to elites and 
professionals, it further combines hierarchy into the microblogging world. Furthermore, 
posts from verified accounts are supposed to be more credible than posts from ordinary 
accounts. This presents a telling illustration of what Becker (1967: 243) called the 
‘hierarchy of credibility’, which claims that those who occupy higher social status are seen 
to be more credible than people at the bottom of a society. This verification system has 
profound implications for and impacts on journalists’ online activities, which is discussed 
later. The next section explores the impact of microblogging on the media-source 
relationship.  
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Online media-source relationship  
The most prominent impact of microblogging is that it stands as the most important 
repertoire of news sources. Almost all participants in the fieldwork agreed that at least half 
of the news comes from microblogging. A vice editor-in-chief reckoned that nowadays 
over 80 per cent of the news printed in his newspaper came from microblogs (I-1, a vice 
editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). A number of journalists complained that the 
traditional media are even firstly released by microblogs. One journalist said, 
I feel that traditional media are somewhat kidnapped by microblogging. As 
long as it was heatedly discussed on the microblogs, you must report it. But the 
topic may be just a rumour or of no actual news value. Even if it was merely a 
hyped topic on the microblogs, you have to report it. Otherwise, your superiors 
may think you are not covering your beat well. (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 
11 February 2012) 
The account above gained frequent nods in the focus group. A significant number of 
journalists further commented that the means of producing news had changed. A journalist 
said the trajectory of an event becoming news is ‘something happened and then became a 
hot topic on the microblogs; subsequently traditional media followed up’ (F-3, a mixed 
group, Beijing, 13 January 2012). A beat journalist working for a party organ newspaper 
said, 
In the past, our routine work pattern was to go to news conferences organised 
by authorities and then write stories. So it was the authorities and journalists 
who set the societal agenda. But now thanks to microblogging, everyone seems 
to have microphones voicing their own initiatives. So it is really difficult to 
assert who is setting the agenda now. To a larger extent, it is ordinary people 
who are taking the lead. They put their voices online which are of news value. 
Then we carry their voices to authorities to ask for replies. In this sense, the 
direction has been reversed’. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 5 January 
2012) 
The editors from the same newspaper echoed, 
Yes, indeed. Microblogging has somewhat changed the way news is produced. 
In the past, news sources were primarily from journalists. They reported their 
beat sources to us and then we worked together to figure out reporting plans. 
Thus, editors were not promptly updated with news events. But after 
microblogging emerged, editors are better informed. Now it is editors who may 
learn of an event first through microblogging and then assign it to a journalist. 
Then journalists go to check the facts and get replies from authorities. (ibid.) 
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From the above quotes, the journalists seem to argue that microblogging empowers 
grassroots’ voices and has changed journalists’ reliance on the authorities as source. 
However, accounts from other journalists provide counter-evidence. An editor working for 
an internet company claimed, 
Microblogging extensively reduces the cost of disseminating information. 
Everybody has his own microphone. This is indeed a step forward. Especially 
for countries like China, microblogging brings merits to ordinary people. 
However, the reality is not that optimistic. In fact, it is extremely difficult for 
grassroots accounts to be heard. You know Qian, Mingqi who bombed the 
local government building due to the demolition of his house. The bombing 
caused several deaths including him. He actually had a microblog account and 
leaked his attack plan on the microblog several days before. He even tagged a 
number of “big V” accounts and local newspaper account hoping his case 
would be cared about. But sadly his posts attracted no attention. I think he 
could have been saved if somebody stood out and helped him. It is just in such 
a big country, so many things happen there. It is really by chance that your case 
could stand out on a microblog. (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 
January 2012) 
Another editor working for a market-driven newspaper added,  
My microblog account is verified as a news editor. So I always receive 
complaints or pleas from ordinary people. They are hoping that I will report 
their issues. But actually I can do nothing about this. Sometimes you are 
overwhelmed by such pleas. This is one of the reasons that I want to remove 
my job title from my microblog account. (Personal communications No. 8, 9 
May 2013) 
The same feeling was also shared by two of the editor’s colleagues in personal 
communications. From what has been shown above, it is highly arguable that grassroots 
voices have been activated through microblogging. Microblogs provide ordinary people 
with a platform to voice their concerns on their own initiatives, which had been rarely 
enabled through traditional media due to journalistic norms or constraints. However, such 
voices still need to be confined within the party-state’s limits. In spite of the party-state’s 
online censorship, as described above, ordinary people are still seeking remediate help 
from elites to get their voices heard by the media. Even if the person in the case directly 
sent his plea to the media by tagging the newspaper’s account, his plea is often ignored. 
Moreover, media workers consciously avoid receiving pleas from ordinary people by 
reducing their visibility online. Therefore, microblogging is far from opening up more 
space to empower ordinary people. Actually, a predominant number of participants in the 
fieldwork emphasised that journalists should be cautious about general online opinion. A 
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journalist working for broadcast media expressed her concern about reliance on microblogs 
as sources, 
I think it is very much questionable to closely follow up opinions on 
microblogs. First of all, it is hard to tell whether it is true. Secondly, opinions 
gathered on microblogs tend to be sensationalised and radicalised in order to 
gain eyeballs. You may easily be agitated by such seditious information. (F-6, 
a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 February 2012) 
Her concern was echoed in every focus group discussion. A journalist working for a party 
organ newspaper added, 
China is now experiencing dramatic social changes. Different vested interest 
groups express their concerns on microblogs. Journalists need to be detached 
and objective in dealing with various pleas. Popular microblog opinions are 
easily led by mobs and populists. Thus it poses a higher requirement for 
journalists to identify valuable sources on the microblogs. Journalists have to 
be cautious not to be coerced by populist ideas. (F-1, a party organ group, 
Beijing, 8 January 2012) 
Notably, journalists’ approach to sources on microblogs is further complicated by covert 
microblog propagandists. It is widely reported that the Chinese authorities hire online 
commentators to post favourable comments towards the party-state in an effort to sway 
online public opinion. The commentators are usually paid fifty cents in the Chinese 
currency (approximately £0.50) for each comment they post online. Thus they are named 
by internet users as the ‘fifty cents army/party’ (wu mao dang) (King et al., 2013; Shirk, in 
Shirk ed., 2011). It is estimated that there are 250 to 300 thousand workers for the ‘fifty 
cents army’ who monitor online opinions (King et al., 2013). Besides, commercial interest 
groups also employ online commentators for commercial purposes which are generally 
named as the ‘water army’ (shui jun). The difference between the ‘fifty cents army’ and 
the ‘water army’ is that the former requires more sophisticated communication skills 
whereas the latter requires fewer skills. Generally speaking, the ‘fifty cents army’ aims to 
post targeted information to subtly sway public opinion, meanwhile covering their true 
purposes. The job of the ‘water army’ is relatively easier. Many websites and microblogs 
have bulletin board services which rank hot topics by the numbers of clicks or reposts. The 
‘water army’ aims to keep certain topics on top of the list by multi-clicking, reposting, or 
making simple comments. As the comments are usually less informative, they are dubbed 
‘water’ which symbolises tasteless yet necessary. A journalist expressed her deep concern 
about online propagandists, 
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The year before I wrote an article about online propagandists. I was shocked by 
what they could achieve. I interviewed those who are normally known as the 
“water army”. They are quite familiar with the news production process. They 
created virtual hot topics to attract journalists’ attention. They even tailored 
their posts to appeal to different media organisations. If traditional media 
report their topics, they will get paid. This behaviour really disturbs your 
judgement. Journalists are not general internet users. I think journalists should 
use discretion in approaching online sources. (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 
8 January 2012) 
Microblogging also facilitates news production by making it easy to locate and contact 
interviewees online. A journalist said, 
Microblogging has extensively shortened the time required to produce news. In 
the past, when preparing a breaking story, you needed to locate the interviewee 
which is not usually an easy job. You probably need to go to his home or 
workplace which may be time consuming. But now, the most efficient way to 
locate somebody is by searching for his or her microblog to find out whether 
he or she has an account. In most of the cases, the answer is yes. Then you 
simply send an instant message to interview them. Additionally, nearly all the 
specialists you need have a microblog account. Thus you can conduct all your 
interviews online. (I-2, a senior editor, Beijing, 6 January 2012) 
The next part explores whether microblogging challenges control over traditional media 
and pushes traditional media forward to conduct more investigative reports. 
Microblogging and control over traditional media 
The Wenzhou high-speed train collision which caused 40 deaths and 191 injures is seen as 
a milestone in the development of microblogging. Approximately 26 million messages 
were posted within a week on microblogs and are believed to help break the censorship 
chains and boost traditional media to expose the government’s wrongdoings (Wines & 
Lafraniere, 2011). The online discontent expressed by ordinary internet users even ‘forced 
embarrassed officials to reverse themselves’ (ibid.). This view was shared by a small 
number of participants in the fieldwork. An editor working for a state-run broadcaster said, 
I think microblogging has pushed traditional media to go forward, taking off 
the shackles. A good case in point is the “high-speed train” incident. If the 
public’s discontent was not widely spread on microblogs, I do not think the 
traditional media would have put such tremendous effort into disclosing the 
wrongdoings. Just imagine if such an incident happened before microblogging 
was born, I think the traditional media would have followed the authority’s 
line. (F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012) 
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An editor working for a news website echoed this saying that messages, including on-
location pictures, can be instantly uploaded and virally spread on microblogs which makes 
it difficult to censor, 
As for traditional media, censorship works along with publication periods. One 
banning order once a day can easily keep traditional media silent as long as the 
order comes before going to print. But for microblogs, everything is different. 
There is no such a thing as publication period. You can post anytime. Of 
course, the government will delete posts. But internet users will continue 
posting and deletion will never end. (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 
January 2012) 
Conversely, studies show that deletion based on a key-word blocking system effectively 
prevents viral spread of information on microblogs (King et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2012). 
However, such studies may fail to take transformational discourse into account. As 
discussed in previous parts, internet users may change characters, use homophones or other 
tactics to get around keyword blocking. Additionally, blocked words can be embedded in 
pictures which can escape being detected by machine blocking mechanisms. Thus, manual 
censorship work is further required. It is reckoned that the Sina microblogging platform 
currently employs more than 4 thousand censors (China’s Internet: A Giant Cage, 2013) to 
read post by post and delete potentially sensitive posts (King et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2012). 
However, manual deletion cannot override millions of uploads. Furthermore, a strikingly 
increasing number of internet users write posts using mobiles. According to an annual 
survey by CNNIC, 65.5 per cent of all microbloggers, 20.2 million people, accessed 
microblogging on a mobile phone in 2012 (Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China, 2013), which facilitates quick information uploading and dissemination. The time 
lag between post and deletion allows certain sensitive information to spread. 
From the above discussion, it seems that the new technology has opened up some space for 
free speech and has pushed traditional media to go forward. However, over half of the 
participants in the fieldwork provided counter-claims. In the case of the ‘Wenzhou high-
speed train crash’, it was not the new platform, microblogging, that facilitated information 
spread, but the collaboration of the traditional media. A vice editor-in-chief of a mass-
appeal newspaper explained, 
In the case of the high-speed train crash, it was actually traditional media 
workers who banded together and cheered each other on to push the line 
forward. If you take a careful look at online opinions at that time, you may find 
that so-called public opinion is actually concentrated in two groups. One is 
from traditional media workers; the other is from public intellectuals. The two 
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are inextricably linked with each other. I think it is not the grassroots opinion 
crystallised online that boosted reports on traditional media. Actually, there 
were not many grassroots voices leading the trend. Instead, microblogging 
helps a peer group to grow. Traditional media are able to stand together to 
encourage each other stepping forward. (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 
January 2012) 
Furthermore, instead of opening up more space for freedom of expression, three focus 
group discussions tended to disagree that microblogging facilitates control over traditional 
media. A journalist working for a party-organ newspaper named the new control method as 
‘targeted killing’, 
Microblogging actually adds new surveillance methods. I have heard that some 
newspapers require journalists to update breaking news on microblogs. This 
aims to publish news as soon as possible. But this also helps propaganda 
departments to locate journalists immediately and respond to it as soon as 
possible. They then simply issue the banning order. And then there is no 
chance for the traditional media to report it. (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 
February 2012) 
Another participant working for broadcast media in the same focus group echoed,  
I deeply agree. In the past, propaganda departments were not that informative 
about breaking incidents. Thus we could broadcast news before they got to 
know. But it has been much easier for propaganda departments to monitor 
media activities since microblogging was introduced. Thanks to quick 
information dissemination on microblogs, propaganda departments thus react 
quickly by issuing the banning orders. (ibid.) 
Additionally, as journalists’ accounts on microblogging platforms are generally verified, 
this has further restrained their personal expression. A significant number of participants 
endeavoured to remove verification to free themselves. An editor working for a market-
driven newspaper said, 
I got invited to join a microblog by a colleague’s wife. My account was also 
verified by her when I first logged onto the microblog. But last year, like local 
propaganda department ordered all local media to list their employees’ 
microblog accounts. Just after I heard the order, I applied to remove my 
verification. Many of my colleagues also de-verified at that time. I also delete 
my job description on my microblog’. (Personal communications No. 8, 9 May 
2013) 
Even if a great number of journalists removed their verification to reduce their visibility, 
they are still caught by close scrutiny. A journalist working for a party-organ said, 
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I have already de-verified my account. Yet I still got caught by my superior 
once. I just posted a message saying that the food provided in a governmental 
canteen was not good. Later that day, I received a phone call from my superior 
asking me to delete my post because he thought this might cause potential 
trouble to our media. This is ridiculous. (F-6, a mixed group, Shanghai, 11 
February 2012)   
In the accounts by participants, all online expressions are under close watch regardless of 
whether the accounts are verified or not. The journalist quoted above added that ‘even if 
you do not use your real name and do not get verification, you are still under the eyes of 
your superiors or colleagues’ (ibid.). Another journalist in the same focus group 
commented by joking that ‘keeping yourself transparent online is the only way to escape 
from scrutiny’ (ibid.). However, another participant heckled ‘what is the point of opening a 
microblog account and using social media’ (ibid.). Actually, there are a considerable 
number of participants in the fieldwork who access microblogs in an effort to build up their 
own career fame. A representative comment is as follows, 
Honestly speaking, I feel a bit proud when I have more and more followers on 
my microblog. I also copy my articles to the microblog hoping younger readers 
will read my articles. So basically, I am using microblogging to build up my 
career. My microblog account got verified which helps audiences to locate me. 
But I need to be cautious about my online posts. You know, my superior is 
watching me. Propaganda officials are watching me. (Personal 
communications No. 9, 9 May 2013) 
As discussed above, views diverge regarding the impact of microblogging in opening up 
more spaces for traditional media. Different media types and job titles do not make any 
differences as to this point. In the final section of this chapter, this research intends to 
make some cautious conclusions regarding the changes brought forth by the internet in the 
Chinese context.  
6.3 Conclusion 
The internet was first introduced in to China in the mid 1990s and grew at a phenomenal 
rate. At present, China is second to the United States in terms of the size of its internet user 
base. The party-state conceptualises the internet in three dimensions: first, as a booster to 
the economy; second, as a threat to information control; and third, as a new platform to 
deliver party propaganda. Therefore, the party-state employs multiple controlling 
mechanisms to direct the development of the internet in its favour. 
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The controlling mechanisms have been explored based on a useful categorisation of four 
aspects: the rules, architecture, social norms, and the market. Most of the existing 
scholarship focuses on the architecture of the Chinese internet which has meant that other 
controlling forces have been overlooked. This research highlights the controlling forces 
such as the rules and regulations in an effort to fill in this vacuum. The Chinese authorities 
have issued over one hundred rules, regulations, and policies in total regarding the internet. 
The stipulation that has had the biggest impact on journalistic practices is the prohibition 
of privately owned news websites producing their own news content. Thus, these websites 
can only relay news from the established traditional media which extensively restrains the 
potential of the internet to unfold. In terms of the internet architecture, the Chinese 
authorities have made extreme efforts, including blocking key-words, GFW filtering, and 
channelling through portals, to build a virtual intranet which cages internet users in a 
authority-friendly online world. 
However, as a Chinese saying goes, suppression and resistance always go hand in hand 
(nali you yapo, nali jiuyou fankang), and internet users, including journalistic practitioners, 
employ tactics to circumvent control. In practice, privately owned news websites produce 
their news stories by working ‘undercover’. Such websites hire journalists under the guise 
of editors. Besides, they mainly work on entertainment, sports, and finance beats which are 
regarded as not relating to current affairs. The party-state turns a blind eye to the 
undercover journalists, as long as the party’s legitimacy has not been challenged. 
Another tactic that frequently emerged in the fieldwork was transforming expressions to 
avoid keyword blocking. The main tactics include using homophones, homographs, and 
synonyms to replace blocked words, which are further evolved to include spoof jokes, and 
satires to express discontent online. For example, the coined phrase, ‘兲朝’, literally 
meaning ‘bastard regime’, refers to the Chinese regime and has gained tremendous 
popularity online. These coded languages, neologisms, and satires exactly show an element 
of what Scott has called, the ‘hidden transcript’ (1990: xii). In analysing discourse 
employed by subordinate groups in Malaysia, Scott created the phrase ‘hidden transcript’. 
According to Scott, in a power-laden environment, ‘every subordinate group creates a 
“hidden transcript” that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the 
dominant’ (ibid.). Using hidden transcripts is actually a form of resistance behaviour 
towards domination. Using hidden transcripts in public brings profound psychological 
gains for individuals. Scott pointed out recovered dignity, self-relaxation, and self-
satisfaction as the main psychological gains (1990: 212-213). In the Chinese context, using 
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transformational discourse online also brings a sense of self-gratification. The underlying 
feeling is that the ‘little’ individual has the power to mock the ‘giant’ establishment. In the 
fieldwork, journalists quoting homophones often induced smiles or tacit consent among 
peers. However, this practice also induces pervasive cynicism. A vice editor-in-chief 
expressed his annoyance that he usually felt bored with loads of such online expressions 
and even bored with expressions on microblogs (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 
January 2012). According to him, such expressions changed nothing except inducing a 
laugh. ‘Powerless’ is a key word in his online surfing experience. This research argues that 
transformational discourse subverts the moral authority of the party-state to a certain 
extent. Meanwhile, cynicism among journalistic practitioners grows on by the pervasive 
usage of transformation discourse. 
Among all the new applications of Web 2.0, microblogging has had the biggest impact on 
traditional media practices in mainland China. The verification system employed by 
microblogging especially the Sina microblog has constructed a hierarchical society online. 
According to accounts from journalists, microblogs have changed the traditional way of 
approaching sources as at least half of sources are obtained from microblogs nowadays. A 
number of journalists proclaimed that this change in the media-source relationship has 
empowered ordinary people by allowing more grassroots voices to speak. Yet the 
grassroots voices need to meet two requirements to be heard. First, the voices need to be 
sanctioned by the authorities. After seeing the sources online, editors first sent the sources 
to beat journalists to ask for confirmation from the authorities (F-1, a party organ group, 
Beijing, 8 January 2012). In the fieldwork, journalists tend to share the same attitude 
towards online information: it is not suggested to simply use the online information, for 
there is too much fraudulent or fake information online (ibid.; F-2, a mass-appeal group, 
Beijing, 9 January 2012). A number of journalists argued that the working mechanism has 
changed. Sources are now coming more from the microblogs than coming directly from 
the authorities. Yet in order to become news, the sources still need to be checked by the 
authorities. Second, if the grassroots voices cannot get noticed by the authorities, they 
resort to unconventional measures, such as riots or demolition as in the case provided by 
journalists in the focus group (F-5, a news website group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). 
Otherwise, grassroots voices may also seek help from the elites, in the microblogs, big Vs. 
The grassroots voices need to be remediated by elites’ voices to be heard by the media.  
Thus, this research argues that the source power is still largely in the hands of the elite 
group. The change is that the elite group has expanded. In the past, the source power was 
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confined to the political elite group, namely, the officials. The microblog has brought other 
social elites, such as businessmen, actors, and writers into the spotlight. To some extent, 
they have become the new opinion leaders (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 2005). Their opinions, 
however, are still confined to the party’s realm considering the systematic online 
censorship mechanisms. Moreover, the mutual interests easily push the new elites to ally 
with the political establishment. Borrowing from Bourdieu’s field toolkit (2005; 2012), the 
microblog can be seen as a contested field with multiple forces competing for symbolic 
power employing different strategies. However, this field is still a structured power-laden 
field with ordinary people being less visible then elite groups. Political power is very much 
dominating the field either by exerting censorship to suppress or utilising propaganda, such 
as the online ‘fifty cents army’, to promote certain symbolic power. Economic power also 
plays a role in this field, such as by using the ‘water army’ to highlight symbols. 
As is widely claimed, public opinion which crystallises on microblogs forces traditional 
media outlets forward by taking off censorship shackles. Journalists’ views diverge here. 
Different media types and work titles do not make any difference at this point. A small 
number of journalists agreed with this claim. However, counter-claims argue that it is the 
opinions of the elite group crystallised on microblogs instead of a crystallisation of 
grassroots opinions. Furthermore, journalists and intellectuals are grouping together over 
the microblogging platform that helps collective ideas to grow. Additionally, a great 
number of journalists commented that the speed of online information dissemination also 
facilitates targeted censorship as the party-state can easily locate any journalist by 
microblog posts. An increasing number of journalists have therefore removed their account 
verification in order to reduce visibility. Nevertheless, this effort conflicts with the dream 
of building a stronger career reputation online. Exposing identity online extends 
journalists’ fame to the online world and attracts online audiences, but it also increases the 
possibility of being suppressed. Caught in this dilemma, journalists tend to exert self-
censorship which is actually a retreat. 
From what has been discussed above, one phenomenon is worth future examination: the 
association of different groups enabled by microblogging. As indicated by state 
corporatism theory (Unger & Chan, 1993), authoritarian regimes do not allow different 
professional groups to associate in an effort to fragment elite groups. The accounts from 
journalists show that microblogging serves as a platform to let a virtual journalistic 
community to grow. A vice editor-in-chief also suggested that he mainly followed media 
intellectuals on microblogs (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). By 
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following their posts, he learned new overseas information and began to reflect on the 
ethics of practising journalism. Although the evidence is still not strong enough to assert 
that an online journalistic community is emerging, it is worth noting for future research. 
After reporting the findings chapter by chapter, this research now turns to highlight a 
number of key findings and concludes by discussing the key factors driving contemporary 
Chinese journalism.
  
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The aim of this research has been to examine the changing journalistic culture in the 
contemporary Chinese context. It adopts three commonly employed perspectives, the 
political economy of communication, the sociology of journalism, and the cultural studies 
of journalism, to understand some of the key ethos guiding present day Chinese 
journalism. This thesis has reviewed the relevant scholarship within this area and 
discovered an entanglement of political, economic, cultural, and technological factors 
influencing journalistic practices.  
To conclude this research, the final chapter is composed of two parts. The first part 
outlines the contributions of this research to the understanding of the journalistic culture. 
The second part discusses two specific themes that underpin the enquiry of this research. 
The first theme centres on professionalism. Here, the meaning and application of 
professionalism in Chinese journalism are summarised. As outlined in the introduction, the 
second theme, an essential enquiry of this thesis, considers the role of Chinese traditional 
culture in shaping journalistic culture. Here, the discussion is open on to what extent 
culture plays a decisive role and how culture interacts with political, economic, and 
technological factors. 
The contribution of this research 
As outlined in the introduction, the main chapters of this research were structured around 
three aspects: the norms of practising journalism under media control, the problem of 
journalistic corruption, and the changes in journalism in the age of social media. Herein, 
the findings are highlighted in the same order. 
In terms of media control, most of the studies have touched on the methods of control 
(Brady, 2008; Hassid, 2008; Zhao, 2008). This research goes one step further by providing 
a detailed description regarding how ideological control works in newsrooms. This 
research has shown that the banning orders, which are issued to the media on a daily basis, 
are the primary filter (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) of news. Furthermore, this research has 
discovered that pre-publication censorship systematically exists, which counters the 
prevalent claim that thought control has been too effective to set up any pre-publication 
system (Brady, 2008; Hassid, 2008; Zhao, 2008; Link, 2002). Furthermore, the majority of 
studies argue that it is self-censorship that keeps the media in line (Zhao, 2008; de Burgh, 
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2003) and it stops there. This research has provided further insights into how self-
censorship has been transferred to all staff through the news production chain. They work 
as gatekeepers dodging political risks at different positions in the chain.  
Moreover, the research has provided more insights into factors that induce self-censorship. 
The uncertainty about permissible boundaries does exist and induces self-censorship as has 
been argued by Hassid (2008). Yet it is not a lack of written rules and media laws as 
advanced by Hassid (2008) but the cultural tradition of the ‘rule of man’ that results in 
uncertainty. Moreover, this research further claims that the lack of job security and the 
payment structure all contribute to self-censorship. Particularly, this research diverges 
from previous studies by claiming the active role of journalists in sustaining the control 
system instead of viewing them as victims. 
In terms of journalistic corruption, this research has uncovered more insights into the most 
prevalent forms of corruption: taking red-envelope-cash. This research has described the 
process of this transaction. More importantly, this research has revealed further insights 
into the roots of corruption through empowering the journalists to explain corrupt 
practices. They conceptualise the reasons behind journalistic corruption in four 
dimensions: cultural influences, the influences of working conditions, the influences from 
wider society, and the institutional factor. All the journalists in the fieldwork emphasised 
that corruption grows out of Chinese culture, which stresses connection and etiquette. 
Thus, this research has enriched the knowledge of factors inducing corrupt journalism, 
which locates the reason in the contradiction between the party’s control and the market 
imperative (Chen, L., 2007; Zhao, 1998). 
This research has provided fresh insight into the potential changes brought forth by new 
technology on the interactions between the party-state and the media. This research has 
shed more light on the impact of the law and regulations, which is lacking in the existing 
scholarship. This research has illustrated that the law and regulations have largely confined 
the potentialities of the internet. Furthermore, a number of studies have reported that 
internet users express their voices employing what this research calls transformational 
discourse, such as by using synonyms and homographs, to circumvent online censorship 
(King et al., 2013; Zhu, 2012; Shirk, in Shirk ed., 2011). This research develops from here 
arguing that this practice can be seen as passive resistance. Yet such practice brings forth 
pervasive cynicism among journalists. Thus, the resistance, in a way, strengthens the 
party’s control. Moreover, this research has provided an up-to-date analysis regarding 
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media-source relations in the digital age. The research argues that source power is still in 
the hands of an elite group. Additionally, contrary to the general view that the internet 
would democratise journalistic practices, this research has found that self-censorship still 
pervades the online world. 
To conclude, this research argues that self-censorship and corruption, which are 
systematically embedded in Chinese journalism, are key aspects of journalistic culture with 
Chinese characteristics. Thus, Chinese journalism is far from nearing a profession, which 
is delineated as follows. 
Professional operation instead of professionalism 
As discussed previously, professionalism is more than welcome in Chinese journalism 
both by journalistic practitioners and by scholars. Drawing upon the fieldwork data, 
professionalism (zhuan ye) is frequently referred to in Chinese newsrooms. Yet the 
professionalism with Chinese characteristics is anything other than Western journalistic 
professionalism. In the following discussion, this research uses its Chinese name, ‘zhuan 
ye’, in order to distinguish the two meanings. 
An editor-in-chief frequently stressed that beat journalists should be more ‘zhuan ye’ (I-6, 
an editor-in-chief, Beijing, 17 January 2012). In doing so, he expected the journalists to dig 
deeper in their reporting areas and to provide exclusive and in-depth reports. A vice editor-
in-chief also stressed that editors should be more ‘zhuan ye’ in assigning tasks and 
assembling articles on newsdesk meetings every day (I-1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 
January 2012). A number of journalists said that taking red-envelope-cash would not affect 
their professional news judgement (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-4, 
a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012). Herein, ‘zhuan ye’ is normally 
used as an adjective rather than a noun.  
This research argues that the ‘ism’ part of Western professionalism has been removed in 
the Chinese context. ‘Zhuan ye’ or professionalism only refers to operational standards and 
practical skills. Just as a vice editor-in-chief succinctly pointed out, ‘“zhuan ye” refers to a 
set of normative operational standards on which the journalistic practices are evaluated’ (I-
1, a vice editor-in-chief, Beijing, 5 January 2012). Viewing taking red-envelope-cash as 
not necessarily against ‘zhuan ye’, he confined ‘zhuan ye’ merely to practical skills (ibid.). 
In light of this, ‘zhuan ye’ held by journalists cannot thwart political intrusion not to 
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mention journalists who endeavoured to justify the intrusion. Moreover, ‘zhuan ye’ cannot 
work as an ideology policing the practitioners in the journalism domain as embodied in the 
corrupt behaviour. Furthermore, lacking an ideological basis, ‘zhuan ye’ cannot be used for 
self-interest. In the fieldwork, journalists constantly complained about their payment 
situation, but they never referred to ‘zhuan ye’ in bargaining for a higher rate of pay. To 
conclude, ‘zhuan ye’ in the Chinese context refers to professional operation rather than 
what is known as professionalism in the Western context. In this sense, journalism in 
contemporary China is a craft. 
Actually, many believed that the ‘ism’ part of professionalism, or in other words, ideology-
based professionalism, could never grow in China due to its unique cultural elements (Rui, 
2010; Lee, in de Burgh ed., 2005). To give just one example, journalists view themselves 
as intellectuals or the literati (Wu, 2009b; Lu & Pan, 2002). They hold an elitist view 
regarding ordinary people, viewing them as the masses. Thus, the role of media is to 
educate and enlighten rather than to inform (Ma, in Curran & Park eds., 1999; Cheek, 
1989). Serving the public is expediently replaced by educating the populace. This chapter 
now turns to the core enquiry underpinning this research, the role of culture in shaping 
journalism. 
The role of culture 
In the fieldwork, the journalists argued that Chinese culture plays a decisive role in shaping 
contemporary journalistic culture. To be specific, the ‘rule of man’ (ren zhi) cultivates self-
censorship. Moreover, connection and etiquette induce corrupt behaviour. One editor said, 
‘corruption cannot be eradicated in that it grows out of the culture’ (I-5, an editor-in-chief, 
Beijing, 11 January 2012). In the case of self-censorship, it seems that the ‘rule of man’ is 
a long tradition and leads to self-censorship. In the case of journalistic corruption, 
however, if the journalists’ accounts are taken for granted, one would expect that 
journalistic corruption is a chronic problem and exists throughout history. Yet as discussed 
in Chapter 2, journalists achieved a high level of journalistic ethics in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Moreover, journalistic corruption became a noted problem at the beginning of 1980s when 
media commercialisation started (Zhao, 1998). In addition, as everybody breathes the same 
cultural atmosphere, then one would expect that this would induce corruption in all 
newsrooms in China. This is, however, not the case. Almost all focus group discussions 
mentioned that the journalists working for the Caixin-China Economics & Finance 
magazine do not commit corruption (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012; F-
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2, a mass-appeal group, Beijing, 9 January 2012; F-3, a mixed group, Beijing, 13 January 
2012; F-4, a national broadcasting group, Beijing, 14 January 2012; F-5, a news website 
group, Beijing, 15 January 2012). It is suggested therefore, that elements of culture may 
have different influences in different aspects of journalism and it is necessary to invite 
more explorations to explain journalistic corruption.  
In examining corruption, Chen, L. (2007) reflected that he had located corruption in 
Chinese culture in previous research. After comparing with Korean journalism, he changed 
his conclusion. Korean society is also highly influenced by Confucianism, which 
emphasises connection and interpersonal relationships. Korean journalists accepted cash 
from sources in the late 1980s (ibid). Similarly, Korean journalists also excused 
themselves by referring to Confucian elements: connection and etiquette (ibid.). 
Nowadays, self-regulation helps to police journalists, and the behaviour of taking cash 
from sources has been phased out. Thus, Chen, L. argued that culture does not play a 
decisive role in journalistic corruption.  
Resonating with the argument of Chen, L., this research had originally attributed 
corruption to culture based on journalists’ own accounts. Yet with more desk research, the 
researcher has found that similar patterns of corruption had pervaded Western journalism 
and they also exist in various parts of the world in the present day. For example, the 
working conditions of American journalists in the latter 19th century are very similar to that 
of the Chinese journalist today. At that time, American journalists were underpaid and 
were either paid with ‘a fixed weekly salary or payment by space (by the amount of copy 
actually printed)’ (Baldasty 1992: 88). The latter payment is similar to the author’s 
remuneration payment, with both involving economic consideration. Besides, the 
American advertisers at that time regularly bribed reporters in exchange for favourable 
reports (Baldasty, 1992: 80). Many publishers also welcomed advertisements disguised as 
news (ibid.). In the present day, envelope journalism is a common problem for many 
developing countries (Schudson, 2011). Taking cash wrapped in envelopes from sources is 
also found in Ethiopian journalism (Lodamo & Skjerdal, 2009) and Philippine journalism 
(Shafer, 1990). In both cases, journalists referred to culture as the factor inducing 
corruption. The above discussion shows that different cultures have induced the same 
pattern of corruption and journalists all attributed corruption to culture.  
Additionally, in the case of Chinese culture, there are also cultural elements that help 
combat corruption. As discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional literati viewed themselves as 
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the elite class and represented the social consciousness. Self-regarded as intellectuals or the 
literati, journalists are also embodiments of social consciousness. One senior journalist said 
of journalistic corruption: ‘the social consciousness has rotted away’ (Personal 
communications No. 2, on multiple days). Here, this research argues that culture does not 
play a decisive role in Chinese journalistic corruption but that certain elements of culture 
have been selected by journalists as a convenient reason to excuse themselves. Thus, it is 
necessary to explore the whole picture of reasons behind pervasive corrupt practices. 
Returning to the fieldwork data, journalists referred to corruption as the de facto tacit rule 
(qian guize). Sociologists (Ji, 2012; Whyte & Parish, 1984) explained that a tacit rule 
emerges when the formal rule is lacking. In sociological terms, it is named as the informal 
relation (fei zhengshi guanxi), being the opposite of the formal relation (zhengshi guanxi) 
that is shaped by bureaucracy. The informal relation works to supplement the formal 
relation (ibid.). If the formal relation is unstable or incomplete, the informal relation thus 
emerges. Parish (1973) has found that the Chinese bureaucracy was relatively stable before 
the Cultural Revolution. Yet the Cultural Revolution virtually broke down the bureaucratic 
system. Thus, ordinary people could not rely only on the bureaucratically formed relation, 
in other words, the formal relation. They turned to rely on informal relations, such as 
kinship, classmate-ship, and so forth. After the Cultural Revolution, the bureaucracy 
experienced rebuilding and was followed by the economic reforms. Since then the benefits 
and resources have begun to be allocated by the bureaucratic system. But the available 
resources were relatively scarce in the early stages of economic reform (Whyte & Parish, 
1984), and ordinary people approached the officials who controlled the resources through 
informal relations in order to get privilege access to resources. To a certain extent, 
connections served as a coordinating mechanism that function outside of the market and 
the political system (Walder, 1986). 
Sociological studies are insightful in analysing Chinese journalistic corruption. After 
accepting money from sources, journalists and sources have set up informal relations. The 
formal relation is hard to establish between the two in that journalists possess an 
advantageous position. Just as journalists said in the fieldwork, journalism holds the 
publicity power (F-1, a party organ group, Beijing, 8 January 2012), and this power has 
been kept in scarce supply in China. The party-state monopolises the media and prohibits 
private capital from investing into it. Although media titles are proliferating, the daily 
propaganda directives consume a large portion of airtime and newspaper pages. Thus, the 
reporting space is limited. Through the informal relation, the sources are thus able to 
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access scarce publicity power, which was monopolised by the party-state. In this sense, the 
source spectrum has been widened. Actually, it was a foreign company that started paying 
journalists who came to the press conference in the early 1980s (Chen, L., 2007; Zhao, 
1998). In the old frame of party journalism, foreign companies find it extremely difficult to 
attract the spotlight. By providing money to journalists, the non-party agents can get access 
to the media. 
Furthermore, the profits of media are seriously affected by party policies and interventions. 
As discussed previously, media’s businesses are confined geographically. For example, the 
newspapers based in Beijing are not allowed to merge with newspapers based in Tianjin. 
Besides, media are arbitrarily ordered by propaganda officials to buy unprofitable 
businesses. Moreover, the propaganda reports are normally boring which may affect 
media’s sales. Additionally, private investment into media is forbidden. These all hit 
media’s profits. Thus, the media are under economic pressure to keep operating expenses 
low and tight with staff. The pervasive corruption, in a way, has subsidised the media by 
providing financial support to media staff. In this sense, corruption is supplementary to the 
media’s financial resources. This explains why red-envelope-cash is generally regarded as 
a part of a journalist’s income.  
As discussed previously, journalistic corruption is not only confined to China. Sociological 
research also finds that relying on the informal relation to obtain resources is a worldwide 
practice (Ji, 2012). However, it is particularly prominent in China. This research argues 
that Chinese culture fuels the growth of the informal relation but political factors play a 
key role. In the Chinese context, cultural factors such as connection (guan xi), 
particularistic relations, gift exchanging, and banqueting create an environment in which 
the line between acceptable social interactions and corruption is blurred and easily crossed 
(Wedeman, 2012). Pervasive corruption may push journalists to ally with the ruling class 
in impeding transparency and democracy (Zhao, 2008). The financial rewards through 
corruption may also defer journalists’ aspirations towards journalistic independence. In 
light of this, corruption strengthens media control.  
Some of the findings of this research accord with the existing theories discussed in Chapter 
1 and others do not. A number of key scholars on Chinese media control claim that there is 
no formal and systematic pre-publication censorship in China (Brady, 2008; Hassid, 2008; 
Zhao, 2008; Link, 2002). Hassid (2008) further argues that there is no need to launch pre-
publication censorship organs, since political education and pervasive indoctrination 
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activities can keep the media in line. This evidence has emerged from the fieldwork 
showing that pre-publication censorship exists systematically in the form of ‘submission 
for review’. Furthermore, Link (2002) and Hassid (2008) attribute self-censorship to 
uncertainty and vagueness in media control methods and punishment. Yet based on 
journalists’ own accounts, self-censorship is conducted primarily according to the 
knowledge of banning orders, which clearly define taboo topics. Contrary to the general 
view that journalists are victims of censorship, this research finds that journalists 
endeavour to justify censorship and media control. Journalists argue that censorship or 
propaganda is indispensible in processing cross-national information, which is similar to 
the contested argument of Ellul (1965). That is, the inability to process international 
information creates the need for propaganda. 
The survey findings discussed in Chapter 1 have reported that journalists were rather 
satisfied with their job conditions in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Yet this research has 
found that journalists tend to view their jobs as transitional ones. They do not have long-
term career goals and intend to leave journalism in their thirties or early forties. 
Furthermore, echoing the survey findings, journalistic corruption pervades Chinese 
journalism. Zhao (1998) attributes corruption to the contradiction between political 
imperatives and commercial incentives simultaneously operated by the media. This 
research further adds a cultural dimension and employs a sociological view in analysing 
the roots of corruption.  
In conclusion, this research argues for a dynamic view in assessing the role of culture in 
shaping journalism. As discussed previously, elements of culture do not always play a 
leading role. In the case of self-censorship, the cultural tradition of the ‘rule of man’ does 
play a key role. In terms of journalistic corruption, culture facilitates corrupt behaviour, but 
political forces play the dominant role. 
Further research may develop from here in exploring the future of journalistic corruption 
as well as self-censorship. It is hard to tell whether corruption and self-censorship are 
going to be a long-term journalistic pattern in the Chinese context. As pointed out above, 
this enquiry is largely dependent on Chinese politics and can be translated into the 
fundamental question of whether China can successfully sustain its political system. China 
has proved itself to be more capable of adjusting the authoritarian system to meet new 
social changes (Ljunggren, 2010) than many had predicted. Thus, Chinese authoritarianism 
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is rather adaptive. Its future direction can be expressed by the old cliché that only time will 
tell. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Individual interview list 
 
 
Code  Time  Place  Job description 
I-1 5 January 
2012 
Beijing A vice editor-in-chief of a mass-appeal newspaper in Beijing 
I-2 6 January 
2012 
Beijing A senior editor in finance news desk of a news website based in 
Beijing 
I-3 6 January 
2012 
Beijing A senior editor in economic and finance channel of a national 
broadcasting 
I-4 9 January 
2012 
Beijing A senior political journalist of a mass-appeal newspaper in 
Beijing 
I-5 11 
January 
2012 
Beijing An editor-in-chief of a news magazine 
I-6 17 
January 
2012 
Beijing An editor-in-chief of a mass-appeal newspaper in Beijing 
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Appendix II: Focus group interview list 
Code  Time  Place  Number of  
participants 
Composition  
F-1 8 
January 
2012 
Beijing  5 A party organ group, the participants work 
for a national party organ press 
F-2 9 
January 
2012 
Beijing  6 A mass-appeal group, the participants are 
from a mass-appeal newspaper in Beijing  
F-3 13 
January 
2012 
Beijing 3  A mixed group, the participants are from 
the state-run news agency, a leading 
national newspaper based in Beijing, and a 
leading national weekly newspaper based 
in Guangzhou 
F-4 14 
January 
2012 
Beijing  4 A national broadcasting group, the 
participants are from a national 
broadcasting 
F-5 15 
January 
2012 
Beijing 6 A news website group, the participants are 
working for news websites 
F-6 11 
February 
2012 
Shanghai 4 A mixed group, the participants are based 
in Shanghai, working for TV, Radio, a 
news website and a newspaper. 
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Appendix III: Personal contact list 
Code Time  Contact method Job description 
Personal 
communications No.1 
On 
multiple 
days 
Face-to-face, 
online, Skype 
video call 
A senior journalist working for a 
party organ based in Beijing 
Personal 
communications No. 
2 
On 
multiple 
days 
Face-to-face and 
online 
A senior journalist working for a 
mass-appeal newspaper based in 
Beijing 
Personal 
communications No. 
3 
On 
multiple 
days 
Face-to-face, 
online, Skype 
video call 
A journalist working for a mass-
appeal newspaper based in 
Beijing 
Personal 
communications No. 
4 
On 
multiple 
days 
Face-to-face A vice editor-in-chief of a mass-
appeal newspaper based in 
Beijing 
Personal 
communication No. 5 
14 January 
2012 
Face-to-face A journalist working for a mass-
appeal newspaper based in 
Beijing 
Personal 
communications No. 
6 
15 January 
2012 
Face-to-face A journalist working for a party 
organ based in Beijing 
Personal 
communications No. 
7 
On 
multiple 
days 
Online A journalist working for a party-
organ newspaper based in 
Shanghai  
Personal 
communications No. 
8 
9 May 
2013 
Email A senior editor working for a 
mass-appeal newspaper in 
Beijing 
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Personal 
communications No. 
9 
9 May 
2013 
Email A senior journalist working for a 
mass-appeal newspaper in 
Beijing 
Personal 
communications No. 
10 
24 March 
2013  
Online A vice editor-in-chief working 
for a mass-appeal newspaper in 
Beijing 
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Appendix IV: Consent form 
Interview consent form 
Project title: Practising journalism in contemporary mainland China: media control, 
journalistic corruption, and the social media 
Researcher: Xu, Di 
Data protection statement 
The data is collected as part of a research project regarding journalistic culture in 
contemporary mainland China for a PhD thesis in the Department of Theatre Film and 
Television of the University of Glasgow. The information that you supply will only be 
accessed by authorised persons of the University of Glasgow and will only be used for 
research purpose. 
Consent to being interviewed 
Name:                                    Date:  
I hereby give consent to the information discussed in the interview being used in Xu, Di’s 
research:  Yes/No 
I would like to keep my name anonymous:  Yes/No 
I would like to keep the media organisation that I work for confidential: Yes/No 
Signature:                              Date: 
If you have any concerns regarding this project then you may contact my supervisors: 
Professor Philip Schlesinger                                      Professor Raymond Boyle 
Centre for Cultural Policy Research                          Centre for Cultural Policy Research 
University of Glasgow                                               University of Glasgow 
Glasgow G12 8QQ                                                     Glasgow G12 8QQ 
Philip.Schlesinger@glasgow.ac.uk                            Raymond.Boyle@glasgow.ac.uk  
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Appendix V: Registration form 
1. Your sex:   
Male   
Female   
N/A 
2. Your age: 
17 and under 
18-20 
21-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60 and above 
3. The highest degree that you have had: 
High school and under 
College 
Undergraduate 
Master 
PhD 
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Others: please indicate 
4. The type of the media that you work for: 
Broadcasting 
Party organ press 
Mass-appeal press 
Special interests press 
News website 
Others: please indicate 
5. Your political affiliation: 
Member of the Chinese Communist Party 
Member of the Democratic Parties 
Not enrolled in any political parties 
Others: please indicate 
6. The working place you based in: 
Beijing 
Shanghai 
7. Please indicate your job title: 
 
8. Your contact information: 
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Name:  
Email: 
Tel: 
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Appendix VI: Interview guide 
Name: 
Job title: 
Organisation: 
Date: 
Place: 
Introduction of the project regarding the aims of the research, anonymity, and consent. 
Warm up phase: 
1. Interviewee’s background 
2. Interviewee’s incentive to enter into journalism  
3. Job description 
First phase: 
1. The usage of ‘zhuan ye’ in daily news practice 
2. What attributes are often attached to ‘zhuan ye’? 
Second phase: 
1. The kinds of orders from the party-state in daily practice. In what forms? 
2. How to react to the orders? 
3. Explain the factors that have triggered the self-censorship. 
Third phase: 
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1. Explain the situations that involving transaction in news practice. In what forms? 
2. How to define journalistic corruption? 
3. Explain the reasons behind the practices that have mentioned. 
Fourth phase: 
1. The usage of the new media in your daily practice. In what ways? 
2. Has the new media brought changes to the traditional media? In what ways? 
2. Has the news media helped changing the boundary of permissible reporting? 
Ending phase: 
1. Summary of what has been discussed. 
2. Anything that the interviewees intend to bring up. 
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